Besides the obvious fact that the biggest loser of Anh “Joseph” Cao’s upset win over Rep. Bill Jefferson was the incumbent himself, next in line is the neighbor to the south, Rep. Charlie Melancon, and Louisiana Democrats as a whole.
A Democrat as is Jefferson, he is the most endangered species in the Louisiana House delegation since every single member other member now is a Republican. The giddy dreams some state party officials must have had now have turned nightmarish; the party had hoped to wiggle out of this election cycle with another Democrat to succeed Jefferson on the Second District, Paul Carmouche to pick up the open seat in the Fourth, and Rep. Don Cazayoux to retain the seat he has won by special election only months early, to give the delegation a majority in the state. Instead, despite all being at least even-money possibilities, all three wishes came up craps.
In the short run, the surviving Melancon (unopposed for reelection) really gains nothing more than he already had. Even had Jefferson won, the indictments hanging over his head would had rendered him largely ineffective as a powerbroker, so Melancon among the state’s House members, being of the same party as the current Congressional majority and incoming president (plus now among the most senior even just starting his third term), would still have been the most influential. But in the long run, the Cao upset along with these other GOP victories makes Melancon’s deteriorating position even worse.
With Louisiana very likely losing a House seat due to reapportionment in 2012, Melancon’s seat remains the most threatened. Three interests will jockey over this process, and two of them have a community of interest that will drive it. Republicans will want to create conditions that will ensure at least five of the six seats remain in their hands, while black Democrats will want a secure seat for themselves.
This cuts out white Democrats entirely, and the other two forces have the muscle to put this through the state legislature. Republicans already effectively control the House and while Democrats control the Senate, black legislators among them will defect on this issue. And of course Gov. Bobby Jindal whose approval is necessary on any plan and could only be bypassed with an impossible supermajority is a Republican.
The idea all along has been to carve up Melancon’s Third District and shifting other districts at the margins. This would allow the Second District to take in majority black areas of the Third and reach into the Sixth and First to do the same to reinforce its current black majority – necessary not only because of general population loss, but as a result of the hurricane disasters of 2005. These with the Seventh then can swallow up the Third.
Just in case black Democrats hesitate, Jindal and his allies can offer them a deal they can’t refuse. With depopulation costing New Orleans as many as five legislative seats, Republicans can offer to save most of these black legislators’ seats in exchange for dismantling the Third. Those affected incumbents will throw Melancon overboard faster than the Silver Zipper can charm a female ex-reporter.
But with the election of Cao, they may not need such inducements. The special circumstances of this contest are not likely to repeat, but they still demonstrate that the seat is not as safe as they might like for a black. Any thoughts they may have harbored about trying to eliminate a Republican seat against the odds to save Melancon’s surely are reduced now.
As 2010 approached, had a black Democrat been ensconced in the Second and Cazayoux or Carmouche or both in office, there would have been less concern about shoring up the majority black status of the Second and perhaps the Sixth or Fourth (likely the latter) would have been more vulnerable for elimination. But the 2008 cycle produced the worst possible outcome for Melancon, meaning this could be his last term. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, in 2010 he may take a chance opposing a slightly vulnerable Sen. David Vitter as the only opportunity to extend his political career past 2012.
10.12.08
Caddo failing schools plan itself not likely to succeed
Newcomer Caddo Parish School District Superintendent Gerald Dawkins has introduced a plan to deal with schools threatened by state takeover, which should receive an answer concering it from the state next week. As befitting a situation where dramatic results must be changed the plan is bold. Unfortunately, it addresses too few of the impediments that have created the underachieving problem in the first place.
To prompt better performance out of failing schools, first one must be clear about why the underperformance happens. No one cause, but several in part interrelated must be addressed before any substantial improvement can occur. They deal with the students’ backgrounds themselves, the competency of the teachers, and the administrative/political environment in which it all operates.
Dawkins’ plan faces long odds because it cannot adequately address all of these considerations. It seeks to create a theme at each subpar school (typically utilizing some already-developed education system), clear all present positions of their occupants and invite open hiring into them, and add instructional and development time among other things. The hope is to attract students from other attendance zones in the district interested in theme areas which (even if this goes unstated) can increase the school’s test scores, as well as to attract better teachers to get students to achieve more.
These outcomes may be realized, but given all of the other inertia they are unlikely to cause the big improvement necessary. The least controllable factor of school performance is the students themselves, more specifically the backgrounds and cultures from which they hail. Simply, in these schools, children disproportionately come from families that do not possess the attitudes and/or abilities to facilitate success in learning.
Regrettably, too many of these children have parents who do not value education and/or are unable to assist their kids in their schoolwork or in providing support that encourages students to stay in school and learn. (Not surprisingly, most of these parents were poor or indifferent students usually if now working in low-paying jobs that afford them little opportunity to give support, creating a cycle of low achievement.) Shamefully, until welfare reform in the past dozen years, these attitudes were encouraged (what was so important about doing well in school if the state would support you regardless?) and it will take a generation to undo the entitlement mentality present in the subculture of underachievement, something Dawkins’ plan can do nothing about.
Teacher competency in their subject knowledge base also contributes. In its initial certification guidelines (and note that schools are not forced to hire only teachers certified in the subject area they teach), Louisiana requires some undemanding demonstration of knowledge, but none to renew certificates. And a large number of teachers still operate under the old certification system where no demonstration of competency is required at any time. Louisiana as many states have done already needs to implement a periodic testing of subject area knowledge of all teachers to make sure only those who demonstrate proficient knowledge of the subject areas they teach be allowed to do so.
But this necessity is a pipe dream as long as current school governance remains unaltered and teachers’ unions given power to prevent the needed changes. Ideally, the best teachers, both in terms of subject competency and in pedagogical skill, would be placed in the worst schools. The central office could create a process offering substantially better pay for teaching in these schools, based upon these two merits demonstrated by some objective process, with it doing the hiring for these schools. That would be needed to get the better teachers in place.
However, this would invoke the wrath of the beneficiaries of the current process, where hiring is done in a decentralized process by principals primarily based upon seniority and who knows whom where the low-performing school are generally the last choice of teachers, and would be opposed bitterly by unions whose main goal is to transfer as much money as possible into the pockets of as many (unionized) teachers as they can and who have vehemently obstructed any efforts at kinds of merit pay or competency testing. Another potential improvement would be to introduce much sterner disciplinary measures for disruptive students, whose behavior disproportionately plagues these schools, but then different political and legal forces would fight these changes as well.
For a vexing problem it’s good to be a big thinker. But one also must understand the root causes of the disease, some of which are beyond schools’ control and others where fundamental political change must occur requiring courage seldom seen within the educational establishment. Dawkins’ plan addresses little of this, and such represents a reshuffling of chairs resting on the deck of a sinking ship.
To prompt better performance out of failing schools, first one must be clear about why the underperformance happens. No one cause, but several in part interrelated must be addressed before any substantial improvement can occur. They deal with the students’ backgrounds themselves, the competency of the teachers, and the administrative/political environment in which it all operates.
Dawkins’ plan faces long odds because it cannot adequately address all of these considerations. It seeks to create a theme at each subpar school (typically utilizing some already-developed education system), clear all present positions of their occupants and invite open hiring into them, and add instructional and development time among other things. The hope is to attract students from other attendance zones in the district interested in theme areas which (even if this goes unstated) can increase the school’s test scores, as well as to attract better teachers to get students to achieve more.
These outcomes may be realized, but given all of the other inertia they are unlikely to cause the big improvement necessary. The least controllable factor of school performance is the students themselves, more specifically the backgrounds and cultures from which they hail. Simply, in these schools, children disproportionately come from families that do not possess the attitudes and/or abilities to facilitate success in learning.
Regrettably, too many of these children have parents who do not value education and/or are unable to assist their kids in their schoolwork or in providing support that encourages students to stay in school and learn. (Not surprisingly, most of these parents were poor or indifferent students usually if now working in low-paying jobs that afford them little opportunity to give support, creating a cycle of low achievement.) Shamefully, until welfare reform in the past dozen years, these attitudes were encouraged (what was so important about doing well in school if the state would support you regardless?) and it will take a generation to undo the entitlement mentality present in the subculture of underachievement, something Dawkins’ plan can do nothing about.
Teacher competency in their subject knowledge base also contributes. In its initial certification guidelines (and note that schools are not forced to hire only teachers certified in the subject area they teach), Louisiana requires some undemanding demonstration of knowledge, but none to renew certificates. And a large number of teachers still operate under the old certification system where no demonstration of competency is required at any time. Louisiana as many states have done already needs to implement a periodic testing of subject area knowledge of all teachers to make sure only those who demonstrate proficient knowledge of the subject areas they teach be allowed to do so.
But this necessity is a pipe dream as long as current school governance remains unaltered and teachers’ unions given power to prevent the needed changes. Ideally, the best teachers, both in terms of subject competency and in pedagogical skill, would be placed in the worst schools. The central office could create a process offering substantially better pay for teaching in these schools, based upon these two merits demonstrated by some objective process, with it doing the hiring for these schools. That would be needed to get the better teachers in place.
However, this would invoke the wrath of the beneficiaries of the current process, where hiring is done in a decentralized process by principals primarily based upon seniority and who knows whom where the low-performing school are generally the last choice of teachers, and would be opposed bitterly by unions whose main goal is to transfer as much money as possible into the pockets of as many (unionized) teachers as they can and who have vehemently obstructed any efforts at kinds of merit pay or competency testing. Another potential improvement would be to introduce much sterner disciplinary measures for disruptive students, whose behavior disproportionately plagues these schools, but then different political and legal forces would fight these changes as well.
For a vexing problem it’s good to be a big thinker. But one also must understand the root causes of the disease, some of which are beyond schools’ control and others where fundamental political change must occur requiring courage seldom seen within the educational establishment. Dawkins’ plan addresses little of this, and such represents a reshuffling of chairs resting on the deck of a sinking ship.
8.12.08
Fat lady sings but Carmouche doesn't yet listen
Democrat candidate Paul Carmouche for Louisiana’s Fourth Congressional District is of a mind to ask for a recount of the results from last Saturday’s contest with Republican Dr. John Fleming, where Fleming came out 356 votes ahead. The way the numbers are, it is the equivalent of coming into the last hole of a golf tournament in second place trailing the clubhouse leader by four shots on a par 5 hole.
At least this is according to national Republican officials, who sent out information Monday about what a recount would entail. Important to note is that the only recounting done is for ballots not counted electronically. Excluded are paper ballots courtesy of early voting procedures by mail, which since they are counted by a scanner typically have a very low error rate. All other ballots are electronically cast and could be recounted only if there is some verified irregularity revealed when they are “opened” tomorrow. (See here for an excellent front-line explanation of what gets counted.)
Therefore, the only place where Carmouche could make up ground would be with provisional ballots – those cast because an election commissioner had reason to believe the voter was registered but for whatever reason was not recorded as being registered to that precinct – and any challengeable spoiled ballots. There are only 36 verified of the former and 171 of the latter (and perhaps an additional 10 potentially spoiled).
But there could be many more provisional ballots in each precinct box containing information from the voting machines. A general rule of thumb from national statistics is that one percent of the total cast end up as provisional, meaning 926 in this case (although Republican operatives estimate there may only be about 200). Further, other rules of thumb indicate that only half of provisional ballots are verified and half of spoiled ballots are reintroduced and declared valid.
If these numbers hold – 463 provisional and 181 spoiled – Carmouche would really have to pull a rabbit out of his hat to win with these. Even if he got 50 percent greater than Fleming on each set (such as a 75/25 split) that’s only 322 votes he makes up. He would have to capture close to 80 percent of the votes (assuming voting machine tallies check and no errors made in tallying already-processed paper ballots which all would have to be non-randomly in his favor) in order to pull ahead.
That seems very improbable given the closeness of the contest. Of course, a higher number of provisional ballots discovered would decrease the margin necessary to win, as would more of them and the spoiled ballots being validated, but these things also would entail a departure from statistical norms, and potentially dramatic ones for a difference to be made. After spending in the neighborhood of $1.5 million to try to take this office, Carmouche can’t be blamed for putting a little more down on a recount, but it looks like it will be just a little more good money after bad for him and an unnecessary taxing of registrar resources and the public’s patience for everybody else.
At least this is according to national Republican officials, who sent out information Monday about what a recount would entail. Important to note is that the only recounting done is for ballots not counted electronically. Excluded are paper ballots courtesy of early voting procedures by mail, which since they are counted by a scanner typically have a very low error rate. All other ballots are electronically cast and could be recounted only if there is some verified irregularity revealed when they are “opened” tomorrow. (See here for an excellent front-line explanation of what gets counted.)
Therefore, the only place where Carmouche could make up ground would be with provisional ballots – those cast because an election commissioner had reason to believe the voter was registered but for whatever reason was not recorded as being registered to that precinct – and any challengeable spoiled ballots. There are only 36 verified of the former and 171 of the latter (and perhaps an additional 10 potentially spoiled).
But there could be many more provisional ballots in each precinct box containing information from the voting machines. A general rule of thumb from national statistics is that one percent of the total cast end up as provisional, meaning 926 in this case (although Republican operatives estimate there may only be about 200). Further, other rules of thumb indicate that only half of provisional ballots are verified and half of spoiled ballots are reintroduced and declared valid.
If these numbers hold – 463 provisional and 181 spoiled – Carmouche would really have to pull a rabbit out of his hat to win with these. Even if he got 50 percent greater than Fleming on each set (such as a 75/25 split) that’s only 322 votes he makes up. He would have to capture close to 80 percent of the votes (assuming voting machine tallies check and no errors made in tallying already-processed paper ballots which all would have to be non-randomly in his favor) in order to pull ahead.
That seems very improbable given the closeness of the contest. Of course, a higher number of provisional ballots discovered would decrease the margin necessary to win, as would more of them and the spoiled ballots being validated, but these things also would entail a departure from statistical norms, and potentially dramatic ones for a difference to be made. After spending in the neighborhood of $1.5 million to try to take this office, Carmouche can’t be blamed for putting a little more down on a recount, but it looks like it will be just a little more good money after bad for him and an unnecessary taxing of registrar resources and the public’s patience for everybody else.
7.12.08
Numbers show disgust at Jefferson likely ousted him
Analysis shows the reason why Rep. Bill Jefferson lost a chance at a tenth term, even if it might have been attenuated, was his black voting base abandoned him at his time of need while disproportionately more non-black voters showed up to give Republican Anh “Joseph” Cao enough margin to knock Jefferson off.
It’s fascinating to review the 91 precincts in the Second Congressional District that have at least 95 percent black majorities with fewer than 2.5 percent whites in them over the Oct. 4 Democrat primary, the Nov. 4 nomination runoff, and the Dec. 6 general election. In this time period they averaged 61,477 registrants or about a sixth of the district’s voters, and it’s no surprise that almost all of them in all three contests returned 95 percent-plus majorities for black candidates (several in the first election, Jefferson in the remaining two). Indeed, in the general election Jefferson swept every vote in 10 of them, while Cao was shut out in another 7.
The problem for Jefferson was, too few of them voted in the general election compared to the others. Turnout in October was only a little under 17 percent in these districts, but swelled to over 37 percent in November. But in December, it plunged to just under 12 percent. In numerical terms, the drop from October to December was over 3,000. Considering that Jefferson would have gotten at least 95 percent of this vote and he lost by 1,826 votes, even a turnout level, all other things equal, matching October’s would have brought him the victory by about 1,000 votes.
Why did turnout fall so incredibly? One clue is to look at the October election’s other contests and compare it to other contests on the ballot. Comparing precincts, there wasn’t a whole lot of difference between the sum total of votes received in the Second District primary and those for other local contests. Important to remember is that Republicans could vote in these other local races, but they comprise only about 11 percent of the district’s total. In other words, in a contest where a range of choices besides Jefferson was available, turnout was roughly equivalent to other contests on the ballot, meaning few of those voting were there only to vote on local races and rolled off on the congressional contest.
Therefore, if all other things were equal, turnout should have been close in December to October levels in these precincts. Instead, it dropped five percent. This would appear to indicate that some who voted in October did not vote in December because their choice was either a damaged Democrat in Jefferson or non-Democrats. Rather than be forced to make such a choice, they stayed home.
This played into Cao’s favor given the dynamics with which he had to work. He saw a boost come from white and Vietnamese constituencies. In October, turnout in the 24 precincts (that comprise over 25,000 registrants) with at least 80 percent of registrants being white and fewer than 5 percent being black, adjusting for Republicans not being able to participate until December turnout was over 28 percent, zooming to about 52 percent in November, and then declining back to about 29 percent in December.
The differentials are striking, especially in December. Typically, black turnout will fall a few percentage points behind that of whites. But the gaps here are unusual, of 11, 15, and 17 percent. The last in particular was stunning and cannot be explained, as Jefferson seems to want to believe, that there was “confusion.” Whites turned out at almost exactly the same adjusted rate October to December, so is it being argued here that whites somehow were less confused? The only explanation that makes sense is that some black, mostly Democrats, in October found someone they could for in the Democrat primary, but in December they felt there was nobody on the ballot for which they could touch the screen, and therefore stayed home.
Even though whites comprise only 31 percent of the district while blacks have twice as high a proportion, white turnout apparently was over 2.5 times that of blacks (this was the scenario for a Cao victory previously outlined). The magnitude of the increased differential suggests that some whites and other race voters who had participated in the Democrat primary defected to Cao. So he not only benefitted from a depressed Jefferson base, but appeared to also differentially benefit from defections. There maybe have been “apathy” among blacks about this election, but let’s be clear about why – it was because of the Democrat nominee.
(Only four precincts have a large Vietnamese population. In the two where other races outnumbered blacks, turnout increased from October to November, and then stayed the same from November to December – likely a boost of about a hundred votes for Cao.)
In the end, Jefferson appeared to lose support in the general election well in excess of what normally would have been expected – likely because of the federal indictments hanging over him – while Cao’s base remained more present and firmer. It’s why this unprecedented situation has occurred where for the nest two years a non-black Republican will represent a district with over half of his registered constituents being black Democrats.
It’s fascinating to review the 91 precincts in the Second Congressional District that have at least 95 percent black majorities with fewer than 2.5 percent whites in them over the Oct. 4 Democrat primary, the Nov. 4 nomination runoff, and the Dec. 6 general election. In this time period they averaged 61,477 registrants or about a sixth of the district’s voters, and it’s no surprise that almost all of them in all three contests returned 95 percent-plus majorities for black candidates (several in the first election, Jefferson in the remaining two). Indeed, in the general election Jefferson swept every vote in 10 of them, while Cao was shut out in another 7.
The problem for Jefferson was, too few of them voted in the general election compared to the others. Turnout in October was only a little under 17 percent in these districts, but swelled to over 37 percent in November. But in December, it plunged to just under 12 percent. In numerical terms, the drop from October to December was over 3,000. Considering that Jefferson would have gotten at least 95 percent of this vote and he lost by 1,826 votes, even a turnout level, all other things equal, matching October’s would have brought him the victory by about 1,000 votes.
Why did turnout fall so incredibly? One clue is to look at the October election’s other contests and compare it to other contests on the ballot. Comparing precincts, there wasn’t a whole lot of difference between the sum total of votes received in the Second District primary and those for other local contests. Important to remember is that Republicans could vote in these other local races, but they comprise only about 11 percent of the district’s total. In other words, in a contest where a range of choices besides Jefferson was available, turnout was roughly equivalent to other contests on the ballot, meaning few of those voting were there only to vote on local races and rolled off on the congressional contest.
Therefore, if all other things were equal, turnout should have been close in December to October levels in these precincts. Instead, it dropped five percent. This would appear to indicate that some who voted in October did not vote in December because their choice was either a damaged Democrat in Jefferson or non-Democrats. Rather than be forced to make such a choice, they stayed home.
This played into Cao’s favor given the dynamics with which he had to work. He saw a boost come from white and Vietnamese constituencies. In October, turnout in the 24 precincts (that comprise over 25,000 registrants) with at least 80 percent of registrants being white and fewer than 5 percent being black, adjusting for Republicans not being able to participate until December turnout was over 28 percent, zooming to about 52 percent in November, and then declining back to about 29 percent in December.
The differentials are striking, especially in December. Typically, black turnout will fall a few percentage points behind that of whites. But the gaps here are unusual, of 11, 15, and 17 percent. The last in particular was stunning and cannot be explained, as Jefferson seems to want to believe, that there was “confusion.” Whites turned out at almost exactly the same adjusted rate October to December, so is it being argued here that whites somehow were less confused? The only explanation that makes sense is that some black, mostly Democrats, in October found someone they could for in the Democrat primary, but in December they felt there was nobody on the ballot for which they could touch the screen, and therefore stayed home.
Even though whites comprise only 31 percent of the district while blacks have twice as high a proportion, white turnout apparently was over 2.5 times that of blacks (this was the scenario for a Cao victory previously outlined). The magnitude of the increased differential suggests that some whites and other race voters who had participated in the Democrat primary defected to Cao. So he not only benefitted from a depressed Jefferson base, but appeared to also differentially benefit from defections. There maybe have been “apathy” among blacks about this election, but let’s be clear about why – it was because of the Democrat nominee.
(Only four precincts have a large Vietnamese population. In the two where other races outnumbered blacks, turnout increased from October to November, and then stayed the same from November to December – likely a boost of about a hundred votes for Cao.)
In the end, Jefferson appeared to lose support in the general election well in excess of what normally would have been expected – likely because of the federal indictments hanging over him – while Cao’s base remained more present and firmer. It’s why this unprecedented situation has occurred where for the nest two years a non-black Republican will represent a district with over half of his registered constituents being black Democrats.
6.12.08
Cao's stunning win shows maturity of Second District
One would have thought that Anh “Joseph” Cao had as good a chance as anyone to turn the majority-black Louisiana Second Congressional District into a Republican seat, at least for two years. He has a rag-to-riches background, faced an indicted incumbent the evidence concerning which was particularly toxic, and had the good fortune for the election to occur in the optimal electoral environment that would attract disproportionately his supporters compared to those of his opponent’s, Democrat incumbent Rep. Bill Jefferson.
But early voting totals seemed to dispel the notion of an upset, combined with the insistence by a large portion of the district’s black voters that comprise 62 percent of the total electorate that when it comes to voting, the absolute necessary condition for any candidate to be eligible to receive a vote is that he is black. For Cao to have any chance of winning, he had to draw disproportionately from Republicans, mainly whites. Early voting indicators showed that wasn’t going to happen. As these results tipped off an overall low turnout, this would have helped Cao only if whites had disproportionately shown up then (signaling the same was likely to occur on Saturday). Instead, the ratio of white-black-other-race turnout was pretty close to the district’s overall ratio.
And yet, Cao pulled off the biggest upset of the 2008 election campaign. I’ll need more time to scan the precincts to give a definitive answer, but two things seemed obvious. First, turnout for the election was just 70 percent of the Democrat/independent-only primary total on Nov. 4 – now about 50,000 Republicans would get a say and looked to ahev turned out disproportionately. Second, while some of the super-black-majority precincts in Orleans (95 percent-plus black registration) had decent turnouts of 20 percent, other turnouts were microscopic – heavily Jefferson, but less than 5 percent. Even a 10 percent turnout in these might have been enough to win Jefferson the election.
Just a couple of days ago, rhetoric such as this was emanating from Jefferson supporters:
“They're trying to disenfranchise us, trying to convince us that it's a wasted vote to go on Saturday and pull the lever for a man who we know is ours,” said the Rev. Samuel Butler, who organized the news conference [Thursday supporting Jefferson]. He didn't elaborate on how he believes Republicans are trying to accomplish [that].
“This district means a lot to us because it was really created ... for the blacks to have representation,” said the Rev. Zebedee Bridges, a longtime Jefferson ally. “I'm hoping that the people in that district don't sit down and let someone walk in and take our rights away from us. You really can't visualize how much this means to us. This is history.”
Such ignorance reflects poorly on the leadership, if any, that these ministers demonstrate. Butler needs to explain how the election of Cao would “disenfranchise” him, blacks, or anybody else. How would the election of Cao in any way show compromising of the right to vote? Bridges desperately needs a history lesson: the district was designed to have black interests represented, not blacks – demonstrated by the fact that the longest-serving holders of the district were husband-and-wife white politicians Hale and Lindy Boggs. And he needs to explain the obviously racist sentiment that somehow failure to elect a black to the office would “take our rights away from us.” Does he mean whites like the Boggs in office did that? Or in Tennessee, does he imply that white Democrat Rep. Steve Cohen discriminates against black constituents in his majority-black district?
One would have thought America was past this with the election of multi-racial president-elect Barack Obama. These people may not be, but the voters of the Second District showed they were.
But early voting totals seemed to dispel the notion of an upset, combined with the insistence by a large portion of the district’s black voters that comprise 62 percent of the total electorate that when it comes to voting, the absolute necessary condition for any candidate to be eligible to receive a vote is that he is black. For Cao to have any chance of winning, he had to draw disproportionately from Republicans, mainly whites. Early voting indicators showed that wasn’t going to happen. As these results tipped off an overall low turnout, this would have helped Cao only if whites had disproportionately shown up then (signaling the same was likely to occur on Saturday). Instead, the ratio of white-black-other-race turnout was pretty close to the district’s overall ratio.
And yet, Cao pulled off the biggest upset of the 2008 election campaign. I’ll need more time to scan the precincts to give a definitive answer, but two things seemed obvious. First, turnout for the election was just 70 percent of the Democrat/independent-only primary total on Nov. 4 – now about 50,000 Republicans would get a say and looked to ahev turned out disproportionately. Second, while some of the super-black-majority precincts in Orleans (95 percent-plus black registration) had decent turnouts of 20 percent, other turnouts were microscopic – heavily Jefferson, but less than 5 percent. Even a 10 percent turnout in these might have been enough to win Jefferson the election.
Just a couple of days ago, rhetoric such as this was emanating from Jefferson supporters:
“They're trying to disenfranchise us, trying to convince us that it's a wasted vote to go on Saturday and pull the lever for a man who we know is ours,” said the Rev. Samuel Butler, who organized the news conference [Thursday supporting Jefferson]. He didn't elaborate on how he believes Republicans are trying to accomplish [that].
“This district means a lot to us because it was really created ... for the blacks to have representation,” said the Rev. Zebedee Bridges, a longtime Jefferson ally. “I'm hoping that the people in that district don't sit down and let someone walk in and take our rights away from us. You really can't visualize how much this means to us. This is history.”
Such ignorance reflects poorly on the leadership, if any, that these ministers demonstrate. Butler needs to explain how the election of Cao would “disenfranchise” him, blacks, or anybody else. How would the election of Cao in any way show compromising of the right to vote? Bridges desperately needs a history lesson: the district was designed to have black interests represented, not blacks – demonstrated by the fact that the longest-serving holders of the district were husband-and-wife white politicians Hale and Lindy Boggs. And he needs to explain the obviously racist sentiment that somehow failure to elect a black to the office would “take our rights away from us.” Does he mean whites like the Boggs in office did that? Or in Tennessee, does he imply that white Democrat Rep. Steve Cohen discriminates against black constituents in his majority-black district?
One would have thought America was past this with the election of multi-racial president-elect Barack Obama. These people may not be, but the voters of the Second District showed they were.
4.12.08
Democrat mistakes appear set to cost them more seats
One reason why Louisiana Democrats are becoming an endangered species in the state is they would rather shoot the messenger than comprehend the message. The party’s reaction that led to Rep. Don Cazayoux’s failed reelection bid only demonstrates this and may explain why they are about to let another congressional seat slip from its grasp..
There is a standard Democrat playbook to try to win these seats in the South where solid white conservative majorities exist: get white candidates who can sound conservative on social issues, and take the black vote for granted. As compared to a candidate, black or white, who always unabashedly will vote liberal, this kind of candidate can be relied upon by the party leadership to do so much of the time and has much improved chances of winning since casual voters will be fooled into thinking he is more conservative.
But for this to work, black Democrats have to cooperate. In all, with this kind of candidate they still will get a majority of what they want in policy terms. However, it discriminates against black candidates who find it more difficult to hide their liberalism because, as long as party officials think the district is competitive or there is no other alternative, they will prefer the white candidate. The problem Cazayoux encountered was state Rep. Michael Jackson tired of this condition of servitude in the party, and when narrowly defeated by Cazayoux in the nomination for the special election, struck out on his own as an independent in the regular election.
Jackson did so because he felt slighted by regular power brokers in the party. He had good reason to feel so. Comparing donors to the special election campaigns, a flood of money from Democrat-supporting interest groups and a who’s-who of prominent white Democrats in the state gave to Cazayoux, while Jackson got little in the way of these PAC contributions, from individuals most money came from blacks, and of whites more (although still a fraction of Cazayoux’s total receipts) actually came from Republicans. And while the party in terms of giving remained neutral until after Cazayoux secured the nomination (and then it threw everything it had to him), it is incredibly hard to believe that it was coincidental that the traditional big donors to the party’s candidates would not almost exclusively line up behind Cazayoux if there wasn’t some tacit, perhaps even unspoken, directive from party leaders to support Cazayoux because he better fit the playbook.
There was a good case that the party could have supported Jackson over Cazayoux as a winner in the regular election. Especially with then-Sen. Barack Obama on the ticket as the presidential candidate to stimulate black turnout and the regular election scheduled to coincide with this election, Jackson would have had 30 percent of the vote secured immediately. The district probably had enough white liberals that Jackson could have won under these conditions. The problem was Cazayoux was the more electable candidate for the special election which if won could bring advantages of incumbency to the regular election and deny them to a Republican.
So, Jackson was told to stay in his place and this caused him to bolt. It is particularly humorous to witness the naïveté and/or disingenuousness of Democrat officials to “blame” Jackson for Cazayoux’s loss and to call him a “sellout.” This is because Louisiana Democrats long ago sold out the party’s black voters in its attempt to appear to be something that it isn’t to chase more numerous white votes. Jackson was not the reason Democrats lost the seat, it was the party itself from the internal contradictions of its strategy.
(And it may not even be fair to “blame” Jackson for this defeat. As previously noted, the relatively higher turnout among blacks on Nov. 4 really benefitted Cazayoux more than Jackson. Take away the good luck of the “Obama effect” and the bad luck of the “Jackson effect” and Cazayoux’s reelection was a tossup.)
Saturday, it may happen again, this time without a black politician to take the blame. Former First District Attorney Paul Carmouche, the Democrat nominee, is running the same playbook as did Cazayoux against Republican nominee Dr. John Fleming. Already signs seem to point to Fleming winning, but an additional one confirms the trend: in early voting, in Caddo Parish where whites only slightly outnumber blacks, whites turned out in 3.5 times greater numbers than blacks, and in Bossier Parish where whites outnumber blacks 6:1 the ratio in early voting is over double that (these parishes hold over half of the district’s voters and almost all of the its black citizens). This would indicate not a lot of enthusiasm among blacks for a Carmouche candidacy, and would be the death knell for any chance Carmouche has of winning.
Simply, the white, long-time politician Carmouche seems to be failing to energize the majority bloc of blacks in the Democrat base. The Democrats have nobody to blame but themselves for putting up a candidate they thought could fit a cookie-cutter winning mold instead of a candidate who will address what so many of their constituents want. It failed them in the Sixth District, and it may well fail them in the Fourth.
There is a standard Democrat playbook to try to win these seats in the South where solid white conservative majorities exist: get white candidates who can sound conservative on social issues, and take the black vote for granted. As compared to a candidate, black or white, who always unabashedly will vote liberal, this kind of candidate can be relied upon by the party leadership to do so much of the time and has much improved chances of winning since casual voters will be fooled into thinking he is more conservative.
But for this to work, black Democrats have to cooperate. In all, with this kind of candidate they still will get a majority of what they want in policy terms. However, it discriminates against black candidates who find it more difficult to hide their liberalism because, as long as party officials think the district is competitive or there is no other alternative, they will prefer the white candidate. The problem Cazayoux encountered was state Rep. Michael Jackson tired of this condition of servitude in the party, and when narrowly defeated by Cazayoux in the nomination for the special election, struck out on his own as an independent in the regular election.
Jackson did so because he felt slighted by regular power brokers in the party. He had good reason to feel so. Comparing donors to the special election campaigns, a flood of money from Democrat-supporting interest groups and a who’s-who of prominent white Democrats in the state gave to Cazayoux, while Jackson got little in the way of these PAC contributions, from individuals most money came from blacks, and of whites more (although still a fraction of Cazayoux’s total receipts) actually came from Republicans. And while the party in terms of giving remained neutral until after Cazayoux secured the nomination (and then it threw everything it had to him), it is incredibly hard to believe that it was coincidental that the traditional big donors to the party’s candidates would not almost exclusively line up behind Cazayoux if there wasn’t some tacit, perhaps even unspoken, directive from party leaders to support Cazayoux because he better fit the playbook.
There was a good case that the party could have supported Jackson over Cazayoux as a winner in the regular election. Especially with then-Sen. Barack Obama on the ticket as the presidential candidate to stimulate black turnout and the regular election scheduled to coincide with this election, Jackson would have had 30 percent of the vote secured immediately. The district probably had enough white liberals that Jackson could have won under these conditions. The problem was Cazayoux was the more electable candidate for the special election which if won could bring advantages of incumbency to the regular election and deny them to a Republican.
So, Jackson was told to stay in his place and this caused him to bolt. It is particularly humorous to witness the naïveté and/or disingenuousness of Democrat officials to “blame” Jackson for Cazayoux’s loss and to call him a “sellout.” This is because Louisiana Democrats long ago sold out the party’s black voters in its attempt to appear to be something that it isn’t to chase more numerous white votes. Jackson was not the reason Democrats lost the seat, it was the party itself from the internal contradictions of its strategy.
(And it may not even be fair to “blame” Jackson for this defeat. As previously noted, the relatively higher turnout among blacks on Nov. 4 really benefitted Cazayoux more than Jackson. Take away the good luck of the “Obama effect” and the bad luck of the “Jackson effect” and Cazayoux’s reelection was a tossup.)
Saturday, it may happen again, this time without a black politician to take the blame. Former First District Attorney Paul Carmouche, the Democrat nominee, is running the same playbook as did Cazayoux against Republican nominee Dr. John Fleming. Already signs seem to point to Fleming winning, but an additional one confirms the trend: in early voting, in Caddo Parish where whites only slightly outnumber blacks, whites turned out in 3.5 times greater numbers than blacks, and in Bossier Parish where whites outnumber blacks 6:1 the ratio in early voting is over double that (these parishes hold over half of the district’s voters and almost all of the its black citizens). This would indicate not a lot of enthusiasm among blacks for a Carmouche candidacy, and would be the death knell for any chance Carmouche has of winning.
Simply, the white, long-time politician Carmouche seems to be failing to energize the majority bloc of blacks in the Democrat base. The Democrats have nobody to blame but themselves for putting up a candidate they thought could fit a cookie-cutter winning mold instead of a candidate who will address what so many of their constituents want. It failed them in the Sixth District, and it may well fail them in the Fourth.
3.12.08
Signs point to Republican retention of LA Fourth District
With the reelection of Republican Sen. Saxby Chambliss yesterday, only one probable competitive federal contest remains to complete election cycle 2008, in Louisiana’s Fourth Congressional District (while by no means impossible, Rep. Bill Jefferson is not likely to lose in the state’s Second District). Chambliss’ win gives clues as to the winner between Republican physician/businessman John Fleming and Democrat former First District Attorney Paul Carmouche.
Fleming has run as a solid conservative from the start in this conservative district, while Carmouche has tried to do the same despite his party label that won president-elect Barack Obama all of 39 percent of the vote in the district. Citing his prosecutorial background and constantly articulating social conservative views, Carmouche has bent over backwards to argue he can work for a liberal taskmaster such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (who dropped in during the campaign to help him raise money) yet somehow reflect conservative values in his representation.
It is the preferred strategy by non-incumbent Southern Democrats, trying to appear conservative on a few issues to “inoculate” themselves against charges that they largely will serve liberal interests. But it’s wearing thin, as results across the South showed in November, and in December now (the election pushed back here because of Hurricane Gustav-induced difficulties) odds are it will come a-cropper on Carmouche.
Two dynamics are at work here, both because this is an election outside the normal election day: that disproportionately better-informed voters will show up at the polls, and that there is no one at the top of the ballot which with Obama in November served to give an extra boost to Democrats. Reviewing the first consideration, more casual voters are less likely to vote this time out than in November, and these voters are typically less informed and therefore less likely to grasp the contradictions of the Carmouche candidacy.
For example, despite the fact that pro-abortion forces such as Pelosi have rallied to the aide of Carmouche, he says he’s pro-life and implies he’d vote that way on legislation addressing that in Congress. But more informed voters doubt that he would. One thing that Obama is likely to do is relaxing the current presidential order that funds not be given to international groups that advocate and perform abortions, so the next budget passed by Congress could include that kind of funding. So Carmouche really is going to stand up to Pelosi (who was rebuked by American bishops for suggesting the Catholic theology really did not ban abortion, while some church leaders including Pope Benedict XVI have suggested Catholic politicians should not take communion if they voted to support abortion) on this, or would he try to have it both ways?
Carmouche has stated, on occasions such as this, he would act independently and still have influence in a liberal party. But either he is being dishonest or ignorant with this attitude. On tougher issues where there will be defections, perhaps from the 45 or so (hard to tell how many exactly are left given recent election results) “blue dog” Democrats currently in the House (Carmouche wants to join the caucus if he wins), a lot of pressure will be put on him to vote liberal. And on others, he will have no influence at all because (if he and Jefferson win) there will be 257 Democrats in the House, meaning even discarding the fiscally moderate blue dogs Pelosi has around 210 sure votes. A few absent members and GOP defectors on each vote, and Pelosi can ignore the blue dogs and Carmouche. So he will often be there for her against the will of his district, and often when he is not he will have no influence anyway. This is something better-informed voters understand and therefore conservatives among them will be hesitant to support him.
Concerning the other consideration, the Georgia election shows that while Chambliss’ vote total dropped off about 600,000 from November to December, his Democrat opponent’s dropped about 800,000 (although Chambliss’ figures may be slightly understated because he probably picked up some portion of those who voted for the Libertarian candidate in November although the majority of those voters probably stayed home in December). The same dynamic will be at work Saturday in Louisiana.
The only independent survey of the contest assumed 72 percent turnout among registered voters and that 27 percent of the electorate would be blacks (which the survey showed favored Carmouche by 85 to 9 percent), which deduced Fleming would win by two percent. Both of those turnout figures are optimistic; overall turnout may reach two-thirds of that number and black turnout was only 28 percent of the total electorate in the October primary where there were both local and statewide contests on the ballot with especially intense local contests in Caddo Parish where well over half of the district’s blacks live.
After Democrats won the White House in 1992 and retained control of Congress, a Georgia runoff for the Senate that captured a seat from the Democrats was the very first signal of the approaching Republican onslaught of 1994. Should Fleming retain the seat for the GOP, it could be the initial sign of a Republican comeback in 2010.
Fleming has run as a solid conservative from the start in this conservative district, while Carmouche has tried to do the same despite his party label that won president-elect Barack Obama all of 39 percent of the vote in the district. Citing his prosecutorial background and constantly articulating social conservative views, Carmouche has bent over backwards to argue he can work for a liberal taskmaster such as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (who dropped in during the campaign to help him raise money) yet somehow reflect conservative values in his representation.
It is the preferred strategy by non-incumbent Southern Democrats, trying to appear conservative on a few issues to “inoculate” themselves against charges that they largely will serve liberal interests. But it’s wearing thin, as results across the South showed in November, and in December now (the election pushed back here because of Hurricane Gustav-induced difficulties) odds are it will come a-cropper on Carmouche.
Two dynamics are at work here, both because this is an election outside the normal election day: that disproportionately better-informed voters will show up at the polls, and that there is no one at the top of the ballot which with Obama in November served to give an extra boost to Democrats. Reviewing the first consideration, more casual voters are less likely to vote this time out than in November, and these voters are typically less informed and therefore less likely to grasp the contradictions of the Carmouche candidacy.
For example, despite the fact that pro-abortion forces such as Pelosi have rallied to the aide of Carmouche, he says he’s pro-life and implies he’d vote that way on legislation addressing that in Congress. But more informed voters doubt that he would. One thing that Obama is likely to do is relaxing the current presidential order that funds not be given to international groups that advocate and perform abortions, so the next budget passed by Congress could include that kind of funding. So Carmouche really is going to stand up to Pelosi (who was rebuked by American bishops for suggesting the Catholic theology really did not ban abortion, while some church leaders including Pope Benedict XVI have suggested Catholic politicians should not take communion if they voted to support abortion) on this, or would he try to have it both ways?
Carmouche has stated, on occasions such as this, he would act independently and still have influence in a liberal party. But either he is being dishonest or ignorant with this attitude. On tougher issues where there will be defections, perhaps from the 45 or so (hard to tell how many exactly are left given recent election results) “blue dog” Democrats currently in the House (Carmouche wants to join the caucus if he wins), a lot of pressure will be put on him to vote liberal. And on others, he will have no influence at all because (if he and Jefferson win) there will be 257 Democrats in the House, meaning even discarding the fiscally moderate blue dogs Pelosi has around 210 sure votes. A few absent members and GOP defectors on each vote, and Pelosi can ignore the blue dogs and Carmouche. So he will often be there for her against the will of his district, and often when he is not he will have no influence anyway. This is something better-informed voters understand and therefore conservatives among them will be hesitant to support him.
Concerning the other consideration, the Georgia election shows that while Chambliss’ vote total dropped off about 600,000 from November to December, his Democrat opponent’s dropped about 800,000 (although Chambliss’ figures may be slightly understated because he probably picked up some portion of those who voted for the Libertarian candidate in November although the majority of those voters probably stayed home in December). The same dynamic will be at work Saturday in Louisiana.
The only independent survey of the contest assumed 72 percent turnout among registered voters and that 27 percent of the electorate would be blacks (which the survey showed favored Carmouche by 85 to 9 percent), which deduced Fleming would win by two percent. Both of those turnout figures are optimistic; overall turnout may reach two-thirds of that number and black turnout was only 28 percent of the total electorate in the October primary where there were both local and statewide contests on the ballot with especially intense local contests in Caddo Parish where well over half of the district’s blacks live.
After Democrats won the White House in 1992 and retained control of Congress, a Georgia runoff for the Senate that captured a seat from the Democrats was the very first signal of the approaching Republican onslaught of 1994. Should Fleming retain the seat for the GOP, it could be the initial sign of a Republican comeback in 2010.
2.12.08
Jindal plan offers most possible, best health care fix
Battle lines continue to be drawn over Louisiana’s reform for its indigent care. Four separate ideas currently circulate, but only one will work both in political terms and in achievement of quality care done more efficiently. But the political side of the equation already has ruled out one alternative, and threatens this other one as well.
Essentially, the state’s fee-for-service Medicaid system that encourages providers, often government itself, to bill away with little regard for cost containment or efficiency, continues to devour more and more resources. The state faces the central problem of having to pay for nearly a third of these costs which, except for elementary and secondary education as a whole, is the single largest programmatic expenditure of the state. Reform promises to control these costs without deterioration, if not actual improvement, of service provision.
Gov. Bobby Jindal’s Secretary of Health and Hospitals Alan Levine has come up with a plan that would take the indigent and allow their placement into various insurance pools run by the private sector, which would negotiate rates with providers. It is hoped that, in the long run, this would introduce efficiencies into the system that would allow for more coverage at the same or reduced cost. Theoretically, it could allow for higher reimbursement rates than now exist to encourage more providers into the Medicaid system and to discourage essentially unnecessary expenditures that currently must be paid for either because of lack of coordination or because providers want to increase their revenues.
This is a plan similar to that Levine introduced when he served as head of Florida’s health care, and the initial returns on that are encouraging. The main problem seems to be raising awareness of the indigent about the program and their options, but despite higher per person administrative costs (because only 10 percent of the indigent population has been allowed to participate), at least for now its expenditures are running below budgeted levels (outcome changes have yet to be assessed).
But this idea has its detractors. The Louisiana State Medical Society has proposed a system where the poor are given vouchers to purchase medical care, where Jindal’s system would interpose an intermediary. While this proposal might have trouble holding costs down unless providers are fully subjected to market forces, it probably would lower administrative costs without an intermediary. However, practically speaking this would be a nonstarter in Louisiana as it completely cuts out government and too many politicians simply don’t want to do that.
Another suggestion from other sources has been to adopt a system such as in North Carolina replicated to some extent in Louisiana’s CommunityCARE program, where government tries to coordinate care itself. The problem with this model, however, is that doesn’t do a particularly good job of cost containment (as one might expect without market forces prevailing) nor makes a great deal of progress on improving outcomes (Levine concedes it might be a good model for rural areas where little private-sector competition would exist).
And out there at the federal level is the plan proposed by president-elect Barack Obama that largely could moot the entire argument. Obama would force everybody to be insured with the government either forcing employers to provide it or herding everybody into a government-run plan. The indigent would automatically be enrolled and so federal parameters could supersede any state directives.
At an out-of-session informational meeting of the House yesterday, state Rep. Herbert Dixon wondered why act now when it appeared this Obama plan was on the way. He got sidestepped a bit on the answer from Levine, who said there were consistencies between the Obama plan and Jindal’s. But there is a major difference, that where Obama’s would force everybody into a plan heavily managed by the government that would mandate reimbursements and that the non-indigent pay for the indigent premiums through government directly or indirectly (passing through employers), Jindal’s would set aside a fixed amount of dollars to be managed by the private sector that could much more easily adapt to specific conditions and use dollars more efficiently. Thus Obama’s plan, which would require a massive increase in spending, may only marginally increase coverage of the indigent while Jindal’s would do a far superior job of coverage and of introducing efficiency into the system.
However, the basic idea behind Jindal’s plan, removing government as much as possible from the enterprise, haunts Democrats and liberals like a vampire ready to suck the life out of their favorite institution, government. They want government involved as much as possible because it increases the power of elected officials and facilitates redistribution of wealth. So it is in their interests to stall as much as possible in the hopes that an Obama Administration would veto a move to remove government as much as possible from health care, just as it is in the interest of Jindal (and the state as a whole) to move quickly under the present administration that would look far more favorably on a private sector orientation to reform.
Whether that will happen is anybody’s guess, given time constraints. Obama forces formally take control of government in less than 50 days, but for weeks after his inauguration holdovers and careerists in the federal government will still be making decisions. Jindal has to get his plan to Washington as soon as possible to ensure that forces ideologically opposed to his solution won’t control the situation. Especially key to this is the present administration probably much more likely to forgo the state having to pay back the federal government for past overcharges, in order to facilitate this kind of reform. If not in time, the plan will be vetoed and for at least another year Louisiana will have to operate under the old inefficient, inferior-outcome system that will eat up more money that could have been used for other purposes with the prospect of potentially worse to come.
Given what is now possible, Jindal’s best shot at substantive reform is to try to get Levine’s ideas through. If that fails, Louisiana should prepare to hunker down to face a system that, if squeezed for funds because of budget deficits elsewhere, will expand on its history of underperformance and inefficiency.
Essentially, the state’s fee-for-service Medicaid system that encourages providers, often government itself, to bill away with little regard for cost containment or efficiency, continues to devour more and more resources. The state faces the central problem of having to pay for nearly a third of these costs which, except for elementary and secondary education as a whole, is the single largest programmatic expenditure of the state. Reform promises to control these costs without deterioration, if not actual improvement, of service provision.
Gov. Bobby Jindal’s Secretary of Health and Hospitals Alan Levine has come up with a plan that would take the indigent and allow their placement into various insurance pools run by the private sector, which would negotiate rates with providers. It is hoped that, in the long run, this would introduce efficiencies into the system that would allow for more coverage at the same or reduced cost. Theoretically, it could allow for higher reimbursement rates than now exist to encourage more providers into the Medicaid system and to discourage essentially unnecessary expenditures that currently must be paid for either because of lack of coordination or because providers want to increase their revenues.
This is a plan similar to that Levine introduced when he served as head of Florida’s health care, and the initial returns on that are encouraging. The main problem seems to be raising awareness of the indigent about the program and their options, but despite higher per person administrative costs (because only 10 percent of the indigent population has been allowed to participate), at least for now its expenditures are running below budgeted levels (outcome changes have yet to be assessed).
But this idea has its detractors. The Louisiana State Medical Society has proposed a system where the poor are given vouchers to purchase medical care, where Jindal’s system would interpose an intermediary. While this proposal might have trouble holding costs down unless providers are fully subjected to market forces, it probably would lower administrative costs without an intermediary. However, practically speaking this would be a nonstarter in Louisiana as it completely cuts out government and too many politicians simply don’t want to do that.
Another suggestion from other sources has been to adopt a system such as in North Carolina replicated to some extent in Louisiana’s CommunityCARE program, where government tries to coordinate care itself. The problem with this model, however, is that doesn’t do a particularly good job of cost containment (as one might expect without market forces prevailing) nor makes a great deal of progress on improving outcomes (Levine concedes it might be a good model for rural areas where little private-sector competition would exist).
And out there at the federal level is the plan proposed by president-elect Barack Obama that largely could moot the entire argument. Obama would force everybody to be insured with the government either forcing employers to provide it or herding everybody into a government-run plan. The indigent would automatically be enrolled and so federal parameters could supersede any state directives.
At an out-of-session informational meeting of the House yesterday, state Rep. Herbert Dixon wondered why act now when it appeared this Obama plan was on the way. He got sidestepped a bit on the answer from Levine, who said there were consistencies between the Obama plan and Jindal’s. But there is a major difference, that where Obama’s would force everybody into a plan heavily managed by the government that would mandate reimbursements and that the non-indigent pay for the indigent premiums through government directly or indirectly (passing through employers), Jindal’s would set aside a fixed amount of dollars to be managed by the private sector that could much more easily adapt to specific conditions and use dollars more efficiently. Thus Obama’s plan, which would require a massive increase in spending, may only marginally increase coverage of the indigent while Jindal’s would do a far superior job of coverage and of introducing efficiency into the system.
However, the basic idea behind Jindal’s plan, removing government as much as possible from the enterprise, haunts Democrats and liberals like a vampire ready to suck the life out of their favorite institution, government. They want government involved as much as possible because it increases the power of elected officials and facilitates redistribution of wealth. So it is in their interests to stall as much as possible in the hopes that an Obama Administration would veto a move to remove government as much as possible from health care, just as it is in the interest of Jindal (and the state as a whole) to move quickly under the present administration that would look far more favorably on a private sector orientation to reform.
Whether that will happen is anybody’s guess, given time constraints. Obama forces formally take control of government in less than 50 days, but for weeks after his inauguration holdovers and careerists in the federal government will still be making decisions. Jindal has to get his plan to Washington as soon as possible to ensure that forces ideologically opposed to his solution won’t control the situation. Especially key to this is the present administration probably much more likely to forgo the state having to pay back the federal government for past overcharges, in order to facilitate this kind of reform. If not in time, the plan will be vetoed and for at least another year Louisiana will have to operate under the old inefficient, inferior-outcome system that will eat up more money that could have been used for other purposes with the prospect of potentially worse to come.
Given what is now possible, Jindal’s best shot at substantive reform is to try to get Levine’s ideas through. If that fails, Louisiana should prepare to hunker down to face a system that, if squeezed for funds because of budget deficits elsewhere, will expand on its history of underperformance and inefficiency.
1.12.08
Bossier City squandering endangers its financial health
There seems to be trouble brewing in paradise, better known to elected officials and political insiders there as Bossier City, as a couple of their own seem to be straying off the reservation. If only it could be that over the thunderous din arising from politicians’ incessant patting themselves on their own backs that more of these voices asking for a reality check could be heard – and one which voters might be well advised to assist.
Over the past month, Bossier City got presented with another quantum growth in the size of city government. Commonly known is that long before it became fashionable courtesy of the president-elect to preach of “investing” in government, Bossier City has practiced it -- $56.5 million on an arena that historically loses operating funds, not even considering opportunity and indirect costs; $21 million for a parking garage for private developers that will not be paid off in added tax receipts for decades, if ever; and the latest, $35 million to a cyberspace startup with little chance much of the government spinoff business on which it was breathlessly predicated ever will come this way.
Less well known is that in its operating expenses the city has been profligate. From 1998 through 2007, spending in its three major areas outside of debt have mushroomed – public safety being the largest area with the most growth of over 88 percent, general government up nearly 60 percent, and culture and recreation nearly 225 percent (over all of these three which make up over 90 percent of recurring non-debt related expenditures the increase is 89 percent). This has been reflected by the number of employees added by the city over that time, rising by nearly a quarter, with dozens more added to the payroll this year and 16 more asked for next year.
To add insult to injury, spending recently has begun to outstrip revenues, forcing the city to dip into its reserves. For the general fund, which is where the majority of tax collections go, its projected cushion would be only $4 million, down 70 percent in just three years. This got the attention of Democrat Councilman Don “Bubba” Williams and independent Councilman Jerome Darby, who wondered about the prudence of the latest budget which has increased general fund spending almost 14 percent in just the past two years.
One could argue that the cost of living could account for some of this increase. But the producer price index increased only a little under 39 percent during these 10 years, meaning Bossier City spending increased at a rate over twice as fast. And even giving a pass on increased public safety spending, the fact remains other spending increased at about the same high rate.
Defenders of the status quo, much like their brethren in Washington whose free-spending ways cost them Congress, Councilmen Republicans David Jones and Tim Larkin argue that because the “city is growing” such increased expenditures are needed. If so, they need to check the city’s own internal figures which show the population increased only about 6 percent in the 10 years from 1998 inclusive. This means per capita major item spending has increased almost 80 percent in that period, and employees per capita have increased 18 percent. Simply, spending (and hiring) is growing far beyond what a population increase could explain.
The other major defense of this spendaholicism is that it’s a revenue problem, not a spending problem. City Finance Director Joe Buffington keeps saying if property tax millages weren’t consistently rolled back, there would be millions in extra revenue available.
However, Buffington doesn’t bother to admit that city revenues from property taxes have increased dramatically in these ten years, almost 56 percent, because the total value of assessed property in city boundaries (mostly because of improvements to property and some from a rising real estate market) went up 75 percent. The sad fact is, despite this impressive escalation, spending rose even faster (for their part, sales taxes doubled plus five percent). Perhaps to increase revenue Buffington should pay more attention to a property tax collection rate that once was close to 100 percent which has gone below 95 percent during his tenure, costing the city about a half a million dollars a year.
The voracious appetite of Bossier City government bothers not Republican Mayor Lo Walker and the GOP majority on the Council. When queried about the city’s deteriorating financial condition and his budget, Walker blithely answered if people didn’t like it, they could vote its supporters out of office this spring (in other words, it was like he held up perhaps on both hands his index, middle, and ring fingers together, and said, “read between the lines,” by which he definitely would not mean this column). Let's hope enough members of the Council at least will alter the budget that they will soon consider before it comes to that.
If not, the dual arrogance and imbecility most Bossier City’s elected officials have on this issue in fact should elevate Walker’s observation to the level of an imperative. Booting these spendthrifts out of office maybe the only way both the sustained squandering of the city’s tax dollars and of its potential can be halted.
Over the past month, Bossier City got presented with another quantum growth in the size of city government. Commonly known is that long before it became fashionable courtesy of the president-elect to preach of “investing” in government, Bossier City has practiced it -- $56.5 million on an arena that historically loses operating funds, not even considering opportunity and indirect costs; $21 million for a parking garage for private developers that will not be paid off in added tax receipts for decades, if ever; and the latest, $35 million to a cyberspace startup with little chance much of the government spinoff business on which it was breathlessly predicated ever will come this way.
Less well known is that in its operating expenses the city has been profligate. From 1998 through 2007, spending in its three major areas outside of debt have mushroomed – public safety being the largest area with the most growth of over 88 percent, general government up nearly 60 percent, and culture and recreation nearly 225 percent (over all of these three which make up over 90 percent of recurring non-debt related expenditures the increase is 89 percent). This has been reflected by the number of employees added by the city over that time, rising by nearly a quarter, with dozens more added to the payroll this year and 16 more asked for next year.
To add insult to injury, spending recently has begun to outstrip revenues, forcing the city to dip into its reserves. For the general fund, which is where the majority of tax collections go, its projected cushion would be only $4 million, down 70 percent in just three years. This got the attention of Democrat Councilman Don “Bubba” Williams and independent Councilman Jerome Darby, who wondered about the prudence of the latest budget which has increased general fund spending almost 14 percent in just the past two years.
One could argue that the cost of living could account for some of this increase. But the producer price index increased only a little under 39 percent during these 10 years, meaning Bossier City spending increased at a rate over twice as fast. And even giving a pass on increased public safety spending, the fact remains other spending increased at about the same high rate.
Defenders of the status quo, much like their brethren in Washington whose free-spending ways cost them Congress, Councilmen Republicans David Jones and Tim Larkin argue that because the “city is growing” such increased expenditures are needed. If so, they need to check the city’s own internal figures which show the population increased only about 6 percent in the 10 years from 1998 inclusive. This means per capita major item spending has increased almost 80 percent in that period, and employees per capita have increased 18 percent. Simply, spending (and hiring) is growing far beyond what a population increase could explain.
The other major defense of this spendaholicism is that it’s a revenue problem, not a spending problem. City Finance Director Joe Buffington keeps saying if property tax millages weren’t consistently rolled back, there would be millions in extra revenue available.
However, Buffington doesn’t bother to admit that city revenues from property taxes have increased dramatically in these ten years, almost 56 percent, because the total value of assessed property in city boundaries (mostly because of improvements to property and some from a rising real estate market) went up 75 percent. The sad fact is, despite this impressive escalation, spending rose even faster (for their part, sales taxes doubled plus five percent). Perhaps to increase revenue Buffington should pay more attention to a property tax collection rate that once was close to 100 percent which has gone below 95 percent during his tenure, costing the city about a half a million dollars a year.
The voracious appetite of Bossier City government bothers not Republican Mayor Lo Walker and the GOP majority on the Council. When queried about the city’s deteriorating financial condition and his budget, Walker blithely answered if people didn’t like it, they could vote its supporters out of office this spring (in other words, it was like he held up perhaps on both hands his index, middle, and ring fingers together, and said, “read between the lines,” by which he definitely would not mean this column). Let's hope enough members of the Council at least will alter the budget that they will soon consider before it comes to that.
If not, the dual arrogance and imbecility most Bossier City’s elected officials have on this issue in fact should elevate Walker’s observation to the level of an imperative. Booting these spendthrifts out of office maybe the only way both the sustained squandering of the city’s tax dollars and of its potential can be halted.
30.11.08
Jindal now targeted by national mainstream media
Wonder why the media have been looking at Republican presidential contenders for three years, 11 months from now, and paying quite a bit of attention to Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal? The push on to make him the frontrunner way in advance has more to do with the left’s agenda than covering a good horse race.
Ever since Jindal succumbed to the electoral politics bug, liberals have recognized the danger he presents to their agenda. Jindal does not apologize for his conservatism but neither does he come off as much of an ideologue; he articulates it well both at a philosophical level but also in terms that demonstrate its superiority to the typical citizen; and, worst of all from the liberal perspective, his life to date explodes the myths of racism and upper-class warfare that liberals desperately want to con Americans into thinking, particularly when it comes to conservatives and Republicans.
The only missing ingredient that could make Jindal a virulent political force against liberalism, now with its most complete control over policy-making at the federal level in history, is a sustained record of success in governance. A candidate with this quality not only would win a decision in 2012 over president-elect Barack Obama, given that Obama appears at this point not be to wavering from his stated agenda, but would score a Reaganesque knockout of Democrats and liberals.
Smart liberals know two things, that if they really do try to implement their agenda they are going to make quite a mess of things principally economically, and that they cannot allow conservative candidates with credibility who effectively communicate the flaws and internal contradictions of liberalism contrasted to conservatism to emerge to point out the problems the undiluted Obama agenda is sure to bring. As things go sour on many fronts, they have to be able to distort and to distract to deflect the public from making this realization.
If Jindal can establish a good governing record to go along with superior communication, liberals lose. They can’t do much about the communication aspect, but they can try to frame Jindal’s record. And this is where the media, who will provide many willing, if not eager, allies, can come into play.
By focusing on Jindal now, they want to be there every step of the way to control the public’s image of him. This is a longer-term version of the tactic utilized against Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin in the wake of her vice presidential nomination, where because of the compressed nature of the campaign quicker hits with less time for rebuttal from forces outside of the media made her easier prey. With Jindal, they want to be able to spot episodes that potentially can be exploitable to damage Jindal’s credibility, and only through constant monitoring can this be maximized.
History shows that the presumed “frontrunners” in presidential nomination contests often fare poorly, precisely because there is so much attention paid to them that any warts discovered can be emphasized time and time again to fatigue potential supporters. Worse for Jindal, that he is an ethnic minority member and conservative invites, if history is any guide, even more media scrutiny and criticism (such as that paid to another potential GOP presidential candidate of the future, former Ohio Sec. of State Ken Blackwell).
So let’s recognize this mainstream media attention for what it is for many: the opening salvo of a national campaign that hopes to neutralize Jindal as a force to be reckoned with in 2012. Whether he will be able to resist that will depend in part on his political skills, and some may be fortune simply beyond his control. Regardless, the battle is commenced.
Ever since Jindal succumbed to the electoral politics bug, liberals have recognized the danger he presents to their agenda. Jindal does not apologize for his conservatism but neither does he come off as much of an ideologue; he articulates it well both at a philosophical level but also in terms that demonstrate its superiority to the typical citizen; and, worst of all from the liberal perspective, his life to date explodes the myths of racism and upper-class warfare that liberals desperately want to con Americans into thinking, particularly when it comes to conservatives and Republicans.
The only missing ingredient that could make Jindal a virulent political force against liberalism, now with its most complete control over policy-making at the federal level in history, is a sustained record of success in governance. A candidate with this quality not only would win a decision in 2012 over president-elect Barack Obama, given that Obama appears at this point not be to wavering from his stated agenda, but would score a Reaganesque knockout of Democrats and liberals.
Smart liberals know two things, that if they really do try to implement their agenda they are going to make quite a mess of things principally economically, and that they cannot allow conservative candidates with credibility who effectively communicate the flaws and internal contradictions of liberalism contrasted to conservatism to emerge to point out the problems the undiluted Obama agenda is sure to bring. As things go sour on many fronts, they have to be able to distort and to distract to deflect the public from making this realization.
If Jindal can establish a good governing record to go along with superior communication, liberals lose. They can’t do much about the communication aspect, but they can try to frame Jindal’s record. And this is where the media, who will provide many willing, if not eager, allies, can come into play.
By focusing on Jindal now, they want to be there every step of the way to control the public’s image of him. This is a longer-term version of the tactic utilized against Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin in the wake of her vice presidential nomination, where because of the compressed nature of the campaign quicker hits with less time for rebuttal from forces outside of the media made her easier prey. With Jindal, they want to be able to spot episodes that potentially can be exploitable to damage Jindal’s credibility, and only through constant monitoring can this be maximized.
History shows that the presumed “frontrunners” in presidential nomination contests often fare poorly, precisely because there is so much attention paid to them that any warts discovered can be emphasized time and time again to fatigue potential supporters. Worse for Jindal, that he is an ethnic minority member and conservative invites, if history is any guide, even more media scrutiny and criticism (such as that paid to another potential GOP presidential candidate of the future, former Ohio Sec. of State Ken Blackwell).
So let’s recognize this mainstream media attention for what it is for many: the opening salvo of a national campaign that hopes to neutralize Jindal as a force to be reckoned with in 2012. Whether he will be able to resist that will depend in part on his political skills, and some may be fortune simply beyond his control. Regardless, the battle is commenced.
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