In academia, there are those who often seem more interested in calling attention to themselves than just doing their jobs of teaching and providing useful research. The self-promotion efforts of athletes, entertainers, reality-show participants, and politicians pale in comparison to some of the things I see regularly in my profession. But they need accomplices to pull off this showmanship, so when their “discoveries” comport with the media’s agenda and ideology (see an example here) and its need to follow them, both can fulfill their desires.
It’s not always intentional; sometimes the media will take some research out of context, and other times (quite frankly) since few journalists have anything more than a surface understanding of the topics they cover, the media will swallow whole what is fed to them by some in academia. I don’t know if either holds true in this case, but certainly it was not at all responsible for the media to report and for the researchers to allow them to promote
… if the post-Katrina city were limited to the population previously living in areas that were undamaged by the storm – that is, if nobody were able to return to damaged neighborhoods – New Orleans is at risk of losing more than 80% of its black population …. if the future city were limited to the population previously living in zones undamaged by Katrina it would risk losing about 50% of its white residents but more than 80% of its black population.
Were this written in September, 2005, it might have been interesting speculation. But it’s now about five months later, and the numbers they use are wholly unrealistic as proven by subsequent events. To begin, let’s review the population as best known in New Orleans when Katrina hit, from the Jul. 1, 2004 estimates from the Census Bureau (oddly, the researchers ignore these and use the 2000 actual census – usually not a bad strategy, but it’s not good in this case because New Orleans lost about 5 percent of its population just in those four years).
According to it, New Orleans (Orleans Parish) had 462,269 people, of which 313,402 were black, 132,314 white, and 16,553 of “other” races. Taking these researchers’ claims, this means that New Orleans could wind up with just 62,681 blacks and 66,157 whites (and that’s putting the black total at 80 percent, not “more than”).
But then consider first a Congressional Research Service report they used, which says that 272,000 blacks and 101,000 non-blacks evacuated. Doing the math tells you that meant 41,402 blacks and (assuming the ratio of 8:1 whites/others prior to the storm holds) 42,548 whites remained (and with other races a city total of 89,269). With these numbers not far from their initial guesses, this should have alerted these researchers immediately to a fundamental problem in their study – that their 80/50 assumption is that all parts of all “damaged” neighborhoods would not be rebuilt was way overboard.
Now consider estimates provided by Louisiana’s Department of Health and Hospitals, that at least by December the city had 136,681 people. Without going into the methodology here (part of a future academic presentation I’ll be making at a professional meeting which will predict the number of registered voters in Orleans come the rescheduled election days, who they are, and how they likely will vote), that figure can be decomposed into an estimate of 67,691 blacks and 62,699 whites. In other words, before the end of the year was out, already these researchers’ numbers were quite shaky.
Now about two months later, people continue to flow into Orleans. And what these guys fail to appreciate is the details of the plan considered by the Bring New Orleans Back Commission which do not at all imply that nothing in the damaged areas will be rebuilt, and also that more housing will be constructed in higher ground in other areas. (This is not the wisest plan, but it seems to be the one that will be pursued.) In short, other estimates that argue New Orleans will approach or even exceed a quarter million people in the next couple of years seem much more valid.
Were these researchers more cautious and mindful in drawing conclusions, and the media less focused on trying to make for a “bigger” story, more temperate estimates with more conditions attached to them would have been reported. (At least this news story added a dose of realism in recognizing the conclusions as improbable; some didn’t. This one even downplays the sensational claims in favor of analyzing other aspects.) And that would mean watchdogs like myself would have written on a different subject today, and gladly so.
26.1.06
Louisiana sees through LeBlanc's dishonest history rewrite
One reason why Gov. Kathleen Blanco will not be reelected – and cannot seem to understand that – is, by the communications of her administration, that it seems to think that the Louisiana public is comprised of sheep that cannot think for themselves.
There may be some truth to that belief – witness the fact that Democrats/liberals/populists keep getting elected to office, Blanco included – but, by and large, the hurricane disasters of 2005 have startled many out of their somnambulant conditions regarding state government. The magnitude of the impacts of the disasters on peoples’ personal lives has re-engaged the critical faculties of many.
So when Commissioner of Administration Jerry Luke LeBlanc tries to paint stripes on a horse and call it a zebra in a letter reprinted in the Louisiana press, we can see the paint. In the letter, LeBlanc proclaims that the failed response of Blanco to Katrina’s invasion wasn’t really that because she couldn’t be held responsible for government’s actions or inactions because former head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Michael Brown said dealing with Katrina’s impact “was beyond the capacity of the state and local government.”
Very true, but LeBlanc here uses a strange logic that tries to deflect us from the truth. He wants us to believe that we should interpret Brown’s comments to mean “beyond the capacity of any state and local government” which then would, as LeBlanc writes, mean that what Brown “told a congressional committee in Washington last September that the blame lay on the doorsteps of the governor are now proven to be untrue.”
Uh, not quite; not even. With his mode of thinking displayed here, I wouldn’t mind being an alcoholic panhandling outside of LeBlanc’s office, because I could be assured that he reliably would hand me more money to drink away, telling me, “It’s not your fault, it’s beyond your capacity to sober up, I don’t blame you,” when, in fact, the right attitude and willpower can be provided by the responsible person to help himself out of this unfortunate condition.
What LeBlanc doesn’t understand that Brown’s remark really meant that Katrina was “beyond the capacity of Louisiana state and New Orleans local government,” not any or all state and local governments. And what LeBlanc won’t admit to us is the reason why it was “beyond capacity” was because Louisiana state and local governments by their own inept actions stunted their capacities to respond adequately.
Documentation is extensive about how state and local emergency plans were a joke, how Blanco seemed unable to issue the correct orders even though she had had a chance to learn the ropes a year previously, and how she seemed confused and paralyzed by the crisis. In fact, LeBlanc even authors an outright falsehood, that Blanco’s “pleas for massive outside help went unheeded” since she dallied and ultimately turned down Pres. George W. Bush’s offer to send in troops under federal control.
(Ironically, as LeBlanc’s letter was being reprinted across the state, more egg got thrown on the Blanco Administration’s face as more details about the “Hurricane Pam” exercise became available that directly impugned his argument. The report pointed out the inadequacies of the state’s then-planned response – a full year before it really happened with Katrina during which time Blanco did little to correct the clearly-identified shortcomings that she could.)
To summarize, LeBlanc seems unable to grasp that just because Brown said he bore much blame for inadequate response that this does not automatically absolve Blanco of blame herself. Her actions are a matter of public record, and they are decidedly unflattering. By all means, let’s heed LeBlanc’s advice to not “make political gains in the middle of this tragedy” – starting with LeBlanc himself by his disavowing his attempts to rewrite history.
Closing, LeBlanc asks that observers of the situation move along from assigning blame. Agreed, but this does not give him license to distort the record. Because before they can be effective leaders in the state’s recovery, LeBlanc and Blanco need to be honest with themselves and with the Louisiana public, who can see through all of this chicanery.
There may be some truth to that belief – witness the fact that Democrats/liberals/populists keep getting elected to office, Blanco included – but, by and large, the hurricane disasters of 2005 have startled many out of their somnambulant conditions regarding state government. The magnitude of the impacts of the disasters on peoples’ personal lives has re-engaged the critical faculties of many.
So when Commissioner of Administration Jerry Luke LeBlanc tries to paint stripes on a horse and call it a zebra in a letter reprinted in the Louisiana press, we can see the paint. In the letter, LeBlanc proclaims that the failed response of Blanco to Katrina’s invasion wasn’t really that because she couldn’t be held responsible for government’s actions or inactions because former head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Michael Brown said dealing with Katrina’s impact “was beyond the capacity of the state and local government.”
Very true, but LeBlanc here uses a strange logic that tries to deflect us from the truth. He wants us to believe that we should interpret Brown’s comments to mean “beyond the capacity of any state and local government” which then would, as LeBlanc writes, mean that what Brown “told a congressional committee in Washington last September that the blame lay on the doorsteps of the governor are now proven to be untrue.”
Uh, not quite; not even. With his mode of thinking displayed here, I wouldn’t mind being an alcoholic panhandling outside of LeBlanc’s office, because I could be assured that he reliably would hand me more money to drink away, telling me, “It’s not your fault, it’s beyond your capacity to sober up, I don’t blame you,” when, in fact, the right attitude and willpower can be provided by the responsible person to help himself out of this unfortunate condition.
What LeBlanc doesn’t understand that Brown’s remark really meant that Katrina was “beyond the capacity of Louisiana state and New Orleans local government,” not any or all state and local governments. And what LeBlanc won’t admit to us is the reason why it was “beyond capacity” was because Louisiana state and local governments by their own inept actions stunted their capacities to respond adequately.
Documentation is extensive about how state and local emergency plans were a joke, how Blanco seemed unable to issue the correct orders even though she had had a chance to learn the ropes a year previously, and how she seemed confused and paralyzed by the crisis. In fact, LeBlanc even authors an outright falsehood, that Blanco’s “pleas for massive outside help went unheeded” since she dallied and ultimately turned down Pres. George W. Bush’s offer to send in troops under federal control.
(Ironically, as LeBlanc’s letter was being reprinted across the state, more egg got thrown on the Blanco Administration’s face as more details about the “Hurricane Pam” exercise became available that directly impugned his argument. The report pointed out the inadequacies of the state’s then-planned response – a full year before it really happened with Katrina during which time Blanco did little to correct the clearly-identified shortcomings that she could.)
To summarize, LeBlanc seems unable to grasp that just because Brown said he bore much blame for inadequate response that this does not automatically absolve Blanco of blame herself. Her actions are a matter of public record, and they are decidedly unflattering. By all means, let’s heed LeBlanc’s advice to not “make political gains in the middle of this tragedy” – starting with LeBlanc himself by his disavowing his attempts to rewrite history.
Closing, LeBlanc asks that observers of the situation move along from assigning blame. Agreed, but this does not give him license to distort the record. Because before they can be effective leaders in the state’s recovery, LeBlanc and Blanco need to be honest with themselves and with the Louisiana public, who can see through all of this chicanery.
25.1.06
Electoral considerations likely to land Alito Landrieu's vote
The upcoming vote on the confirmation of U.S. Appellate Court Judge Samuel Alito presents a hard choice for Sen. Mary Landrieu, and either option could spell her political doom.
Landrieu must realize that Alito will be confirmed. Senate Democrats should understand the magnanimity of moderate Republican senators has run out on this Supreme Court nominee and any attempted filibuster would send the GOP centrists to support a rule change that would disallow filibusters of judicial nominees. In addition, at least one Senate Democrat moderate has pledged to cross up Democrat leadership and to support Alito.
Therefore, Landrieu’s vote has become merely symbolic, with costs and benefits going both ways. Pre-hurricanes, she showed a selective, maybe even nuanced, behavior towards controversial nominees. She voted against U.S. Appellate Court Judge Janice Rogers Brown, perhaps figuring that black Democrat leaders could not countenance a favorable vote even if whites largely supported her as did a significant portion of blacks, since she needs those leaders’ political machines in the state. She voted against U.S. Appellate Court Judge William Pryor as well, but voted for U.S. Appellate Court Judge Priscilla Owen, perhaps as Owen was more “local” (from Texas, even if Pryor was from the South), less demonized by black Democrats, and female, to give Landrieu some ammunition to garner more conservative support in the state since it was clear Owen’s would go through (after all, 1 out of 3 often wins you a batting championship in the major leagues). And she did vote for U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts.
She likely will apply the same logic to the Alito vote, mindful of the changed election dynamics in the state. By 2008, her base still may be disproportionately eroded courtesy of the hurricane disasters, and the ultra-liberal (even as she tries to disguise it) probable top of the Democrat ticket also may cost her votes. At the same time, she cannot compete against a quality, genuine conservative GOP challenger by deliberately throwing an Alito confirmation vote the way of the majority conservative voters in the state.
At this point, the Senate Democrats’ leaders only reason to try to get as many votes against Alito would be as a campaign issue, precisely the motivation for Landrieu. As evidenced by the pontificating tone and irrelevant comments of Democrats on and the exact split down party lines in the committee vote, they place great store in trying to preserve as close to unanimity as possible their opposition. At the same time, Democrat leaders have released party members from the obligation of voting with it, meaning no sanctions will be levied on members who vote to confirm.
With the GOP bullpen of viable statewide genuine conservative candidates for Senate for the moment sparse (its strongest pick by far interested in the Governor’s Mansion) and with the Democrat presidential stakes trending towards the opposite ideology, Landrieu probably can be assured to hold onto much of her liberal base while trying to demonstrate moderate tendencies by tossing a vote Alito’s way. But this may backfire if the state Republicans find a quality conservative to challenge her in 2008 and somehow in a rare moment of Democrat lucidity somebody less liberal snares the presidential nomination, for Landrieu’s solid liberal credentials, out of touch with the state’s majority’s interests, will appear more obvious than ever.
Landrieu must realize that Alito will be confirmed. Senate Democrats should understand the magnanimity of moderate Republican senators has run out on this Supreme Court nominee and any attempted filibuster would send the GOP centrists to support a rule change that would disallow filibusters of judicial nominees. In addition, at least one Senate Democrat moderate has pledged to cross up Democrat leadership and to support Alito.
Therefore, Landrieu’s vote has become merely symbolic, with costs and benefits going both ways. Pre-hurricanes, she showed a selective, maybe even nuanced, behavior towards controversial nominees. She voted against U.S. Appellate Court Judge Janice Rogers Brown, perhaps figuring that black Democrat leaders could not countenance a favorable vote even if whites largely supported her as did a significant portion of blacks, since she needs those leaders’ political machines in the state. She voted against U.S. Appellate Court Judge William Pryor as well, but voted for U.S. Appellate Court Judge Priscilla Owen, perhaps as Owen was more “local” (from Texas, even if Pryor was from the South), less demonized by black Democrats, and female, to give Landrieu some ammunition to garner more conservative support in the state since it was clear Owen’s would go through (after all, 1 out of 3 often wins you a batting championship in the major leagues). And she did vote for U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts.
She likely will apply the same logic to the Alito vote, mindful of the changed election dynamics in the state. By 2008, her base still may be disproportionately eroded courtesy of the hurricane disasters, and the ultra-liberal (even as she tries to disguise it) probable top of the Democrat ticket also may cost her votes. At the same time, she cannot compete against a quality, genuine conservative GOP challenger by deliberately throwing an Alito confirmation vote the way of the majority conservative voters in the state.
At this point, the Senate Democrats’ leaders only reason to try to get as many votes against Alito would be as a campaign issue, precisely the motivation for Landrieu. As evidenced by the pontificating tone and irrelevant comments of Democrats on and the exact split down party lines in the committee vote, they place great store in trying to preserve as close to unanimity as possible their opposition. At the same time, Democrat leaders have released party members from the obligation of voting with it, meaning no sanctions will be levied on members who vote to confirm.
With the GOP bullpen of viable statewide genuine conservative candidates for Senate for the moment sparse (its strongest pick by far interested in the Governor’s Mansion) and with the Democrat presidential stakes trending towards the opposite ideology, Landrieu probably can be assured to hold onto much of her liberal base while trying to demonstrate moderate tendencies by tossing a vote Alito’s way. But this may backfire if the state Republicans find a quality conservative to challenge her in 2008 and somehow in a rare moment of Democrat lucidity somebody less liberal snares the presidential nomination, for Landrieu’s solid liberal credentials, out of touch with the state’s majority’s interests, will appear more obvious than ever.
24.1.06
Louisiana leaders long on whining, short on leadership
Some pundits have pointed out that Louisiana complaints about the distribution of relief monies for the hurricane disasters, as well as federal reticence to do things such as pass homeowner insurance relief or commit to construct Category 5 capable levees for the state risk making the state’s politicians appear to be ingrates, if not crybabies. What most miss, however, are all the reasons why and a thorough explication of what is to come.
Elsewhere I have explained one cause is the general entitlement attitude concerning other peoples’ money often expressed by some of the states’ residents and many of its top politicians, married with a perceived lack of responsibility. Complaints emanating from its denizens thus make the state look petty, ungrateful, and irresponsible to the rest of the country, hardly a triumvirate of qualities to induce maximal aid giving.
Pettiness comes through when drawing comparisons with the how Mississippi seems to get more aid per capita adjusted for amount of destruction. These folks would do well to remember Matthew 20 and not question the generosity of the federal government to others. Even if the American people are the masters of the master, its Louisiana contingent comprises less than 3 percent of all Americans. Obviously, the state also appears as a bunch of ingrates when complaining about not getting enough when already having received tens of billions of dollars from the rest of the country’s taxpayers.
But what really damages the state’s case is this whining occurs within the context of downplaying the unfortunate fact that with many individuals and with the state as a whole that it did not do enough to prevent the widespread damage from occurring. Collectively, through state and local government’s failure to plan well, to follow plans, and to spend money wisely (throwing in here its representatives to national office) set up the New Orleans area for this catastrophe. (Even if the Army Corps of Engineers fell down on the job in some respects, that does not absolve state culpability.) Individually, people’s lack of common sense in having flood insurance also contributes.
Bluntly, had not human errors, many traceable back to state and local government, not occurred, the scale of destruction in Louisiana would have been much less than in Mississippi. We cannot forget that normal life in southern Mississippi did not involve living below sea level. To repeat (and restating this fact will hurt some feelings of some people in bad spots), common sense dictates that if you live below sea level, you buy flood insurance (even if the government tells you that you don’t have to; in that case, it should have been pretty cheap). To fail to do so and then to criticize the federal government for not doing enough to help those who failed to plan on this account defines chutzpah.
I also have noted previously that perceptions of the state leaders’ past performance in managing fiscal resources also has contributed to federal government wariness. The question about who actually is more corrupt, Louisiana, New Jersey, or some other place, is academic because the question isn’t who is worst, but whether Louisiana is bad enough. And nobody with a straight face can assert that Louisiana isn’t.
Finally, both of these factors play into the fact that a Republican-led federal government always will look askance a Democrat-run state. It’s not really partisanship but instead stems from ideological differences. Simply, because the liberalism on which the Democrats draw sustenance is so spectacularly wrong in understanding human beings and their natures, more responsible conservatives that comprise the Republican Party are less likely to trust that giving money with few or no strings to Democrat state leaders. They accurately fear that the inherent liberalism of these politicians will divert the money to uses that provide no real gains or solutions to the public policy problem, as liberals have demonstrated time and again. With its past populist attitudes, increased tolerance for corruption, intact good-old-boy political structure, and continued carping from some about the “unfairness” of aid allocation, Louisiana with its Democrat leadership provides little in the way of reassurance that will calm these fears.
This complex of attitudes argues that the optimal strategy for state politicians to grab larger handouts is not by whining, but by pledging not to repeat past sins, to change institutions to facilitate this, and to emphasize that an economically-vibrant Louisiana serves the interests of the entire nation. Of course, this means admissions of failure by these same people doing the whining in order to make the pledges of improvement credible. But humbling oneself comes as naturally to most Louisiana politicians as rooting for Ole Miss on the gridiron.
While doing so would provide the best chance to secure the most reconstruction dollars, it also would further erode the tenuous reelection chances of many of these individuals such as Gov. Kathleen Blanco who continues to deny her culpability while foisting blame onto others. Nonetheless, true public service does not constitute in doing what it takes to get reelected, but to improve the polity, and it disserves the state to act otherwise. Many of Louisiana’s “leaders” must come to understand that, on this issue, the more they whine, the less they lead.
Elsewhere I have explained one cause is the general entitlement attitude concerning other peoples’ money often expressed by some of the states’ residents and many of its top politicians, married with a perceived lack of responsibility. Complaints emanating from its denizens thus make the state look petty, ungrateful, and irresponsible to the rest of the country, hardly a triumvirate of qualities to induce maximal aid giving.
Pettiness comes through when drawing comparisons with the how Mississippi seems to get more aid per capita adjusted for amount of destruction. These folks would do well to remember Matthew 20 and not question the generosity of the federal government to others. Even if the American people are the masters of the master, its Louisiana contingent comprises less than 3 percent of all Americans. Obviously, the state also appears as a bunch of ingrates when complaining about not getting enough when already having received tens of billions of dollars from the rest of the country’s taxpayers.
But what really damages the state’s case is this whining occurs within the context of downplaying the unfortunate fact that with many individuals and with the state as a whole that it did not do enough to prevent the widespread damage from occurring. Collectively, through state and local government’s failure to plan well, to follow plans, and to spend money wisely (throwing in here its representatives to national office) set up the New Orleans area for this catastrophe. (Even if the Army Corps of Engineers fell down on the job in some respects, that does not absolve state culpability.) Individually, people’s lack of common sense in having flood insurance also contributes.
Bluntly, had not human errors, many traceable back to state and local government, not occurred, the scale of destruction in Louisiana would have been much less than in Mississippi. We cannot forget that normal life in southern Mississippi did not involve living below sea level. To repeat (and restating this fact will hurt some feelings of some people in bad spots), common sense dictates that if you live below sea level, you buy flood insurance (even if the government tells you that you don’t have to; in that case, it should have been pretty cheap). To fail to do so and then to criticize the federal government for not doing enough to help those who failed to plan on this account defines chutzpah.
I also have noted previously that perceptions of the state leaders’ past performance in managing fiscal resources also has contributed to federal government wariness. The question about who actually is more corrupt, Louisiana, New Jersey, or some other place, is academic because the question isn’t who is worst, but whether Louisiana is bad enough. And nobody with a straight face can assert that Louisiana isn’t.
Finally, both of these factors play into the fact that a Republican-led federal government always will look askance a Democrat-run state. It’s not really partisanship but instead stems from ideological differences. Simply, because the liberalism on which the Democrats draw sustenance is so spectacularly wrong in understanding human beings and their natures, more responsible conservatives that comprise the Republican Party are less likely to trust that giving money with few or no strings to Democrat state leaders. They accurately fear that the inherent liberalism of these politicians will divert the money to uses that provide no real gains or solutions to the public policy problem, as liberals have demonstrated time and again. With its past populist attitudes, increased tolerance for corruption, intact good-old-boy political structure, and continued carping from some about the “unfairness” of aid allocation, Louisiana with its Democrat leadership provides little in the way of reassurance that will calm these fears.
This complex of attitudes argues that the optimal strategy for state politicians to grab larger handouts is not by whining, but by pledging not to repeat past sins, to change institutions to facilitate this, and to emphasize that an economically-vibrant Louisiana serves the interests of the entire nation. Of course, this means admissions of failure by these same people doing the whining in order to make the pledges of improvement credible. But humbling oneself comes as naturally to most Louisiana politicians as rooting for Ole Miss on the gridiron.
While doing so would provide the best chance to secure the most reconstruction dollars, it also would further erode the tenuous reelection chances of many of these individuals such as Gov. Kathleen Blanco who continues to deny her culpability while foisting blame onto others. Nonetheless, true public service does not constitute in doing what it takes to get reelected, but to improve the polity, and it disserves the state to act otherwise. Many of Louisiana’s “leaders” must come to understand that, on this issue, the more they whine, the less they lead.
23.1.06
Hightower shows hand; local GOP needs to respond
If you believe that the “image-building” ads being run on television in the Shreveport media market touting the accomplishments of Mayor Keith Hightower are only that, then I’ve got some prime real estate in New Orleans’ Ninth Ward to sell you.
Democrat Hightower doesn’t confirm that he is running for another office when he leaves the mayor’s job at the end of November, 2006, but neither does he disconfirm it. And there seems to be little point to spend $100,000 on feel-good ads about him and having a huge campaign war chest all ready to splurge unless he has something else in mind.
Given the timing of his leaving the mayor’s job, Hightower could be aiming for one of three jobs. First, it’s possible that he could try to set up a run for the House of Representatives later this year. This would be a longshot because of current Republican Rep. Jim McCrery’s high popularity even with his recent donation of contributions from activities organized by tainted lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Plus, Hightower would not want to pursue a campaign so soon after his own controversial special interest connections (sludge contracts, real estate, city lending) alleged to influence his governing decisions and his controversial successful push to get Shreveport into a likely money-losing public lodging business.
Hightower would not be signaling that he wants to bide time and run in 2008, in order for time to lapse for the public to “forget” about these things, by running these ads now because in two years the public will forget any impact these ads had, too. They’ll also forget somewhat about Hightower in the meantime and the 2008 electoral landscape for Democrats in Louisiana probably would be even less favorable than in 2006 with a likely fairly liberal presidential candidate at the top of the ticket.
Second, Hightower could be angling for a statewide office. But the 2007 electoral environment for Democrats statewide probably will even be worse still, with a predicted state fiscal crisis ready to remind the public which party controlled the Legislature and held all the statewide offices before and right after the hurricane disasters (Democrats) and that the performance of state Democrats during that interval was, to be charitable, inadequate. Add to that the reduction of the reliably Democrat voting bloc around New Orleans and Hightower should want no part of an election cycle which may well end with a GOP majority of statewide offices.
Of course, Hightower could be jockeying for the special election later this year to fill the unexpired term of Secretary of State. But he is just a regional Democrat candidate without that large of a financial cushion that could get steamrolled by Mike Francis’ campaign, and the entrance into the contest of a black Democrat would make any such run a waste of Hightower’s resources.
Most likely, Hightower is angling for the open state Senate District 37 seat when (Louisiana’s best state) Sen. Max Malone is retired through term limits at the end of 2007. With current state Rep. Billy Montgomery (also facing term limits in his present post) likely to join the trend of legislators switching from Republican to Democrat and no genuine, competitive, quality Republican having emerged to run at this point, Hightower would like his chances against the big government advocate Montgomery. This also would explain the local range of the Hightower ads.
This cue ought to have metropolitan area Republicans starting an intense search to find a true conservative to challenge for the seat, one with a proven record of restrained government spending, accountability in that spending, and a commitment to honesty in government, among other true conservative principles. Hightower’s ad campaign belies his thinking at this point, a gauntlet thrown down that the GOP needs to take up now before all that’s left for District 37 come 2007 is an echo rather than a true choice with a superior option.
Democrat Hightower doesn’t confirm that he is running for another office when he leaves the mayor’s job at the end of November, 2006, but neither does he disconfirm it. And there seems to be little point to spend $100,000 on feel-good ads about him and having a huge campaign war chest all ready to splurge unless he has something else in mind.
Given the timing of his leaving the mayor’s job, Hightower could be aiming for one of three jobs. First, it’s possible that he could try to set up a run for the House of Representatives later this year. This would be a longshot because of current Republican Rep. Jim McCrery’s high popularity even with his recent donation of contributions from activities organized by tainted lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Plus, Hightower would not want to pursue a campaign so soon after his own controversial special interest connections (sludge contracts, real estate, city lending) alleged to influence his governing decisions and his controversial successful push to get Shreveport into a likely money-losing public lodging business.
Hightower would not be signaling that he wants to bide time and run in 2008, in order for time to lapse for the public to “forget” about these things, by running these ads now because in two years the public will forget any impact these ads had, too. They’ll also forget somewhat about Hightower in the meantime and the 2008 electoral landscape for Democrats in Louisiana probably would be even less favorable than in 2006 with a likely fairly liberal presidential candidate at the top of the ticket.
Second, Hightower could be angling for a statewide office. But the 2007 electoral environment for Democrats statewide probably will even be worse still, with a predicted state fiscal crisis ready to remind the public which party controlled the Legislature and held all the statewide offices before and right after the hurricane disasters (Democrats) and that the performance of state Democrats during that interval was, to be charitable, inadequate. Add to that the reduction of the reliably Democrat voting bloc around New Orleans and Hightower should want no part of an election cycle which may well end with a GOP majority of statewide offices.
Of course, Hightower could be jockeying for the special election later this year to fill the unexpired term of Secretary of State. But he is just a regional Democrat candidate without that large of a financial cushion that could get steamrolled by Mike Francis’ campaign, and the entrance into the contest of a black Democrat would make any such run a waste of Hightower’s resources.
Most likely, Hightower is angling for the open state Senate District 37 seat when (Louisiana’s best state) Sen. Max Malone is retired through term limits at the end of 2007. With current state Rep. Billy Montgomery (also facing term limits in his present post) likely to join the trend of legislators switching from Republican to Democrat and no genuine, competitive, quality Republican having emerged to run at this point, Hightower would like his chances against the big government advocate Montgomery. This also would explain the local range of the Hightower ads.
This cue ought to have metropolitan area Republicans starting an intense search to find a true conservative to challenge for the seat, one with a proven record of restrained government spending, accountability in that spending, and a commitment to honesty in government, among other true conservative principles. Hightower’s ad campaign belies his thinking at this point, a gauntlet thrown down that the GOP needs to take up now before all that’s left for District 37 come 2007 is an echo rather than a true choice with a superior option.
21.1.06
Welfare change to hit Louisiana bottom line
In her upcoming special session call, Gov. Kathleen Blanco might wish to add an item addressing something under the policy radar, the welfare portions of the federal 2006 budget reconciliation act (S. 1932). Failing to do so could cost the state millions of extra dollars.
It’s conceivable that Congress could pass the measure and president sign it before the special session is over. It would force states to place at least half (unadjusted, as current law permits) of their eligible Temporary Assistance to Needy Families recipients (mostly single parents) into workfare or job training programs. At present, Louisiana’s rate is about 35 percent so the bill would mandate a rise of at least 15 percent by October. The first year there would be no penalty, but that would kick in by Oct., 2007.
Act 16 of the 2005 Legislature budgeted around $17.7 million to fund programs that are composed mostly those designed to get TANF recipients training. (The federal government’s contribution is estimated to almost double this, and the figure presents almost twice what the state assumes it will pay out in cash assistance.) Pro-rated, this means about another $7.5 million the state will have to find somewhere in the lean post-hurricane-disaster environment to meet this standard.
Failure to achieve the 50-percent standard also could cost the state in another way. Federal law dictates that states must pay at least 80 percent of the 1994 TAF-equivalent level unless they meet the work participation requirement; if so, it’s just 75 percent. By failing to meet the standard, Louisiana could be required to pay around another $2.6 million a year into TANF activities (based on 2003 data) in addition to any penalty cuts in federal funding into the program (which is predicted to pay in about $137 million). The penalty itself could be from one to five percent, meaning a loss of up to nearly $7 million annually for noncompliance.
(Note, however, that training could cut TANF rolls and thus the amount the state must pay out in direct cash assistance. Still, it is budgeted for just over $9 million in this year with the federal government picking up another nearly $114 million, so the state’s savings would not be much.)
One way or the other, Louisiana is going to have to come up with these funds if the Congressional measure, as seems likely, will pass with this provision intact. If not dealt with during the special session, it will have to be tackled during the regular session.
It’s conceivable that Congress could pass the measure and president sign it before the special session is over. It would force states to place at least half (unadjusted, as current law permits) of their eligible Temporary Assistance to Needy Families recipients (mostly single parents) into workfare or job training programs. At present, Louisiana’s rate is about 35 percent so the bill would mandate a rise of at least 15 percent by October. The first year there would be no penalty, but that would kick in by Oct., 2007.
Act 16 of the 2005 Legislature budgeted around $17.7 million to fund programs that are composed mostly those designed to get TANF recipients training. (The federal government’s contribution is estimated to almost double this, and the figure presents almost twice what the state assumes it will pay out in cash assistance.) Pro-rated, this means about another $7.5 million the state will have to find somewhere in the lean post-hurricane-disaster environment to meet this standard.
Failure to achieve the 50-percent standard also could cost the state in another way. Federal law dictates that states must pay at least 80 percent of the 1994 TAF-equivalent level unless they meet the work participation requirement; if so, it’s just 75 percent. By failing to meet the standard, Louisiana could be required to pay around another $2.6 million a year into TANF activities (based on 2003 data) in addition to any penalty cuts in federal funding into the program (which is predicted to pay in about $137 million). The penalty itself could be from one to five percent, meaning a loss of up to nearly $7 million annually for noncompliance.
(Note, however, that training could cut TANF rolls and thus the amount the state must pay out in direct cash assistance. Still, it is budgeted for just over $9 million in this year with the federal government picking up another nearly $114 million, so the state’s savings would not be much.)
One way or the other, Louisiana is going to have to come up with these funds if the Congressional measure, as seems likely, will pass with this provision intact. If not dealt with during the special session, it will have to be tackled during the regular session.
18.1.06
Francis SOS bid augurs to keep job elective, kickstart GOP
Snowballs designed to turn into avalanches have to get started rolling somewhere, and the candidacy of Mike Francis for Secretary of State marks just such an effort for a concerted Republican takeover of Louisiana by the end of 2007.
Francis, an independent businessman, formerly held the top spot in the state’s Republican Party until being forced out after former Gov. Mike Foster’s reelection. This gives him cachet among GOP activists and donors, not just because of the connections he made during his long service to the party, but because when he left the state GOP sputtered as it veered away from his more conservative line.
Since this is a special election to fill the unexpired term of the late Fox McKeithen, there’ll be no competition statewide for volunteers and money. Plus, Francis is willing to commit a large sum of his own resources to the campaign. Finally, Republicans will be extra motivated to help him win back the office, the only statewide one held by a Republican until current Secretary of State Al Ater succeeded McKeithen.
All in all, it adds up to an impressive potential juggernaut of which Francis no doubt is aware. This explains why he declared his candidacy first, knowing such a show of force would discourage other possible rivals. The only Democrat who even has expressed any interest at all for the job, Sen. Sharon Weston Broome is way too liberal to be a credible threat.
Even if the office carries little in the way of political power and patronage, Republicans will not want to let this golden opportunity to grab it go by – and making any such victory sweeter the fact that it would usher out Ater, who has dragged his feet on calling elections as mandated in New Orleans by citing logistical problems (which can be solved easily) and federal government concerns (which have proven nonexistent). This obstinacy now has triggered a threat by the federal judiciary to set the elections itself within the week unless Ater does it first.
Democrats already may have thrown in the towel on this one. Ater, rumored to become head of the state Democrats after he leaves office, has stated he will lobby to have the Legislature make the office appointive for 2007 (and perhaps Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu is hinting at the same?). But with this prize now moving closer to Republicans, GOP legislators may prevent any such legislation from getting passed.
However, perhaps most importantly, a win by Francis could build momentum for big gains by Republicans in state elections in 2007. Francis already would have his job secure after a win the previous year to discourage opponents, and the activism that he might mobilize for that candidacy could spill over virally with other Republicans. Harping on Ater’s questionable deliberation which has rankled Republicans and following it with a big win could gin up bales full of enthusiasm for GOP candidates in 2007, with Francis using his new post to assist this movement. This will produce more and better candidates and greater support for them added to existing inertia moving in favor of Republicans.
If Francis can deliver on the potential of his candidacy, it not only would signal a Republican resurgence in Louisiana, but this could help bring the party to the greatest heights it ever has known in the state, even to majority status.
Francis, an independent businessman, formerly held the top spot in the state’s Republican Party until being forced out after former Gov. Mike Foster’s reelection. This gives him cachet among GOP activists and donors, not just because of the connections he made during his long service to the party, but because when he left the state GOP sputtered as it veered away from his more conservative line.
Since this is a special election to fill the unexpired term of the late Fox McKeithen, there’ll be no competition statewide for volunteers and money. Plus, Francis is willing to commit a large sum of his own resources to the campaign. Finally, Republicans will be extra motivated to help him win back the office, the only statewide one held by a Republican until current Secretary of State Al Ater succeeded McKeithen.
All in all, it adds up to an impressive potential juggernaut of which Francis no doubt is aware. This explains why he declared his candidacy first, knowing such a show of force would discourage other possible rivals. The only Democrat who even has expressed any interest at all for the job, Sen. Sharon Weston Broome is way too liberal to be a credible threat.
Even if the office carries little in the way of political power and patronage, Republicans will not want to let this golden opportunity to grab it go by – and making any such victory sweeter the fact that it would usher out Ater, who has dragged his feet on calling elections as mandated in New Orleans by citing logistical problems (which can be solved easily) and federal government concerns (which have proven nonexistent). This obstinacy now has triggered a threat by the federal judiciary to set the elections itself within the week unless Ater does it first.
Democrats already may have thrown in the towel on this one. Ater, rumored to become head of the state Democrats after he leaves office, has stated he will lobby to have the Legislature make the office appointive for 2007 (and perhaps Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu is hinting at the same?). But with this prize now moving closer to Republicans, GOP legislators may prevent any such legislation from getting passed.
However, perhaps most importantly, a win by Francis could build momentum for big gains by Republicans in state elections in 2007. Francis already would have his job secure after a win the previous year to discourage opponents, and the activism that he might mobilize for that candidacy could spill over virally with other Republicans. Harping on Ater’s questionable deliberation which has rankled Republicans and following it with a big win could gin up bales full of enthusiasm for GOP candidates in 2007, with Francis using his new post to assist this movement. This will produce more and better candidates and greater support for them added to existing inertia moving in favor of Republicans.
If Francis can deliver on the potential of his candidacy, it not only would signal a Republican resurgence in Louisiana, but this could help bring the party to the greatest heights it ever has known in the state, even to majority status.
17.1.06
This time, Nagin inserts his entire foot into his mouth
I suppose I should thank New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin for validating a recent post I made where I wrote, at best, Nagin could make a general election runoff in the upcoming (fingers crossed) New Orleans mayoral election, but not win. In it, I noted Nagin’s recent good insider political skills but noted his conduct publicly concerning the initial phases of Hurricane Katrina’s striking the city and some remarks afterwards would keep him from reelection.
About the time I wrote those words, Nagin spoke to a rally in honor of Martin Luther King Day where, as has become his signature style, he waxed both astutely and idiotically. Maximal attention has been granted to his remarks about the Deity perhaps smiting his city with the storm, and that chocolate has been and will be the majority flavor of New Orleans’ racial composition.
New Orleans undeniably has its wicked side, but I just don’t think people would find that a convincing reason to unleash wind and flood on it (especially not when the Deity seemed to ignore situations such as wickedness in the White House in the latter 1990s). And absurdly asserting the war in Iraq is a mistake also meriting the Deity's attention will really win him bonus points among policymakers who back the war -- the same ones who have control over pursestrings that could shake some cash loose for reconstructing New Orleans. Moreover, Nagin lacks the Deity’s omniscience so how can he claim credibly that New Orleans always will be a majority black city?
Again, this isn’t the rhetoric that wins one another term in office and overshadows a very cogent point that Nagin also made – poorly. He claimed another reason why New Orleans took the Deity’s wrath was because blacks often were their own worst enemies when it came to achieving progress as a community.
Now, surely the Deity wouldn’t show His displeasure (if He even has any) at failures among black people or anybody else by injuring them – there’s enough in the way of excessive wind that does that already. But despite his apocalyptic rendition of the problem, Nagin’s central idea that the black community has done much to harm itself merely echoes others (which earns the wrath of those invested in the idea that pathologies in the black community are visited upon it by neither the Deity nor blacks themselves, but by evil whitey).
Maybe the “chocolate” remark was Nagin’s way of trying to reassure blacks that proposals for rebuilding New Orleans that he may endorse tomorrow that could be interpreted as discriminating against blacks will not. If so, even by his standards he reached new heights (or, perhaps better expressed, tumbled to new depths) of creating controversy. Or maybe he wants to appear as weird as possible, to make his political opponents underestimate him (the first part is working marvelously).
In the final analysis, this whole episode encapsulates Nagin’s political abilities – that while behind the scenes he seems to have some skills, his public behavior and rhetoric make him seem like a political eccentric. The latter traits certainly can’t assist in exercise of the former. He won’t get reelected, so the least he can do to help the city rebuild, and thus to reinvigorate the Louisiana’s economy, until he leaves office is when in public to just shut up.
About the time I wrote those words, Nagin spoke to a rally in honor of Martin Luther King Day where, as has become his signature style, he waxed both astutely and idiotically. Maximal attention has been granted to his remarks about the Deity perhaps smiting his city with the storm, and that chocolate has been and will be the majority flavor of New Orleans’ racial composition.
New Orleans undeniably has its wicked side, but I just don’t think people would find that a convincing reason to unleash wind and flood on it (especially not when the Deity seemed to ignore situations such as wickedness in the White House in the latter 1990s). And absurdly asserting the war in Iraq is a mistake also meriting the Deity's attention will really win him bonus points among policymakers who back the war -- the same ones who have control over pursestrings that could shake some cash loose for reconstructing New Orleans. Moreover, Nagin lacks the Deity’s omniscience so how can he claim credibly that New Orleans always will be a majority black city?
Again, this isn’t the rhetoric that wins one another term in office and overshadows a very cogent point that Nagin also made – poorly. He claimed another reason why New Orleans took the Deity’s wrath was because blacks often were their own worst enemies when it came to achieving progress as a community.
Now, surely the Deity wouldn’t show His displeasure (if He even has any) at failures among black people or anybody else by injuring them – there’s enough in the way of excessive wind that does that already. But despite his apocalyptic rendition of the problem, Nagin’s central idea that the black community has done much to harm itself merely echoes others (which earns the wrath of those invested in the idea that pathologies in the black community are visited upon it by neither the Deity nor blacks themselves, but by evil whitey).
Maybe the “chocolate” remark was Nagin’s way of trying to reassure blacks that proposals for rebuilding New Orleans that he may endorse tomorrow that could be interpreted as discriminating against blacks will not. If so, even by his standards he reached new heights (or, perhaps better expressed, tumbled to new depths) of creating controversy. Or maybe he wants to appear as weird as possible, to make his political opponents underestimate him (the first part is working marvelously).
In the final analysis, this whole episode encapsulates Nagin’s political abilities – that while behind the scenes he seems to have some skills, his public behavior and rhetoric make him seem like a political eccentric. The latter traits certainly can’t assist in exercise of the former. He won’t get reelected, so the least he can do to help the city rebuild, and thus to reinvigorate the Louisiana’s economy, until he leaves office is when in public to just shut up.
Shreveport convention center ready to debut as white elephant
On Thursday Shreveport’s convention center opens for business, even though officially it will not be fully completed for another two months. Unfortunately, questions continue unanswered whether it will accomplish what its backers claimed it would do, bringing economic development to Shreveport.
Of most serious doubt is whether it really will attract enough business to make up for its cost. Keep in mind that if it comes in at around the $100 million figure often cited, interest on the bonds to pay for it will consume around another $45 million (over 20 years at 4%; these figures are assumptions probably not far off from reality). This brings the total price tag up $145 million, or $7.25 million a year or $36.25 for every man, woman, and child in Shreveport (assuming a population steady around 200,000) for the next 20 years. This means, without any operating costs worked in, that the total amount of additional taxes and fees the city takes in from its operation must be in essence $7.25 million annually for it to “break even.”
Further breaking this down, given 2005 budgeted figures, sales and use taxes triggered solely by the convention center (such as conventioneers dining out, etc.) would have to increase by about 9 percent to earn back the money being pumped into the convention center just for its building. This means guests would have to spend over $300 million if we assume it all gets made up in sales taxes. Even if the city attracts annually 30 mid-sized conventions of 200 attendees from outside the area, this means each person would have to spend over $50,000 during his visit to Shreveport – in Shreveport.
Theoretically, the revenue contribution is more complicated than this, since some property values could go up, jobs may get created creating other taxable sources of revenue, etc. (one which will not provide much more is additional hotel occupancy taxes – in 2005 their total is budgeted only at $1.5 million). I can’t give a good guess for these – nobody can. Still, it should be apparent that the only way the convention center will pay for its fixed costs is a couple decades worth of large numbers of convention attendees swarming the city spending far in excess of national averages and creating an unprecedented number of jobs as a result.
(Note that almost all of the kinds of jobs produced are hospitality in nature, considered to be the least value-adding of jobs created and among the least able to contribute to the tax base. Property tax receipts themselves rise incrementally and are far below sales and use tax receipts, so no great increase would come from here. Furthermore, let’s say these visitors go crazy on the riverboats – collections there now run only about $12 million a year, so even the a bunch of conventioneers spending money at the casinos like they were flushing toilet paper is just not going to add much revenue from this source.)
Compound this revenue problem by the fact that, as of now, the few clients lined up by the managers of the center are smaller and many are local who would have used other local facilities. In other words, they hardly bring new revenues for the city. And there continue to be plenty of predictions that nationally the convention business isn’t going to improve any time soon.
Finally, potentially discouraging use of the center are political considerations. On both issues of its construction and in hiring its management, the politics of race have been interjected by black Democrats of the City Council. Whether this ultimately inflates the final tab of the joint and/or reduces operating efficiency remains to be seen, but when unofficial quotas get pushed onto an operation, costs of building and operating usually increase. (And in the background waits the hotel attached to the center, now only months from completion, itself perhaps an even greater white elephant and drainer of taxpayer and city resources.)
Still the center is something the citizenry brought upon itself by voting affirmatively for the money to pay for it. Its presence may increase its citizens’ pride, it may raise the city’s profile a bit, and it certainly will allow Shreveport politicians to puff their chests out even more than can their brethren across the river already expert in doing that, but it's unlikely to deliver economic benefits that will pay for itself any time in the near, and likely even distant, future.
Of most serious doubt is whether it really will attract enough business to make up for its cost. Keep in mind that if it comes in at around the $100 million figure often cited, interest on the bonds to pay for it will consume around another $45 million (over 20 years at 4%; these figures are assumptions probably not far off from reality). This brings the total price tag up $145 million, or $7.25 million a year or $36.25 for every man, woman, and child in Shreveport (assuming a population steady around 200,000) for the next 20 years. This means, without any operating costs worked in, that the total amount of additional taxes and fees the city takes in from its operation must be in essence $7.25 million annually for it to “break even.”
Further breaking this down, given 2005 budgeted figures, sales and use taxes triggered solely by the convention center (such as conventioneers dining out, etc.) would have to increase by about 9 percent to earn back the money being pumped into the convention center just for its building. This means guests would have to spend over $300 million if we assume it all gets made up in sales taxes. Even if the city attracts annually 30 mid-sized conventions of 200 attendees from outside the area, this means each person would have to spend over $50,000 during his visit to Shreveport – in Shreveport.
Theoretically, the revenue contribution is more complicated than this, since some property values could go up, jobs may get created creating other taxable sources of revenue, etc. (one which will not provide much more is additional hotel occupancy taxes – in 2005 their total is budgeted only at $1.5 million). I can’t give a good guess for these – nobody can. Still, it should be apparent that the only way the convention center will pay for its fixed costs is a couple decades worth of large numbers of convention attendees swarming the city spending far in excess of national averages and creating an unprecedented number of jobs as a result.
(Note that almost all of the kinds of jobs produced are hospitality in nature, considered to be the least value-adding of jobs created and among the least able to contribute to the tax base. Property tax receipts themselves rise incrementally and are far below sales and use tax receipts, so no great increase would come from here. Furthermore, let’s say these visitors go crazy on the riverboats – collections there now run only about $12 million a year, so even the a bunch of conventioneers spending money at the casinos like they were flushing toilet paper is just not going to add much revenue from this source.)
Compound this revenue problem by the fact that, as of now, the few clients lined up by the managers of the center are smaller and many are local who would have used other local facilities. In other words, they hardly bring new revenues for the city. And there continue to be plenty of predictions that nationally the convention business isn’t going to improve any time soon.
Finally, potentially discouraging use of the center are political considerations. On both issues of its construction and in hiring its management, the politics of race have been interjected by black Democrats of the City Council. Whether this ultimately inflates the final tab of the joint and/or reduces operating efficiency remains to be seen, but when unofficial quotas get pushed onto an operation, costs of building and operating usually increase. (And in the background waits the hotel attached to the center, now only months from completion, itself perhaps an even greater white elephant and drainer of taxpayer and city resources.)
Still the center is something the citizenry brought upon itself by voting affirmatively for the money to pay for it. Its presence may increase its citizens’ pride, it may raise the city’s profile a bit, and it certainly will allow Shreveport politicians to puff their chests out even more than can their brethren across the river already expert in doing that, but it's unlikely to deliver economic benefits that will pay for itself any time in the near, and likely even distant, future.
16.1.06
Another test ahead for resurrecting Nagin's political career
Despite inauspicious moments initially after Hurricane Katrina, is it possible that, left for dead politically, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin can resurrect his political career?
While Nagin bungled the evacuation of New Orleans before the hurricane, and the imposition of law and order and coordination of assistance immediately after, since the rescue portion of the crisis has passed he has staged a comeback. He seems to have mended fences with the federal government and it can be argued that he is on better terms with Pres. George W. Bush than is Gov. Kathleen Blanco. Nagin also has turned on the gladhanding with members of Congress who matter and can claim legitimately to have brought home some reconstruction bacon.
His efforts take place in the shadow of city elections forthcoming by the end of April. Only a couple of months ago, with the opening chapters of his storm response still in mind, pundits believed he had little chance for reelection. But a case can be made that Nagin’s chances have gone from none to competitive.
No other black politician has announced a mayoral run. Also, heavyweights such as Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu seem reluctant to enter the fray (in Landrieu’s case, because possibly he has much bigger fish to fry). If a projected field of conservative Republican and former New Orleans city member Peggy Wilson, liberal Democrat and former member Eddie Sapir, conservative Democrat and Orleans Parish School Board member Jimmy Fahrenholtz, and Nagin materializes, black Democrat Nagin has a pretty decent chance to make it to the general election runoff phase.
But getting any farther may be difficult. Nagin should get a solid majority of the black vote, but not overwhelmingly so. This makes winning difficult in an electorate that probably will end up majority white and those crossover votes simply are not likely to be there against Wilson or Fahrenholtz, given the relatively slow pace of recovery in the eyes of many white voters (if not Nagin’s outright hostility to some) and the fact, fairly or not, that Nagin spends more time in Dallas or shuttling around the country than governing in the city. He probably would have trouble even against Sapir, where the hesitancy of conservative voters to support such a liberal would get cancelled by Sapir’s picking up greater liberal black votes.
Perhaps sensing his electoral fate has brought about the dramatic rise (although anything coming from zero is by definition a “dramatic rise”) in his political effectiveness. Without feeling the need to impress any constituency, Nagin may feel free to do what he thinks best regardless of political consequences since they seem certain anyway.
How Nagin deals with the coming recommendations this week of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission will provide another marker in his post-hurricane career. He may well accept unpopular parts of the proposals such as building moratoriums in certain places after a certain period of time because he thinks them right. This kind of leadership may not get him another four years, but it may be effective at this particular time for New Orleans.
While Nagin bungled the evacuation of New Orleans before the hurricane, and the imposition of law and order and coordination of assistance immediately after, since the rescue portion of the crisis has passed he has staged a comeback. He seems to have mended fences with the federal government and it can be argued that he is on better terms with Pres. George W. Bush than is Gov. Kathleen Blanco. Nagin also has turned on the gladhanding with members of Congress who matter and can claim legitimately to have brought home some reconstruction bacon.
His efforts take place in the shadow of city elections forthcoming by the end of April. Only a couple of months ago, with the opening chapters of his storm response still in mind, pundits believed he had little chance for reelection. But a case can be made that Nagin’s chances have gone from none to competitive.
No other black politician has announced a mayoral run. Also, heavyweights such as Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu seem reluctant to enter the fray (in Landrieu’s case, because possibly he has much bigger fish to fry). If a projected field of conservative Republican and former New Orleans city member Peggy Wilson, liberal Democrat and former member Eddie Sapir, conservative Democrat and Orleans Parish School Board member Jimmy Fahrenholtz, and Nagin materializes, black Democrat Nagin has a pretty decent chance to make it to the general election runoff phase.
But getting any farther may be difficult. Nagin should get a solid majority of the black vote, but not overwhelmingly so. This makes winning difficult in an electorate that probably will end up majority white and those crossover votes simply are not likely to be there against Wilson or Fahrenholtz, given the relatively slow pace of recovery in the eyes of many white voters (if not Nagin’s outright hostility to some) and the fact, fairly or not, that Nagin spends more time in Dallas or shuttling around the country than governing in the city. He probably would have trouble even against Sapir, where the hesitancy of conservative voters to support such a liberal would get cancelled by Sapir’s picking up greater liberal black votes.
Perhaps sensing his electoral fate has brought about the dramatic rise (although anything coming from zero is by definition a “dramatic rise”) in his political effectiveness. Without feeling the need to impress any constituency, Nagin may feel free to do what he thinks best regardless of political consequences since they seem certain anyway.
How Nagin deals with the coming recommendations this week of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission will provide another marker in his post-hurricane career. He may well accept unpopular parts of the proposals such as building moratoriums in certain places after a certain period of time because he thinks them right. This kind of leadership may not get him another four years, but it may be effective at this particular time for New Orleans.
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