Rid Louisiana of elected judges system, but do it right

The Shreveport Times printed an interesting editorial arguing, as I have for many years, that Louisiana needs to rid itself of election of judges. Without going into too many details, it parallels my thoughts in that election simply provides too many opportunities for compromising justice with politics, running the gamut of aspects from contribution to accountability.

At the same time, a purely direct appointive system such as seen at the federal level would not be best either. Given, unlike at the federal level where criminal cases are relatively few and then only serious crimes, that at the state and local level most cases are criminal involving local people with generally little attention paid to them, it becomes too easy for a judge appointed for life during good behavior to interject personal or political agendas into the decision-making process.

But The Times’ suggestion, which is a judicial panel of supposed “experts” such as sitting lawyers to achieve merit selection, also would do harm to justice. In both Florida and Missouri ideologically politicized panels of lawyers have been able to subvert the process. The better means would be to remove direct political influence from an appointive process that otherwise could force the selection of individuals who adhere to a particular ideology.

As I have recommended previously, the best way to do this is to have elected officials, whose decisions can be held accountable by the electorate, create a nomination panel that may have some rules to assure some kind of balance from and merit in nominees (for example, designating that certain members must come from the major political parties and registered independents, and that others be sitting jurists). The terms would short and non-renewable by gubernatorial appointment with legislative or perhaps only Senate confirmation. The panel could forward sets of nominees to the governor for his approval who could select one or reject all, with the chosen serving for life during good behavior. (These nominations also could be vetted by the Legislature or Senate.)

This works because it almost entirely removes from the process those individuals with vested interests in who gets the job – lawyers who practice in front of these judges – and dramatically reduces the influence of interest groups that claim neutrality but have agendas. At the same time, it retains accountability indirectly because the decisions of elected officials to stock the panel and of the governor and maybe others in selections that can be evaluated at the election booth by the people.

While a pure “Missouri Plan” would include a retention election after some period as well, this could bring the influence and accountability problems concerning elections noted by myself and The Times. Better might be easier recall rules, such as only a 10 percent of registered voter standard rather than the current one-third to add more political accountability to the people. And the existing self-policing standards of the state’s judiciary also can be retained to encourage ethical behavior.

There’s no doubt that the pure electoral nature of the current system must be changed to improve it. But any such change must be done correctly or the system is not improved.