This spring marked the
anniversary of the establishment of the first in Shreveport, and by 2000 there were two on
the west bank and three on the east bank of the Red River. Almost a year ago,
the latest entrant camped in Bossier City. When in 1991 these were legalized
beyond the one land-based casino in New Orleans, after a lengthy process of
licensing then building, then-Harrah’s in Shreveport became the first to
operate outside of New Orleans.
At the time, proponents said that
not only would local governments cash in well with casino gambling, but also
they would indirectly from sales and property taxes generated by employees of
the jobs created. As it transpired, such sentiments have been proved
questionable.
As of the latest (2012) data,
both cities take about $12 million a year from casinos. Both are off historical
highs at the beginning of the millennium – and during a minor national economic
downturn after 9/11/2001 – of between $15-16 million (Bossier City managed to
stay in that range until the next economic downturn beginning in 2007). For
comparison sake, this means that in 2002 direct casino earnings accounted for 7.7 percent of Shreveport’s
non-enterprise revenues and 22 percent of Bossier
City’s. A decade later, the respective percentages were 4.5 percent and 13.4 percent.
These figures precede the market
addition last year, but that is expected not to expand but to cannibalize the
existing marker. As a whole, with the general expansion of legalized gambling
in other states, particularly Oklahoma, will make it difficult not to expect a
decline in this market, and if Texas were to allow it a severe contraction
would result.
Thus, as a whole casinos provide
only a small proportion of direct revenues to Shreveport, although a somewhat
more significant amount to Bossier City. In both cases, that contribution is
becoming more and more minimal.
The effect on sales and property
taxes is much harder to quantify, given the large number of other factors that
can influence these totals. But, anecdotally, it would appear that more
cannibalization than revenue expansion has occurred in this aspect. Local food
and drink establishments have found it difficult to compete with the casinos’
internal and subsidized options. Other discretionary entertainment venues have
contracted; whereas prior to 2002 the area enjoyed at various times Canadian
football, minor league professional basketball, a AA-affiliated baseball team,
a high-minor league hockey franchise, and Division I collegiate sports at
Centenary College, now it has just a semi-professional basketball team, a
low-minor independent baseball squad, and Centenary now playing at Division
III. And cultural attractions such as opera, theater, and symphonic music have contracted
as well during this period.
Therefore, with job displacement
rather than expansion likely occurring, not many revenue gains from taxation
should be expected. Nor does this include external costs, such as social costs
of gambling addiction, which were estimated over a decade ago at almost $11,000
per person in Louisiana. One would expect a disproportionately high number
of people in this category where there are casinos nearby.
Given these data limitations, an
exact accounting of the 20-year impact is impossible. However, it should be
clear that, at best, the picture is mixed, and that the metropolitan area’s
recent designation as the local economy
that shrank the most in 2013 shows gambling certainly has not served
as an economic panacea. And perhaps it’s the very notion that it or anything
else, such as courting a three-wheeled
automobile maker,
paying for a
high-tech office building, or opening a slew of retailers, can serve as a
magic bullet operates as a distraction from the real task at hand that produces
economic growth – having right-sized governments, ones that don’t blow money on
things like hotels or sludge farms or arenas, and
that concentrate on core functions such as education instead of politics or
patronage – necessary for improving the area’s quality of life.
And things don't seem to be getting any better. The latest data show this area following the rest of the state generally downwards in gambling revenues, with Shreveport-Bossier being off about 10 percent year-over-year as 2014 comes to a close.
The only metropolitan areas in the state which rejected casino gambling were Alexandria (which is near all the Indian casinos) and Monroe (which has Bossier City and Vicksburg within 100 miles). If the Shreveport-Bossier experience says anything, it's that perhaps those two abstainers may have made the wisest choice.
And things don't seem to be getting any better. The latest data show this area following the rest of the state generally downwards in gambling revenues, with Shreveport-Bossier being off about 10 percent year-over-year as 2014 comes to a close.
The only metropolitan areas in the state which rejected casino gambling were Alexandria (which is near all the Indian casinos) and Monroe (which has Bossier City and Vicksburg within 100 miles). If the Shreveport-Bossier experience says anything, it's that perhaps those two abstainers may have made the wisest choice.
1 comment:
With respect to riverboat gambling in your area, you say: [T]he effect on sales and property taxes is much harder to quantify, given the large number of other factors that can influence these totals."
Then, you simply move past this metric.
Why, then, is this not the case when trying to measure the effect of the movie investment tax credit, and other credits, which you continually criticize and have no problem specifically quantifying?
Can you really so accurately, as you portray, quantify all of the miriad of factors that go into its success or failure?
Or, is it just one of your dislikes, which, for that reason alone, you can always seem to be able to justify the published negativity?
You probably will not respond, so your readers will just have to think about it and decide on their own.
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