Before the 2013 legislative session, the state was named the most
pro-life of all on the basis of its laws, and the overwhelming majorities both
laws and resolutions alike that protect life receive annually from legislators attest
to the deep enculturation that reverence for life has in Louisiana. But more
can be done, and the starting point to derive optimal policy in this area is to
emulate the conceptualization behind smoking restrictions.
The two issue areas share many similarities. Both acts are considered
threats to the life of those who engage in the practice and therefore deserve
heavy regulation, yet with the presumption that the activity is legal under
certain conditions. The extensive regulation extends not just to individual
actions, but also to the those of the suppliers.
But in a couple of ways, there is on the basis of the risk and danger
involved fewer restrictions to abortion than there are to smoking. For one,
while there is mild association of smoking with mortality, and even less
between mortality and contact with smoke, this assumed indirectness is replaced
by the very direct significant correlation between abortion and mortality for
the one on which it is performed – some women are killed by the procedure – and
a perfect, very direct correlation on the unborn human involved – they are
killed; indeed, that is the entire intent. Also, regulations on tobacco use for
some, minors, are absolute in prohibition, while in all states there are no
absolutes for abortion; it is even possible in some places to have a
partial-birth abortion under certain circumstances.
In both instances, given existing jurisprudence, the prevailing philosophy
should be that the activity is recognized as legal but that the state may
regulate it to the point that it discourages this highly, justified as engaging
in it creates burdens on individuals other than those engaging in the behavior and
may bring harm to that individual user. Yet it seems tobacco regulation is
proportionally more zealous than that over abortion.
Keeping this framework in mind, going forward the state should adopt
two legal changes. One, it should apply a tax on every attempted abortion. Not
only does it already tax tobacco as a way to discourage its use, but it has a
history of taxing users for their access to medical services; just this year it
passed constitutional amendments for voter review next year that would add to
that. If abortion is considered legally a medical service, then this is a
proper step and the proceeds from which can be used for regulation of the five
(a sixth is on the way) abortion mills in the state.
This would increase the cost of provision. But if the mills truly are
there to perform a public service and truly care about women’s health, and it’s
not all about the money to them, perhaps they will absorb that higher cost
(which cannot be paid by state public funds). It also should spur behavior
modification of women who think nothing of the consequences to human life when
they put themselves in position to conceive.
Also, depending on how the constitutionality of North Dakota’s new law
work out, standards should be changed to prohibit elective abortion on the
basis of sex selection, fetal anomaly, or means of conception. Unborn humans
should not be killed just because they don’t have the right specific equipment or
their general equipment is damaged. While a case can be made to allow abortion
in instances where there is agreement that the baby would not survive long
outside of the womb without extreme medical intervention, a human with a
genetic defect that likely will cause medical problems from mild to severe
later in life should have the chance to decide on his own whether to live and
not have that decision made by others. (As for the potential higher medical
costs to the public that may result, Obamacare advocates promise that won’t be
an issue, with its increased coverage, no preexisting conditions excluded,
rates based on that disability not allowed, and its miraculous bending of the
cost curve.)
While conception through rape or incest to an unwilling mother may
appear unnecessarily punitive to an innocent victim, that crime produces
victims is an inescapable fact of life. Some crime victims live the rest of
their lives disabled because of a selfish, violent act. Such unfortunate
women/girls will have at least nine months of physical effects, and possibly longer,
because of a forced pregnancy. But balancing that against a human life, which
should not be made worthless and disposable just because of means of conception,
dictates on a moral basis that for some the after-effects of the crime will have
to continue months longer than they like. Here, since harm is done either way we
must choose to avoid the greater of the two. And with the evolution of pharmaceuticals
that can prevent conception quickly after the attempt and with most victims
reporting their violations immediately to authorities, these would be rare
cases.
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