Rep. Bobby Jindal slowly but surely has been giving details about what he would do as Louisiana governor, and as he does it’s becoming clear that had Jindal been governor during the last legislative session things would have gone very differently, and would continue to do so during his term.
Perhaps the two highest-profile pieces of legislation that failed in the waning days of the session dealt with substantially increased financial disclosure by public officials and dedicating revenues from transportation-related uses to building and maintenance of transportation projects. The first lost because legislators wanted to make a show of reform but didn’t really want it, while the second would have made legislators unable to fund things like about 1,200 new state jobs in a state which has shrunk in population and in giving pay raises to vacant positions.
Enjoying high positive name recognition and commanding leads in polls, Jindal has had the luxury (much to the chagrin of all other candidates) of not having to say much specifically about his platform – following the old rule of if it isn’t broken, don’t try to fix it. But in an electoral environment screaming for change, candidates must provide examples of radical change they wish to pursue to stay at the crest of this wave and to empower themselves with a perceived mandate if winning the office.
8.8.07
Report reiterates Dems take hit on LA statewide elections
The latest report from the Louisiana Recovery Authority gives an idea of the magnitude of displacement of Louisiana citizens from the 2005 hurricane disasters – and, from an electoral perspective, the information contained doesn’t bring a lot of cheer if you are a politician with a last name like Landrieu.
This report does it best to come up with, among other things, a net migration total out of affected parishes and gives a good idea how many left the state. It shows really only three parishes had substantial out-migrations (in terms of proportion of population) from the 2005-06 period: Orleans estimated at 246,390, St. Bernard at 50,000, and Jefferson at 84,697. But if we want to know the electoral impact of this, we need to figure out how many left the state, and what are their partisan affiliations.
The report does give a rough guide to how many left the state from each parish as it tracked how many left the 18-parish area of study. However, it did not attempt specifically to find out whether those who left that area also left the state; i.e., an estimated 6,000 evacuees ended up in Caddo Parish. Still, for each parish it does give an estimate and for Orleans and St. Bernard does give some idea what proportion left the state.
It notes that 31 percent of total out-migrants from Orleans ended up in several large non-Louisiana counties and 23 percent in one of East Baton Rouge, Jefferson, or St. Tammany Parishes. Let’s assume half of the remaining 46 percent went out of state as well as the report notes federal government organized evacuations common from Orleans often went out of state.
For St. Bernard, only 9 percent identifiably went out of state while the “other” category comprised 36 percent. Since as is noted most St. Bernard evacuations were self-planned, let’s assumed only a third of that figure went out of state. Jefferson’s figures by destination were not released but let’s make the assumption for it that one-fourth total left the state.
Thus, for our purposes, the numbers that left the state from Orleans are 133,051, for St Bernard 10,500, and for Jefferson 21,174. Taking voting registration figures at the beginning of 2006 and assuming (probably understating the actual Democrat losses given poorer people were slightly more likely to have fled) people left their parishes in proportion to the partisan distribution, we can figure out numbers of black Democrats, white Democrats, and Republicans who have left (and will assume other races and other party voters are lost equally by the parties).
In Orleans, unadjusted for registration (because we are using total population figures), there would be 69,485 lost black Democrats. Adjusting for registration (only 55 percent of blacks were according to 2005 population figures), this means 38,328. For white Democrats and all Republicans (67.5 percent registered), the figures are 12,124 and 10,777. Using the same kind of procedure for St. Bernard and Jefferson, their figures are, respectively, 358, 3,482 and 1,457, and 1,543, 3,507, and 3,757. (Let’s also assume any other parish’s out-of-state migrants wash evenly between the major parties).
So, it all adds up to a net Democrat voter loss of 43,351. A final adjustment, which is that historically in governor’s races we can expect that, of those that don’t show up at the polls, roughly 2 percent of them have voted absentee and 40 percent of them wouldn’t have voted anyway, estimates that 25,143 fewer Democrat votes relative to Republican ones can be expected using these numbers (assuming party defectors from their registrations wash out). Since we are talking about 2006 data, the figure probably has gone down slightly, but also keep in mind that the estimates make assumptions that probably understate the Democrat losses.
Depending on your contest, such as if you’re Sen. Mary Landrieu or Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu, this could be from 3.5 to 3.7 percent of your total vote disappearing relative to what you could have gotten. And given that Landrieu won her last contest by about 44,000 votes, and Landrieu won his without a runoff by about 77,000, this reality will have to be factored into theirs and all other statewide candidates’ calculations for the next several years.
This report does it best to come up with, among other things, a net migration total out of affected parishes and gives a good idea how many left the state. It shows really only three parishes had substantial out-migrations (in terms of proportion of population) from the 2005-06 period: Orleans estimated at 246,390, St. Bernard at 50,000, and Jefferson at 84,697. But if we want to know the electoral impact of this, we need to figure out how many left the state, and what are their partisan affiliations.
The report does give a rough guide to how many left the state from each parish as it tracked how many left the 18-parish area of study. However, it did not attempt specifically to find out whether those who left that area also left the state; i.e., an estimated 6,000 evacuees ended up in Caddo Parish. Still, for each parish it does give an estimate and for Orleans and St. Bernard does give some idea what proportion left the state.
It notes that 31 percent of total out-migrants from Orleans ended up in several large non-Louisiana counties and 23 percent in one of East Baton Rouge, Jefferson, or St. Tammany Parishes. Let’s assume half of the remaining 46 percent went out of state as well as the report notes federal government organized evacuations common from Orleans often went out of state.
For St. Bernard, only 9 percent identifiably went out of state while the “other” category comprised 36 percent. Since as is noted most St. Bernard evacuations were self-planned, let’s assumed only a third of that figure went out of state. Jefferson’s figures by destination were not released but let’s make the assumption for it that one-fourth total left the state.
Thus, for our purposes, the numbers that left the state from Orleans are 133,051, for St Bernard 10,500, and for Jefferson 21,174. Taking voting registration figures at the beginning of 2006 and assuming (probably understating the actual Democrat losses given poorer people were slightly more likely to have fled) people left their parishes in proportion to the partisan distribution, we can figure out numbers of black Democrats, white Democrats, and Republicans who have left (and will assume other races and other party voters are lost equally by the parties).
In Orleans, unadjusted for registration (because we are using total population figures), there would be 69,485 lost black Democrats. Adjusting for registration (only 55 percent of blacks were according to 2005 population figures), this means 38,328. For white Democrats and all Republicans (67.5 percent registered), the figures are 12,124 and 10,777. Using the same kind of procedure for St. Bernard and Jefferson, their figures are, respectively, 358, 3,482 and 1,457, and 1,543, 3,507, and 3,757. (Let’s also assume any other parish’s out-of-state migrants wash evenly between the major parties).
So, it all adds up to a net Democrat voter loss of 43,351. A final adjustment, which is that historically in governor’s races we can expect that, of those that don’t show up at the polls, roughly 2 percent of them have voted absentee and 40 percent of them wouldn’t have voted anyway, estimates that 25,143 fewer Democrat votes relative to Republican ones can be expected using these numbers (assuming party defectors from their registrations wash out). Since we are talking about 2006 data, the figure probably has gone down slightly, but also keep in mind that the estimates make assumptions that probably understate the Democrat losses.
Depending on your contest, such as if you’re Sen. Mary Landrieu or Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu, this could be from 3.5 to 3.7 percent of your total vote disappearing relative to what you could have gotten. And given that Landrieu won her last contest by about 44,000 votes, and Landrieu won his without a runoff by about 77,000, this reality will have to be factored into theirs and all other statewide candidates’ calculations for the next several years.
7.8.07
Canning July elections sensible but will face resistance
A couple of sessions ago the Louisiana Legislature did the right thing in getting rid of (on the second try after a veto by Gov. Kathleen Blanco) the January state/local election date. Before his wreck, Sec. of State Jay Dardenne suggested the same treatment for the July date, and the reasons for that are much the same as compelled elimination of the January date.
These dates are established to allow local governments to bring forth ballot propositions, almost always dealing with tax matters. To conduct an election it costs the state money, at least $500,000 a pop, and local governments also must contribute, so consolidating elections around another date would save taxpayer dollars. Three other slots, March/April, October, and November, are available (a fourth, February, if you live in Orleans Parish) and there are few situations where a government would need money so quickly that it couldn’t wait at most a half-year for an election.
But what if something of an emergency nature did come up? Well, R.S. 18:402(F)(7) already accounts for that, allowing a local government to call an election with two-thirds concurrence of the State Bond Commission. Further, July elections historically have abysmal turnouts, never higher than 11 percent this millennium with the most recent barely half of that, making them even less-cost effective.
However, expect resistance from local governments. They bank on low turnouts to help pass taxing measures which typically redistribute taxpayers’ funds from a large pool to a small group. They anticipate that among the group that will receive the money (employees from salary increases, contracting interests for construction, organizations that get dedicated funds, etc.) very high turnout in favor will be enough to outpace scattered opposition from the low proportion of the general public that will vote because usually these measures stand alone or have just a few grouped together, with no high-stimulus matters or electoral contests also on the ballot to encourage turnout.
Given its extra cost and the small effort it would take local governments to plan ahead, there’s no logical justification to keep the July date. Yet if Dardenne and/or others push this, look for local governments to find all sorts of political considerations to oppose this very sensible idea.
These dates are established to allow local governments to bring forth ballot propositions, almost always dealing with tax matters. To conduct an election it costs the state money, at least $500,000 a pop, and local governments also must contribute, so consolidating elections around another date would save taxpayer dollars. Three other slots, March/April, October, and November, are available (a fourth, February, if you live in Orleans Parish) and there are few situations where a government would need money so quickly that it couldn’t wait at most a half-year for an election.
But what if something of an emergency nature did come up? Well, R.S. 18:402(F)(7) already accounts for that, allowing a local government to call an election with two-thirds concurrence of the State Bond Commission. Further, July elections historically have abysmal turnouts, never higher than 11 percent this millennium with the most recent barely half of that, making them even less-cost effective.
However, expect resistance from local governments. They bank on low turnouts to help pass taxing measures which typically redistribute taxpayers’ funds from a large pool to a small group. They anticipate that among the group that will receive the money (employees from salary increases, contracting interests for construction, organizations that get dedicated funds, etc.) very high turnout in favor will be enough to outpace scattered opposition from the low proportion of the general public that will vote because usually these measures stand alone or have just a few grouped together, with no high-stimulus matters or electoral contests also on the ballot to encourage turnout.
Given its extra cost and the small effort it would take local governments to plan ahead, there’s no logical justification to keep the July date. Yet if Dardenne and/or others push this, look for local governments to find all sorts of political considerations to oppose this very sensible idea.
6.8.07
Making LA elections ideological best serves GOP
Some months ago I presented a paper that showed Louisiana Republicans had a decent chance to take over the state House in this fall elections, but I cautioned that this potential only would be realized if the party could find good candidates that campaigned adequately. Some recent media comments underscore the validity of these points seven months later, only a little more than two months before the primary elections.
Director of a political action committee formed to bring about this exact result, John Diez noted the party was being hampered by a lack of “bench” – Republicans in lower-level offices that would have the ability to step up and compete effectively in districts amenable to Republican candidates. The main reason behind this is Republican strength in the electorate has lagged translation into offices at all levels, but the reasons for this lag are what really explain the overall difficulty and presents the solution to it.
First, the electoral nonpartisan blanket primary system has retarded GOP growth because it failed to penalize voters who insisted on calling themselves Democrats who typically voted for Republican candidates. Any psychological advantage can be crucial in electoral politics, and by not preventing people who usually want to vote for Republican candidates from registering as Democrats hampers the party as it increases slightly predisposition to vote Democrat. To some degree this will be solved by the coming of closed primaries starting next year for federal offices, when those who mostly vote Republican now will find they cannot choose Republican candidates unless they register as Republicans, breaking the last bonds of loyalty they may feel to Democrat candidates at all levels.
Second, Louisiana has an immature political culture in the sense that its political discourse and evaluation of ideas and candidates is too personalistic and not ideological enough. Compared to other states, evaluation of candidates overweighs on who is the person running and underweighs on the issue preferences expressed by those candidates. This creates the potential for candidates to display a persona designed to obscure ideological leanings that are incongruent with the public policy wishes of a majority in their districts.
In Louisiana, this often is done by advertising how much “stuff” the candidate pledges to cart back from Baton Rouge, failing to inform voters that about anybody can do that and it is “stuff” bought by money wrested from the people in the first place. Or, as long-time practitioner of this tactic state Rep. Charlie DeWitt noted, constituencies that call themselves conservative also embrace and even demand the considerable benefits they receive from government “investment.”
The key to both strengthening the bench and to mature the electorate is the same: make Louisiana elections more ideological in nature. Simply, relative to both fact and logic, intellectually conservatism beats liberalism hands down. What the Louisiana GOP has to do is to help cultivate candidates who are conservatives that can express sufficiently to the electorate this fundamental ideological difference between themselves and their Democrat opponents. And by emphasizing ideology, it will attract as candidates those turned off from electoral politics in the state who to date have seen elective service as little more than a bidding war for who can deliver the most “stuff.”
In short, the GOP maximizes its ability to win seats this fall by making as ideological as possible this election and in skillfully communicating this to an electorate inexperienced in thinking in these terms. The trend change and history are on Republicans’ side, but their own actions could hinder or help things along.
Director of a political action committee formed to bring about this exact result, John Diez noted the party was being hampered by a lack of “bench” – Republicans in lower-level offices that would have the ability to step up and compete effectively in districts amenable to Republican candidates. The main reason behind this is Republican strength in the electorate has lagged translation into offices at all levels, but the reasons for this lag are what really explain the overall difficulty and presents the solution to it.
First, the electoral nonpartisan blanket primary system has retarded GOP growth because it failed to penalize voters who insisted on calling themselves Democrats who typically voted for Republican candidates. Any psychological advantage can be crucial in electoral politics, and by not preventing people who usually want to vote for Republican candidates from registering as Democrats hampers the party as it increases slightly predisposition to vote Democrat. To some degree this will be solved by the coming of closed primaries starting next year for federal offices, when those who mostly vote Republican now will find they cannot choose Republican candidates unless they register as Republicans, breaking the last bonds of loyalty they may feel to Democrat candidates at all levels.
Second, Louisiana has an immature political culture in the sense that its political discourse and evaluation of ideas and candidates is too personalistic and not ideological enough. Compared to other states, evaluation of candidates overweighs on who is the person running and underweighs on the issue preferences expressed by those candidates. This creates the potential for candidates to display a persona designed to obscure ideological leanings that are incongruent with the public policy wishes of a majority in their districts.
In Louisiana, this often is done by advertising how much “stuff” the candidate pledges to cart back from Baton Rouge, failing to inform voters that about anybody can do that and it is “stuff” bought by money wrested from the people in the first place. Or, as long-time practitioner of this tactic state Rep. Charlie DeWitt noted, constituencies that call themselves conservative also embrace and even demand the considerable benefits they receive from government “investment.”
The key to both strengthening the bench and to mature the electorate is the same: make Louisiana elections more ideological in nature. Simply, relative to both fact and logic, intellectually conservatism beats liberalism hands down. What the Louisiana GOP has to do is to help cultivate candidates who are conservatives that can express sufficiently to the electorate this fundamental ideological difference between themselves and their Democrat opponents. And by emphasizing ideology, it will attract as candidates those turned off from electoral politics in the state who to date have seen elective service as little more than a bidding war for who can deliver the most “stuff.”
In short, the GOP maximizes its ability to win seats this fall by making as ideological as possible this election and in skillfully communicating this to an electorate inexperienced in thinking in these terms. The trend change and history are on Republicans’ side, but their own actions could hinder or help things along.
5.8.07
Whatever the reason, Hill reporting will be missed
I may never write a column about a journalist’s retirement again, but the point of this space is to try to get behind the headlines and in this instance I think I can offer something here to readers about a man who has had a not insignificant impact on Louisiana politics – and one who some have come to vilify – for now the chief capital correspondent of Louisiana Gannett News Service, John Hill.
Until perhaps the last decade, for reporting on Louisiana government and expressing some opinion about it, for the previous 20 or so years prior if you didn’t live south of I-12 in Louisiana John probably would have been almost your only source of information and commentary. As such, he fulfilled this need in the world of Louisiana politics for many. As part of that job, John has interviewed me on many occasions but I am fortunate enough to know him outside the two sides of an interview and can offer some additional insight into his career (perhaps other than what he’s about to tell the world over the next couple of weeks.)
John’s a great writer and in some matters he did an outstanding job of distilling complex details of stories into good, readable news copy. I’m not sure he would agree with me on this, but I think his best job was on trial coverage, especially the Prisoner #03128-095 case that landed the four-term ex-governor in jail. That was an extremely complex case but John had a knack of boiling it down into understandable prose for the typical reader.
As John has written before, perhaps his work there and subsequent conversations with and stories about Edwin Edwards may make Edwards the most identifiably-linked political person to John when all is said and done. You have to know that they make somewhat of an odd couple because John’s not been happy about political corruption in the state and Edwards has been perhaps its most proficient practitioner.
But the fact is that John is, at the end of the day, a man of the left in the political world who, as he said, “grew up in the generation hoping to make a difference. And I've always felt like we should be the citizens' representatives when we're sitting in a meeting room or covering a press conference.” In his later years, in my opinion, in his reporting one read a frustration that a different attitude than his about the purposes of government, and of the media, was taking hold in the state, and it did affect what he wrote and wrote about.
It may have been fueled by a vocal set of opponents who, through talk radio and the Internet as their reaches proliferated making available more information about Louisiana politics than provided by just John and the few traditional media outlets that had dominated state political discourse for so long, became very critical about John’s reporting. To some, he represented everything wrong with Louisiana media and its relationship to state government; unfortunately, a few in their zeal to criticize got more to attacking the messenger than in concentrating on the contents and kinds of stories published under his byline.
So, for a rather varied set of reasons, John’s contributions to Louisiana politics will be missed.
Until perhaps the last decade, for reporting on Louisiana government and expressing some opinion about it, for the previous 20 or so years prior if you didn’t live south of I-12 in Louisiana John probably would have been almost your only source of information and commentary. As such, he fulfilled this need in the world of Louisiana politics for many. As part of that job, John has interviewed me on many occasions but I am fortunate enough to know him outside the two sides of an interview and can offer some additional insight into his career (perhaps other than what he’s about to tell the world over the next couple of weeks.)
John’s a great writer and in some matters he did an outstanding job of distilling complex details of stories into good, readable news copy. I’m not sure he would agree with me on this, but I think his best job was on trial coverage, especially the Prisoner #03128-095 case that landed the four-term ex-governor in jail. That was an extremely complex case but John had a knack of boiling it down into understandable prose for the typical reader.
As John has written before, perhaps his work there and subsequent conversations with and stories about Edwin Edwards may make Edwards the most identifiably-linked political person to John when all is said and done. You have to know that they make somewhat of an odd couple because John’s not been happy about political corruption in the state and Edwards has been perhaps its most proficient practitioner.
But the fact is that John is, at the end of the day, a man of the left in the political world who, as he said, “grew up in the generation hoping to make a difference. And I've always felt like we should be the citizens' representatives when we're sitting in a meeting room or covering a press conference.” In his later years, in my opinion, in his reporting one read a frustration that a different attitude than his about the purposes of government, and of the media, was taking hold in the state, and it did affect what he wrote and wrote about.
It may have been fueled by a vocal set of opponents who, through talk radio and the Internet as their reaches proliferated making available more information about Louisiana politics than provided by just John and the few traditional media outlets that had dominated state political discourse for so long, became very critical about John’s reporting. To some, he represented everything wrong with Louisiana media and its relationship to state government; unfortunately, a few in their zeal to criticize got more to attacking the messenger than in concentrating on the contents and kinds of stories published under his byline.
So, for a rather varied set of reasons, John’s contributions to Louisiana politics will be missed.
2.8.07
Veto session possibility illustrates interesting conditions
I was waiting to post looking for updates on veto session information. At this time, both chambers still are a number of votes away from cancelling the session so I can’t wait any longer.
This attempted session has come closer to succeeding than any in the past, over 30 years, for several reasons:
Term limits, to some extent, free legislators from what they perceive to be electoral consequences of gubernatorial retribution since they will not be running for reelection – the consequences being the governor using her people appointed directly or otherwise on the State Bond Commission to excise projects of legislators who don’t vote for not having the session
Gov. Kathleen Blanco’s decision not to run for reelection, making her a lame duck and unable to extend retribution for not stopping the session past the Bond Commission deliberations – in other words, legislators may call her bluff, knowing that she gets no political capital out of denying projects as a response to their not voting to stop the session.
Two of the measures vetoed, HB 505 and SB 45, are extremely high profile and were voted against by 0 and 1, respectively, of the 144 legislators – meaning legislators believe overrides on these will be received favorably by voters back home.
Whether these or any other vetoes would be overridden is another matter. With a third of the House membership voting against a session may mean there’s no chance for overrides working. Then again, maybe the opposition is in being called back in and once there they would be for overrides.
(Note, however, that the National Conference of State Legislatures annual meeting in Boston would overlap at the beginning of the session which may bring about some reluctance to attend – and attendance is needed in order to get the two-thirds majorities to override. Still, probably least likely to vote for overrides would be the attendees of the Boston conference – almost all Democrats demonstrating once again that Democrats are the party of those who think elective office is a vehicle to reap goodies regardless of the taxpayer – so override attempts may be doomed from the start.)
Regardless of what happens, what typically has been a perfunctory exercise instead has taken on meaning this year. The conditions that produced this are worth noting for the future.
This attempted session has come closer to succeeding than any in the past, over 30 years, for several reasons:
Whether these or any other vetoes would be overridden is another matter. With a third of the House membership voting against a session may mean there’s no chance for overrides working. Then again, maybe the opposition is in being called back in and once there they would be for overrides.
(Note, however, that the National Conference of State Legislatures annual meeting in Boston would overlap at the beginning of the session which may bring about some reluctance to attend – and attendance is needed in order to get the two-thirds majorities to override. Still, probably least likely to vote for overrides would be the attendees of the Boston conference – almost all Democrats demonstrating once again that Democrats are the party of those who think elective office is a vehicle to reap goodies regardless of the taxpayer – so override attempts may be doomed from the start.)
Regardless of what happens, what typically has been a perfunctory exercise instead has taken on meaning this year. The conditions that produced this are worth noting for the future.
1.8.07
Veto session worthwhile to improve state education
Given recently-released results of state standardized testing, there should be no question at all that a veto session of the Louisiana Legislature should be called for the first time ever. Whether it will happen is another matter.
The Legislature is empowered to call itself into session to deal with gubernatorial vetoes, if more than half of the members of both chambers refuse to turn in a ballot to call off the session by a deadline, this year Aug. 2. Gov. Kathleen Blanco vetoed fewer than two dozen items from this regular session but she picked some controversial ones. The one with the largest monetary impact might be refusing to lop off a percentage of sales tax on utilities paid by business, who then passes this tax on to consumers.
But the veto with perhaps the longest-term, largest impact to the state was to prevent private school tuition payments receiving a tax credit, continuing the dual-payment system where some families have to pay public school taxes even though their children do not use them and must pay private school tuition to increase their children’s chances of receiving quality instruction. No doubt a tax break on private school tuition would encourage sending children to private schools.
And why not, given the stunning achievements of many of the schools similarly situated to private schools, charter schools, in Orleans Parish? Recent data shows many charter schools there, with often the same kind of student body as in years past when they were wholly public schools, posted extraordinary gains in student achievement on tests. While charter schools vary in some ways that they differ from public schools, two which make them like private schools are they have much greater freedom in personnel policies such as in hiring, promotions, and firings, and in pay policies such as in being able to offer merit pay.
Where typical public schools have failed in Orleans Parish charter schools have succeeded, so one small change to the state’s education landscape that would encourage education of this superior kind, the tax exemption, one would think would be embraced by those in the education profession. Wrong: perhaps the most strident opponents of the veto session because they fear the possibility of undoing the tax exemption veto are teachers unions and their allies in the public education sector.
Why would educators, seeing something that works, be so reflexively against it? Because the goal of teachers’ unions and their sycophants is not to provide the best education possible to students, but instead to transfer as much money as possible from the pockets of taxpayers into their pockets and those of their members. They know all too well that individual accountability measures helping charter schools improve education will impair their greedy impulses.
Of course, since it takes two-thirds vote to override a veto even if the session gets called that’s a tough standard to meet to get Blanco’s decision reversed. But realizing these test results shows at least the attempt through approving an override session should occur, even if for this reason alone.
The Legislature is empowered to call itself into session to deal with gubernatorial vetoes, if more than half of the members of both chambers refuse to turn in a ballot to call off the session by a deadline, this year Aug. 2. Gov. Kathleen Blanco vetoed fewer than two dozen items from this regular session but she picked some controversial ones. The one with the largest monetary impact might be refusing to lop off a percentage of sales tax on utilities paid by business, who then passes this tax on to consumers.
But the veto with perhaps the longest-term, largest impact to the state was to prevent private school tuition payments receiving a tax credit, continuing the dual-payment system where some families have to pay public school taxes even though their children do not use them and must pay private school tuition to increase their children’s chances of receiving quality instruction. No doubt a tax break on private school tuition would encourage sending children to private schools.
And why not, given the stunning achievements of many of the schools similarly situated to private schools, charter schools, in Orleans Parish? Recent data shows many charter schools there, with often the same kind of student body as in years past when they were wholly public schools, posted extraordinary gains in student achievement on tests. While charter schools vary in some ways that they differ from public schools, two which make them like private schools are they have much greater freedom in personnel policies such as in hiring, promotions, and firings, and in pay policies such as in being able to offer merit pay.
Where typical public schools have failed in Orleans Parish charter schools have succeeded, so one small change to the state’s education landscape that would encourage education of this superior kind, the tax exemption, one would think would be embraced by those in the education profession. Wrong: perhaps the most strident opponents of the veto session because they fear the possibility of undoing the tax exemption veto are teachers unions and their allies in the public education sector.
Why would educators, seeing something that works, be so reflexively against it? Because the goal of teachers’ unions and their sycophants is not to provide the best education possible to students, but instead to transfer as much money as possible from the pockets of taxpayers into their pockets and those of their members. They know all too well that individual accountability measures helping charter schools improve education will impair their greedy impulses.
Of course, since it takes two-thirds vote to override a veto even if the session gets called that’s a tough standard to meet to get Blanco’s decision reversed. But realizing these test results shows at least the attempt through approving an override session should occur, even if for this reason alone.
31.7.07
Politics aside, maybe Kennedy wants to be atty. gen.?
This space is called “Between the Lines” because it seeks to go beyond headlines and the surface presentation that the media provide (whether that be as a matter of course or by design to obscure larger issues) about political news in Louisiana, to get at the real story behind it all. But cocnerning news that Democrat state Treasurer John Kennedy is now thinking of running for attorney general, that’s a gambit I have trouble figuring out.
It’s well known that Kennedy would like to run for the Senate next year, perhaps switching parties to facilitate his chances at victory, and clearly holding a current state office and running a statewide campaign this year can only boost his chances of winning a statewide contest next year, Yet it doesn’t seem to make sense that launching such a bid as a rookie (with one year in) attorney general instead of a treasurer in his third term would be more advantageous.
There appear to be many reasons why, if the Senate is his ultimate goal, that an attempted lateral move like this has more disadvantages than advantages:
Kennedy would have no meaningful competition in a run for another term as treasurer. With over $2 million in campaign coffers, he could spend a good portion of this money in a campaign designed to blend easily into a Senate campaign, rather than have to parcel it out designed primarily to secure another statewide office.
A run for attorney general would be no cakewalk, by contrast. While politically wounded, the Democrat apparatus and good-old-boys in the state still would rally around incumbent Atty. Gen. Charles Foti – not just given his incumbency, but that Kennedy has been too reform-minded for their liking. Additionally, other challengers remain particularly a strong one from Republican attorney Royal Alexander. Kennedy could win, but it would not be easy and he very well could lose – a potential loss not the kind of impression he wants to have hanging over him as he immediately would turn around and begin a Senate run.
His current spot has provided a great platform for Kennedy to become the leading voice of reform from Louisiana’s executive branch. Frankly, the attorney general does little that captures headlines (unless, as has happened to Foti, he launches an ill-advised investigation which backfired politically) so if it’s publicity Kennedy would find helpful, even a successful outcome to the lateral move would be less likely to provide it.
It’s possible that other interests that could be helpful to his future campaigning are encouraging this move in conjunction with the party switch, because they think he could be the best Republican candidate against Foti, or, for their own reasons, they’d rather see him launch a Senate bid from this office than the treasury. However, again compared to where he is there just doesn’t seem to be a lot of potential upside here.
Considering all of this, there seems just one reason why Kennedy would go in this direction – maybe he (who has a law degree) simply wants to be attorney general. If so, it would make little sense to take all sorts of electoral risks to get there, especially if he possibly could abandon it after a year. Even with a Senate attempt on his mind, perhaps he would see the attorney general job as one, should he fail next year, as the most desirable consolation prize. Appropriate to Occam’s Razor, it could be that simple.
It’s well known that Kennedy would like to run for the Senate next year, perhaps switching parties to facilitate his chances at victory, and clearly holding a current state office and running a statewide campaign this year can only boost his chances of winning a statewide contest next year, Yet it doesn’t seem to make sense that launching such a bid as a rookie (with one year in) attorney general instead of a treasurer in his third term would be more advantageous.
There appear to be many reasons why, if the Senate is his ultimate goal, that an attempted lateral move like this has more disadvantages than advantages:
Considering all of this, there seems just one reason why Kennedy would go in this direction – maybe he (who has a law degree) simply wants to be attorney general. If so, it would make little sense to take all sorts of electoral risks to get there, especially if he possibly could abandon it after a year. Even with a Senate attempt on his mind, perhaps he would see the attorney general job as one, should he fail next year, as the most desirable consolation prize. Appropriate to Occam’s Razor, it could be that simple.
30.7.07
NW LA delegation provides good, bad, ugly 2007 work
Northwest Louisiana got a comprehensive taste of the good, bad, and the ugly from its delegation in the 2007 regular session of the Louisiana Legislature. Let’s review these:
THE GOOD: Rep. Mike Powell’s HB 113 turned out the best of a thin lineup of superior legislation coming from the delegation. This new law creates the crime of organized retail theft and will make it easier to prosecute and thus deter a crime, one where petty thieves are organized to sell to a fence, that has been growing rapidly.
THE BAD: It’s curious to find someone who tried hard to get passed good bills like SB 313, which would give tax exemptions to those buying vehicles converted for handicapped use, and SB 365, which would have brought some semblance of order to the capital outlay budgeting process, yet who at the same time whiffed so badly on other bills to the detriment of Louisiana, as did Sen. Robert Adley.
THE GOOD: Rep. Mike Powell’s HB 113 turned out the best of a thin lineup of superior legislation coming from the delegation. This new law creates the crime of organized retail theft and will make it easier to prosecute and thus deter a crime, one where petty thieves are organized to sell to a fence, that has been growing rapidly.
THE BAD: It’s curious to find someone who tried hard to get passed good bills like SB 313, which would give tax exemptions to those buying vehicles converted for handicapped use, and SB 365, which would have brought some semblance of order to the capital outlay budgeting process, yet who at the same time whiffed so badly on other bills to the detriment of Louisiana, as did Sen. Robert Adley.
29.7.07
NAACP protests distract from pursuing real solutions
Further demonstrating its irrelevancy to any serious discussion of public policy, the Louisiana National Association for the Advancement of Colored People protested for a second time in Baton Rouge that the promotional tests for fourth and eighth graders in Louisiana were “unlawful” and “unconstitutional.” This distractive rhetoric in part explains why black children disproportionately do poorly on these exams and serves as an impediment to improving the education of all children.
It’s a sign that a protester strives to prick at emotion rather than make a good-faith effort to solve a problem when words like “unlawful” and “unconstitutional” are tossed about without any sensible explanation of them to the matter at hand or even any connection to reality as in this instance. There’s nothing unlawful or unconstitutional about taking a test to demonstrate enough learning has occurred in order to proceed to the next level of mastery; nothing legally or constitutionally prohibits this. Indeed, the tests serve as an accountability measure to show how good of a job both students and schools are doing.
Although it does not have the audacity to explicitly clarify this, what the NAACP really objects to in terms of the tests is that disproportionately black children do poorly on them so many who “pass” their coursework cannot pass the exams. Thus, the protest is a thinly veiled assertion that somehow the tests are unfair, one potential explanation for gap in curriculum passage but test failure.
But if the exams are at fault, then we ought to see similar situations among all students. But non-black students are less likely to pass the classes and fail the tests, so it’s not a problem of instrumentation or the testing process. Rather, the other possible explanation for the gap, lack of rigor and quality in instruction in some schools, must be valid.
As it is, the majority of black students in Louisiana are taught in majority black schools whose staffs typically are plurality if not majority black in terms of both teachers and administrators. Apparently, this is where the problem lies so the NAACP needs to be criticizing in the main the very people it claims to represent.
Rather than blame some inanimate concept like testing, the NAACP needs to stop shooting the messenger and instead address the underlying cause. Only higher expectations of students, increased intellectual and pedagogical capacity of teachers, and expanded rigor will make for better educated students; they won’t become better by offhandedly declaring a measurement of their abilities is invalid and patting them on the back as they fulfill lower standards. State education officials are right to continue to employ testing to help continue improvement in Louisiana’s education; the NAACP’s actions prevent it this realization.
It’s a sign that a protester strives to prick at emotion rather than make a good-faith effort to solve a problem when words like “unlawful” and “unconstitutional” are tossed about without any sensible explanation of them to the matter at hand or even any connection to reality as in this instance. There’s nothing unlawful or unconstitutional about taking a test to demonstrate enough learning has occurred in order to proceed to the next level of mastery; nothing legally or constitutionally prohibits this. Indeed, the tests serve as an accountability measure to show how good of a job both students and schools are doing.
Although it does not have the audacity to explicitly clarify this, what the NAACP really objects to in terms of the tests is that disproportionately black children do poorly on them so many who “pass” their coursework cannot pass the exams. Thus, the protest is a thinly veiled assertion that somehow the tests are unfair, one potential explanation for gap in curriculum passage but test failure.
But if the exams are at fault, then we ought to see similar situations among all students. But non-black students are less likely to pass the classes and fail the tests, so it’s not a problem of instrumentation or the testing process. Rather, the other possible explanation for the gap, lack of rigor and quality in instruction in some schools, must be valid.
As it is, the majority of black students in Louisiana are taught in majority black schools whose staffs typically are plurality if not majority black in terms of both teachers and administrators. Apparently, this is where the problem lies so the NAACP needs to be criticizing in the main the very people it claims to represent.
Rather than blame some inanimate concept like testing, the NAACP needs to stop shooting the messenger and instead address the underlying cause. Only higher expectations of students, increased intellectual and pedagogical capacity of teachers, and expanded rigor will make for better educated students; they won’t become better by offhandedly declaring a measurement of their abilities is invalid and patting them on the back as they fulfill lower standards. State education officials are right to continue to employ testing to help continue improvement in Louisiana’s education; the NAACP’s actions prevent it this realization.
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