New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin has more than reelection to worry about, having become the target of a lawsuit by the National Rifle Association. Nagin ordered police officials to seize privately-held, legal firearms in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and a temporary restraining order issued Sep. 23, 2005 enjoined him to cease the practice. Apparently, confiscated weapons have yet to be returned.
What was particularly lamentable is that Nagin had absolutely no authority under either the U.S. Constitution or the Louisiana Constitution to do so. Louisiana statutory law does allow some restrictions on firearms during extraordinary conditions, but does not allow for out-and-out confiscation.
The publicity generated by this suit (probably not accidentally) comes at the launch of the sprint to the mayor’s election Apr. 22 and it only can hurt Nagin’s already tough chances. Four years ago, Nagin got into the general election by capturing a good chunk of the dwindling white vote, where he used it to defeat another black Democrat. However, no serious Republican or white candidate ran in 2002.
The white vote will be even more important this time out because Nagin has three whites, one Republican, running, Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu, civic leader and Audubon Institute director Ron Forman and former city councilor Peggy Wilson. But, at the same time, he is the only prominent, credible black candidate in the race.
It is likely that most whites will desert Nagin, and whites will comprise a larger portion of the electorate than they did in 2002. At the same time, without a major black opponent (even if Democrat Landrieu will have some crossover appeal), Nagin could win if he monopolizes the black vote.
Here’s where his controversial confiscation action and the reminder the lawsuit serves of it potentially causes him problems. Security is an issue that cuts across partisan and racial lines. Blacks and whites, Republicans and Democrats, and all others equally needed firearms to protect themselves against looters in the chaotic environment right after Katrina. Indeed, violence may have been higher in neighborhoods that had higher proportions of black residents.
If Landrieu in particular can remind people that Nagin grabbed guns instead of allowing their use to prevent looting and demonstrates a strong Second Amendment through past deed and current words, this could facilitate his crossover appeal to black voters. Wilson and Forman can do so, too, but Landrieu would be the biggest beneficiary because Landrieu probably would be the next port of call for black voters disgruntled with Nagin created by negative campaigning against Nagin.
Landrieu has nothing to lose by emphasizing this, and probably could pick up some white votes as well. It’s a vulnerability Nagin will wish he didn’t have.
Jeffrey D. Sadow is an associate professor of political science at Louisiana State University Shreveport. If you're an elected official, political operative or anyone else upset at his views, don't go bothering LSUS or LSU System officials about that because these are his own views solely. This publishes five days weekly with the exception of 7 holidays. Also check out his Louisiana Legislature Log especially during legislative sessions (in "Louisiana Politics Blog Roll" below).
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4.3.06
1.3.06
Katrina response used to advocate border insecurity
Apparently Sen. Mary Landrieu isn’t the only one wanting to pile on the American Red Cross and government organizations for political gain. Enter the National Council of La Raza, an anti-American group (motto: “For the Race, Everything; Outside the Race, Nothing”) which promotes unfettered illegal immigration into the U.S. regardless of national security concerns, and pursues a predictably redistributive agenda focused on taking wealthy and power from others and transferring it to those of Hispanic origins. It’s upset about the “response” of nonprofits and government to “Hispanics” regarding the 2005 hurricane disasters.
A lot of the sheer idiocy of its agenda is visible right off the top. The group claims government agencies didn’t provide emergency directions in languages other than English which cost Peruvians and Brazilian working along the Gulf Coast their lives. So we’re supposed to have a bunch of evacuation signs posted in Spanish and Portuguese because of a few immigrants who were irresponsible enough not to be have some knowledge of English? When you come to America to work legally, you need to know some basics of the country’s official language. You adapt to America; it doesn’t adapt to you. It’s your own fault when you fail to do so, not this country’s obligation to bend over backwards for you. I’ve been to 50 countries worldwide and I sure didn’t expect there to be signs in English alongside those in Arabic or Bulgarian (for example); even if I’m a visitor it’s my responsibility to figure out to get around and my fault alone if I can’t.
Also, the group in the report whines about how storm victims got deported because they showed up seeking aid. Well, a little common sense tells us that if they were in the country illegally to begin with, they needed to be deported after receiving assistance. (And, of course, had they not illegally entered the country, they wouldn’t have needed help in the first place.)
While labor abuses did occur, the report illogically tries to tie that to the wise suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act that serves to restrain trade and infringes on individual rights. There’s nothing about artificially inflating wages in order to satisfy union greed that would stop illegal labor practices.
The report gets downright contradictory when it faults the Red Cross on the one hand for requiring diversity training of its workers, which slowed response, yet at the same time criticized the organization for not having enough Hispanic volunteers. So what was the ARC to do, break down doors to Hispanic household and impress volunteers? Does La Raza even understand the meaning of the word “volunteer?” And if the ARC declined help from other Hispanic groups as the report alleges, do these other groups need the ARC’s permission to launch their own efforts? (Perhaps another word with which La Raza is unfamiliar is “ingrate.”)
Its recommendations turn out predictably leftist with a heavy emphasis on embracing victimhood and irresponsibility: force government to spend money to support additional languages other than the national language of English, refuse to enforce immigration laws in times of turmoil, shower benefits on illegal aliens, compel the ARC to become more diverse, etc. Much of what it proposes would degrade border security. In short, the whole thing is a waste of resources and intellectual energy, just an excuse to promote an agenda not designed to assimilate to and celebrate the concept of America, but instead to divide and weaken it.
A lot of the sheer idiocy of its agenda is visible right off the top. The group claims government agencies didn’t provide emergency directions in languages other than English which cost Peruvians and Brazilian working along the Gulf Coast their lives. So we’re supposed to have a bunch of evacuation signs posted in Spanish and Portuguese because of a few immigrants who were irresponsible enough not to be have some knowledge of English? When you come to America to work legally, you need to know some basics of the country’s official language. You adapt to America; it doesn’t adapt to you. It’s your own fault when you fail to do so, not this country’s obligation to bend over backwards for you. I’ve been to 50 countries worldwide and I sure didn’t expect there to be signs in English alongside those in Arabic or Bulgarian (for example); even if I’m a visitor it’s my responsibility to figure out to get around and my fault alone if I can’t.
Also, the group in the report whines about how storm victims got deported because they showed up seeking aid. Well, a little common sense tells us that if they were in the country illegally to begin with, they needed to be deported after receiving assistance. (And, of course, had they not illegally entered the country, they wouldn’t have needed help in the first place.)
While labor abuses did occur, the report illogically tries to tie that to the wise suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act that serves to restrain trade and infringes on individual rights. There’s nothing about artificially inflating wages in order to satisfy union greed that would stop illegal labor practices.
The report gets downright contradictory when it faults the Red Cross on the one hand for requiring diversity training of its workers, which slowed response, yet at the same time criticized the organization for not having enough Hispanic volunteers. So what was the ARC to do, break down doors to Hispanic household and impress volunteers? Does La Raza even understand the meaning of the word “volunteer?” And if the ARC declined help from other Hispanic groups as the report alleges, do these other groups need the ARC’s permission to launch their own efforts? (Perhaps another word with which La Raza is unfamiliar is “ingrate.”)
Its recommendations turn out predictably leftist with a heavy emphasis on embracing victimhood and irresponsibility: force government to spend money to support additional languages other than the national language of English, refuse to enforce immigration laws in times of turmoil, shower benefits on illegal aliens, compel the ARC to become more diverse, etc. Much of what it proposes would degrade border security. In short, the whole thing is a waste of resources and intellectual energy, just an excuse to promote an agenda not designed to assimilate to and celebrate the concept of America, but instead to divide and weaken it.
28.2.06
Second, Sixth Districts unlikley to have partisan change
On an earlier occasion I warned that superficial analysis and over-reliance on conjecture would create problems in understanding the political changes wrought by the 2005 hurricanes in Louisiana. Another example has presented itself.
An organization headed by 1980 independent presidential candidate John Anderson, FairVote, recently argued that the impact of the hurricanes could create competitive Second (around New Orleans) and Sixth (around Baton Rouge) District Congressional elections. But this analysis only incorporated subjective conjectures and superficial data. A look at more specific and rigorous data demonstrates this scenario to be rather far-fetched.
As concerns the Second, the simple fact of the matter is with almost half of the district comprised of black Democrats before Katrina, some extreme dislocations would have to occur for it to become competitive. This seems unlikely. Understand that prior to the storm the district had about 250,000 black registrants out of 405,000.
Two-thirds of the district is comprised of part of New Orleans. The city now estimates it has 156,140 people, and the work I’m doing for a paper presented later this week shows the majority of them are black (yes, I will summarize it all for a future posting). It’s not the 68 percent prior to the storm, but when this is broken down into voter registration totals of those present in Orleans that puts a bare minority as black Democrats who almost always vote Democrat.
Keep in mind the election is eight months away, people are still flowing into Orleans the majority of who are black, and that some whites will vote for a Democrat. In short, it is highly unlikely that a Democrat will not win there in the fall, and likely that this person will be black.
There’s only a marginally better chance that the Sixth District, represented by Republican Rep. Richard Baker for almost 20 years, could flip Democrat. The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s population estimates show this to be unlikely, reporting state population down about 385,000 in January. The population estimation data only shows an increase of 57,820 total individuals in the Sixth District. Using historical data and assuming they all are black Democrats from Orleans Parish, and further assuming all stay and change their registrations from Orleans, the 56.79 percent who would be registered would comprise 32,836 voters, adding to all black voters in the Sixth District would make the district only 38 percent black.
Further assuming that 82.21 percent of all blacks in the district would be black Democrats, adding to that the 28 percent who are white Democrats, and assuming everybody votes at the same rate their partisanship and other parties registrants split theirs, a Democrat could eke out a victory by about 5 percent of the vote. But historically, white Democrats are as likely to vote for a Republican candidate as they are to stay loyal to their party in the Sixth District’s contest, making a Democrat win, all other things held equal, an unlikely scenario – especially with the election ten months away from the date of this data and continued predicted movement from the Sixth District back to the Second.
I like to think that the intentions of FairVote on this issue were genuine. Its purpose is to suggest changes to electoral codes and systems to better reflect popular will in elections. However, they use their conclusions to support changes suggested by their conclusions, opening the possibility of why they were a bit too lax in their research methods was because such conclusions could assist their agenda. In any event, careless research will do nothing to increase our understanding of Louisiana’s post-hurricanes political geography.
An organization headed by 1980 independent presidential candidate John Anderson, FairVote, recently argued that the impact of the hurricanes could create competitive Second (around New Orleans) and Sixth (around Baton Rouge) District Congressional elections. But this analysis only incorporated subjective conjectures and superficial data. A look at more specific and rigorous data demonstrates this scenario to be rather far-fetched.
As concerns the Second, the simple fact of the matter is with almost half of the district comprised of black Democrats before Katrina, some extreme dislocations would have to occur for it to become competitive. This seems unlikely. Understand that prior to the storm the district had about 250,000 black registrants out of 405,000.
Two-thirds of the district is comprised of part of New Orleans. The city now estimates it has 156,140 people, and the work I’m doing for a paper presented later this week shows the majority of them are black (yes, I will summarize it all for a future posting). It’s not the 68 percent prior to the storm, but when this is broken down into voter registration totals of those present in Orleans that puts a bare minority as black Democrats who almost always vote Democrat.
Keep in mind the election is eight months away, people are still flowing into Orleans the majority of who are black, and that some whites will vote for a Democrat. In short, it is highly unlikely that a Democrat will not win there in the fall, and likely that this person will be black.
There’s only a marginally better chance that the Sixth District, represented by Republican Rep. Richard Baker for almost 20 years, could flip Democrat. The Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s population estimates show this to be unlikely, reporting state population down about 385,000 in January. The population estimation data only shows an increase of 57,820 total individuals in the Sixth District. Using historical data and assuming they all are black Democrats from Orleans Parish, and further assuming all stay and change their registrations from Orleans, the 56.79 percent who would be registered would comprise 32,836 voters, adding to all black voters in the Sixth District would make the district only 38 percent black.
Further assuming that 82.21 percent of all blacks in the district would be black Democrats, adding to that the 28 percent who are white Democrats, and assuming everybody votes at the same rate their partisanship and other parties registrants split theirs, a Democrat could eke out a victory by about 5 percent of the vote. But historically, white Democrats are as likely to vote for a Republican candidate as they are to stay loyal to their party in the Sixth District’s contest, making a Democrat win, all other things held equal, an unlikely scenario – especially with the election ten months away from the date of this data and continued predicted movement from the Sixth District back to the Second.
I like to think that the intentions of FairVote on this issue were genuine. Its purpose is to suggest changes to electoral codes and systems to better reflect popular will in elections. However, they use their conclusions to support changes suggested by their conclusions, opening the possibility of why they were a bit too lax in their research methods was because such conclusions could assist their agenda. In any event, careless research will do nothing to increase our understanding of Louisiana’s post-hurricanes political geography.
27.2.06
Make correct, not expedient, changes in higher education
As is proper, Louisiana is reviewing the provision of higher education in the state in the light of the 2005 hurricane disasters. The luxury of too many baccalaureate degree-granting campuses no longer can be sustained in light of the new fiscal realities.
The main reason why Louisiana has gotten into the position where it has 14 such institutions is because politics, rather than educational or financial considerations, have played the main role in determining what gets taught where. There’s little real reason to have in smaller cities a Northwestern State, Southeastern, Nicholls State, Louisiana Tech, or Grambling when they all are within a hour’s drive of major metropolitan areas with their own (often more than one) major state universities. It also makes little sense to have a Southern University right down the street from the University of New Orleans, and another Southern University up the road from Louisiana State University Baton Rouge.
But you just can’t pick up whole campuses and transport them so the state is looking into some kinds of consolidations. Obviously, the move making the most sense would be to end the Southern University system and combine them into the appropriate LSU schools (including associate degree-granting Southern University Shreveport with Bossier Parish Community College) and to combine Grambling and Louisiana Tech, institutions that grant undergraduate and graduate degrees just miles apart from each other in an area of population about 30,000.
Of course, that will never happen because the schools to be merged into others will themselves and have their alumni (a few of whom roam the state Legislature) complain about the end of tradition and will claim each school has a unique, distinct mission – if any of that is true, it certainly pales in comparison to the hundreds of millions of dollars the state would save each year by this rearrangement. In the end politics, rather than efficient delivery of higher education, will win out.
More limited reforms could occur concerning the campuses in small cities near large ones, where they are more than several miles apart and could not easily consolidate resources. But it cannot occur for trivial reasons. As consultants recently have observed, there must be some synergy of functions, or nothing meaningful gets accomplished.
Fortunately, a synergistic-based strategic plan already exists – the Board of Regents of the State of Louisiana’s 2001 Master Plan. I’ll use my employer, whose views I may or may not represent on this issue, Louisiana State University Shreveport, as an example on how this can work.
LSUS is designated in the plan as the comprehensive university in Northwest Louisiana – that is, it should be the primary institution in serving educational needs in this part of the state. Historically, it has not been. NSU has been allowed to poach students through Shreveport-based programs such as its nursing programs. Tech has been allowed to offer graduate coursework at its Barksdale Air Force Base satellite campus. And graduate medical education, of course, is taken care of by the LSU Health Sciences Center Shreveport.
Given the disparate locations and roles of the programs involved, a merger really would not work. Instead, shifting of programs makes much more sense. Something like this should occur:
NSU’s School of Nursing should be transferred into LSUHSC (which should not, given LSUHSC’s current scope and facilities, not result in the loss of accreditation)
Tech should be made more purely into an engineering school, with transfers of functions such as offering degree in the Liberal Arts to LSUS
Any Tech graduate programs currently offered in Shreveport should be transferred to LSUHSC or LSUS, wherever appropriate
Some serious thought should be made to transferring NSU’s educational instruction to LSUS, even though NSU has a long history in this area (it started as a teachers’ college) because, quite simply, there’s a whole lot more demand for teachers in the 350,000-person Bossier and Caddo Parishes than there is in 25,000-person Natchitoches Parish.
Obviously, politics will intrude on these suggestions, too. NSU and Tech will scream about losing these functions. But these are the kinds of things consultants need to be considering because they will save the state tens of millions of dollars (my best guess; it could be much higher) a year and will bring more rationality to higher education in the state. Whether common sense will prevail on this matter is another matter entirely.
The main reason why Louisiana has gotten into the position where it has 14 such institutions is because politics, rather than educational or financial considerations, have played the main role in determining what gets taught where. There’s little real reason to have in smaller cities a Northwestern State, Southeastern, Nicholls State, Louisiana Tech, or Grambling when they all are within a hour’s drive of major metropolitan areas with their own (often more than one) major state universities. It also makes little sense to have a Southern University right down the street from the University of New Orleans, and another Southern University up the road from Louisiana State University Baton Rouge.
But you just can’t pick up whole campuses and transport them so the state is looking into some kinds of consolidations. Obviously, the move making the most sense would be to end the Southern University system and combine them into the appropriate LSU schools (including associate degree-granting Southern University Shreveport with Bossier Parish Community College) and to combine Grambling and Louisiana Tech, institutions that grant undergraduate and graduate degrees just miles apart from each other in an area of population about 30,000.
Of course, that will never happen because the schools to be merged into others will themselves and have their alumni (a few of whom roam the state Legislature) complain about the end of tradition and will claim each school has a unique, distinct mission – if any of that is true, it certainly pales in comparison to the hundreds of millions of dollars the state would save each year by this rearrangement. In the end politics, rather than efficient delivery of higher education, will win out.
More limited reforms could occur concerning the campuses in small cities near large ones, where they are more than several miles apart and could not easily consolidate resources. But it cannot occur for trivial reasons. As consultants recently have observed, there must be some synergy of functions, or nothing meaningful gets accomplished.
Fortunately, a synergistic-based strategic plan already exists – the Board of Regents of the State of Louisiana’s 2001 Master Plan. I’ll use my employer, whose views I may or may not represent on this issue, Louisiana State University Shreveport, as an example on how this can work.
LSUS is designated in the plan as the comprehensive university in Northwest Louisiana – that is, it should be the primary institution in serving educational needs in this part of the state. Historically, it has not been. NSU has been allowed to poach students through Shreveport-based programs such as its nursing programs. Tech has been allowed to offer graduate coursework at its Barksdale Air Force Base satellite campus. And graduate medical education, of course, is taken care of by the LSU Health Sciences Center Shreveport.
Given the disparate locations and roles of the programs involved, a merger really would not work. Instead, shifting of programs makes much more sense. Something like this should occur:
Obviously, politics will intrude on these suggestions, too. NSU and Tech will scream about losing these functions. But these are the kinds of things consultants need to be considering because they will save the state tens of millions of dollars (my best guess; it could be much higher) a year and will bring more rationality to higher education in the state. Whether common sense will prevail on this matter is another matter entirely.
26.2.06
Landrieu mayoral win creates intriguing statewide scenarios
Last week, Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu revealed one of the worst kept secrets around recent New Orleans that he will run for mayor in April. As interesting as this might be concerning politics in the Crescent City, it makes for even more interesting ramifications statewide.
Were Landrieu, as currently he is favored, to win the top job in New Orleans, he no longer could ascend to the state’s top job of Governor as Lt. Governor. What makes this more than an academic point is that a concerted recall effort is taking place aimed at Gov. Kathleen Blanco.
Legally, a petition must meet the one-third registered voter mark within 180 days, and then officials would have 20 days to certify it. Given this time frame (with any general election for mayor, as expected, to occur May 22), the next election date that could be scheduled for the recall would be the Sep. 30 contest to fill two other statewide offices.
This would give Blanco plenty of time (the Constitution gives no specifics) to choose Landrieu’s successor who would face confirmation by the Legislature (convenient, since it would be in session at the time if she’s quick about it). In essence, she might be picking her own successor if things don’t go well for her.
(This month or so would be an interesting time in the state. Should the governor’s office become prematurely vacant at this time, there would be no Lt. Governor to assume the job. Neither would there be an “elected” Secretary of State that would be next in line – the current holder of that office Al Ater was not elected. That would put Atty. Gen. Charles Foti – whose family is married into the Landrieu clan – in the Governor’s Mansion. How about that for a Landrieu anaconda wrapping itself around the state?)
This duty presents quite a choice for Blanco. She must be relieved that a potential gubernatorial rival now is out, and she would want to pick somebody that would not become a political rival to her; indeed, she would want an ally on the chance she does get recalled successfully and/or to assist her in reelection efforts. Is this a backdoor way for Jim Bernhard to finally get the political power he has craved?
And it’s something she needs to start working on immediately. With Landrieu looking like he well could be out of the picture for a succession, this can only encourage people to sign the recall petition who otherwise would not want to see two Landrieus in three of the most powerful statewide elected offices in Louisiana.
Nothing can happen unless Landrieu wins, but if he does, the situation will conjure up some political intrigue exciting even by Louisiana’s inflated standards.
Were Landrieu, as currently he is favored, to win the top job in New Orleans, he no longer could ascend to the state’s top job of Governor as Lt. Governor. What makes this more than an academic point is that a concerted recall effort is taking place aimed at Gov. Kathleen Blanco.
Legally, a petition must meet the one-third registered voter mark within 180 days, and then officials would have 20 days to certify it. Given this time frame (with any general election for mayor, as expected, to occur May 22), the next election date that could be scheduled for the recall would be the Sep. 30 contest to fill two other statewide offices.
This would give Blanco plenty of time (the Constitution gives no specifics) to choose Landrieu’s successor who would face confirmation by the Legislature (convenient, since it would be in session at the time if she’s quick about it). In essence, she might be picking her own successor if things don’t go well for her.
(This month or so would be an interesting time in the state. Should the governor’s office become prematurely vacant at this time, there would be no Lt. Governor to assume the job. Neither would there be an “elected” Secretary of State that would be next in line – the current holder of that office Al Ater was not elected. That would put Atty. Gen. Charles Foti – whose family is married into the Landrieu clan – in the Governor’s Mansion. How about that for a Landrieu anaconda wrapping itself around the state?)
This duty presents quite a choice for Blanco. She must be relieved that a potential gubernatorial rival now is out, and she would want to pick somebody that would not become a political rival to her; indeed, she would want an ally on the chance she does get recalled successfully and/or to assist her in reelection efforts. Is this a backdoor way for Jim Bernhard to finally get the political power he has craved?
And it’s something she needs to start working on immediately. With Landrieu looking like he well could be out of the picture for a succession, this can only encourage people to sign the recall petition who otherwise would not want to see two Landrieus in three of the most powerful statewide elected offices in Louisiana.
Nothing can happen unless Landrieu wins, but if he does, the situation will conjure up some political intrigue exciting even by Louisiana’s inflated standards.
23.2.06
Spread of misinformation by politicians disserves community
Apparently, a recent rhetorical event into which Shreveport political figures inserted themselves debased education and served only to rip open wounds in the community.
The purpose of a debate ought to inform and invite critical thinking on the behalf of those privy to it. The topic ought to feature facts usable by either side, where the participants argue persuasively that the facts better fit the worldview on their side of the argument. At its conclusion, the side which best employs fact (rather than rhetoric or fiction) informed through a worldview that is best demonstrated as valid should win and inspire the audience to evaluate or re-evaluate its opinion on the matter.
By this standard, the “debate” held as part of Black History Month observations at Southern University – Shreveport was not. Instead, current city councilman Theron Jackson and former city councilman Joe Shyne, among others, made remarks that not only were nonfactual, but which served to inflame, rather than to educate; to confuse, rather than to clarify.
The topic was whether the there was a racially-discriminant component to government responses to and media reporting of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. It seemed that the audience response, comprised mostly of black students, escalated “into a frenzy” when the likes of Jackson, Shyne, and others gave impassioned remarks that asserted the government’s response to victims of the storm discriminated against blacks and the media itself was biased in its portrayal of victims by race. The attendees seemed much more convinced of the veracity of these claims than their opposites.
Except, of course, there is not one shred of evidence to backup these assertions. Let’s take each point in turn.
Perhaps the most persuasive piece of evidence that government rescuing discriminated unfavorably against blacks would be if there were significantly more black mortalities than occurred to non-blacks. If blacks were neglected in favor of non-blacks in rescues, then the percentage of those who died who were black should be much higher than the actual proportion of blacks in the population.
In fact, Congressional research shows that 73 percent of the 373,000 evacuees from New Orleans were black (who comprised only 67.8 percent of the pre-storm population). Louisiana’s preliminary report on the deaths was that in Orleans Parish 59 percent of those who died were black. Also of interest was that deaths were fairly randomly distributed around the city in terms of socioeconomic status: given their relative proportions in the population, the poorer and richer were equally likely to have been killed by Katrina.
This fact makes very inconvenient the assertion that the government responded inequitably. Add to this that no nationally-prominent black politician or leader is willing to endorse this claim and that the only people who would seem to cannot produce any evidence beyond their vague, unsubstantiated “perceptions” (and some came away with very different views in the same situation.)
The charge of media bias in labeling (such as using pejorative terms to describe black victims) seems even sillier, apparently emerging over different wordings in cutlines of photos seized upon by people who specialize in finding offense to anything with which they don’t agree. In essence the photos’ captions were said to connote racial bias, when in fact their takers called the assigned cutlines accurate. Further, numerous, well-documented incidents occurred where the mainstream media itself hyped the imaginary racial element of the Katrina aftermath – hardly an indicator that it was “biased” against blacks in its coverage.
It’s disappointing that these myths have gained such traction, particularly in the black community. It’s unfortunate that locally this opportunity was missed to educate. But it’s shameful that local black political figures not only did not act as leaders to help educate in this matter, but that they encouraged ignorance. (And if they genuinely did not know these facts, they are derelict in their duty to be informed on matters in which they may be called to provide leadership).
As an educator, it frustrates me when those who should enlighten instead discourage inquiry that can open minds and improve the quality of public policy-making. Jackson in particular deserves shame because of his position in government; distancing himself from the event and the remarks made would be appropriate. By all means let’s have debate, but to engage in it bereft of facts not only makes the exercise useless and irresponsible, it makes it disingenuous and destructive, causing needless division and harm. Recall that it is only the truth that sets people free.
The purpose of a debate ought to inform and invite critical thinking on the behalf of those privy to it. The topic ought to feature facts usable by either side, where the participants argue persuasively that the facts better fit the worldview on their side of the argument. At its conclusion, the side which best employs fact (rather than rhetoric or fiction) informed through a worldview that is best demonstrated as valid should win and inspire the audience to evaluate or re-evaluate its opinion on the matter.
By this standard, the “debate” held as part of Black History Month observations at Southern University – Shreveport was not. Instead, current city councilman Theron Jackson and former city councilman Joe Shyne, among others, made remarks that not only were nonfactual, but which served to inflame, rather than to educate; to confuse, rather than to clarify.
The topic was whether the there was a racially-discriminant component to government responses to and media reporting of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. It seemed that the audience response, comprised mostly of black students, escalated “into a frenzy” when the likes of Jackson, Shyne, and others gave impassioned remarks that asserted the government’s response to victims of the storm discriminated against blacks and the media itself was biased in its portrayal of victims by race. The attendees seemed much more convinced of the veracity of these claims than their opposites.
Except, of course, there is not one shred of evidence to backup these assertions. Let’s take each point in turn.
Perhaps the most persuasive piece of evidence that government rescuing discriminated unfavorably against blacks would be if there were significantly more black mortalities than occurred to non-blacks. If blacks were neglected in favor of non-blacks in rescues, then the percentage of those who died who were black should be much higher than the actual proportion of blacks in the population.
In fact, Congressional research shows that 73 percent of the 373,000 evacuees from New Orleans were black (who comprised only 67.8 percent of the pre-storm population). Louisiana’s preliminary report on the deaths was that in Orleans Parish 59 percent of those who died were black. Also of interest was that deaths were fairly randomly distributed around the city in terms of socioeconomic status: given their relative proportions in the population, the poorer and richer were equally likely to have been killed by Katrina.
This fact makes very inconvenient the assertion that the government responded inequitably. Add to this that no nationally-prominent black politician or leader is willing to endorse this claim and that the only people who would seem to cannot produce any evidence beyond their vague, unsubstantiated “perceptions” (and some came away with very different views in the same situation.)
The charge of media bias in labeling (such as using pejorative terms to describe black victims) seems even sillier, apparently emerging over different wordings in cutlines of photos seized upon by people who specialize in finding offense to anything with which they don’t agree. In essence the photos’ captions were said to connote racial bias, when in fact their takers called the assigned cutlines accurate. Further, numerous, well-documented incidents occurred where the mainstream media itself hyped the imaginary racial element of the Katrina aftermath – hardly an indicator that it was “biased” against blacks in its coverage.
It’s disappointing that these myths have gained such traction, particularly in the black community. It’s unfortunate that locally this opportunity was missed to educate. But it’s shameful that local black political figures not only did not act as leaders to help educate in this matter, but that they encouraged ignorance. (And if they genuinely did not know these facts, they are derelict in their duty to be informed on matters in which they may be called to provide leadership).
As an educator, it frustrates me when those who should enlighten instead discourage inquiry that can open minds and improve the quality of public policy-making. Jackson in particular deserves shame because of his position in government; distancing himself from the event and the remarks made would be appropriate. By all means let’s have debate, but to engage in it bereft of facts not only makes the exercise useless and irresponsible, it makes it disingenuous and destructive, causing needless division and harm. Recall that it is only the truth that sets people free.
22.2.06
Is Landrieu more interested in union or port security?
The issue about whether the Port of New Orleans’ operations and those of five others should be run by a United Arab Emirates (essentially government-owned) company raises some interesting points (cogent and informed arguments concerning which may be found, here, here, and here). Why Sen. Mary Landrieu has so stridently come out against the deal at first borders on the baffling, if not insipid.
Democrat Landrieu appears to be against the deal because it would give a state with past dealings with the terror network monetary (but not necessarily operational) control over the company that runs operations (hiring, but not security) of these ports, raising a legitimate security question. She appears to have made up her mind almost instantly on the deal, as opposed to her Republican co-resident Sen. David Vitter who has said he has an open mind on the subject and wants Congressional vetting of the clearance granted in order for the transaction to close by Pres. George W. Bush.
What’s strikingly odd about Landrieu’s knee-jerk reaction is that in past, almost identical situations, we heard nary a peep out of her in opposition. In 1997, she stayed silent as controversy raged about the impending transfer of operation of the Panama Canal to a Chinese holding company with close ties to its communist government. A year later, again she did not voice any opposition to a proposed lease of Long Beach, CA port facilities to a company owned by the Chinese military.
Democrat Landrieu appears to be against the deal because it would give a state with past dealings with the terror network monetary (but not necessarily operational) control over the company that runs operations (hiring, but not security) of these ports, raising a legitimate security question. She appears to have made up her mind almost instantly on the deal, as opposed to her Republican co-resident Sen. David Vitter who has said he has an open mind on the subject and wants Congressional vetting of the clearance granted in order for the transaction to close by Pres. George W. Bush.
What’s strikingly odd about Landrieu’s knee-jerk reaction is that in past, almost identical situations, we heard nary a peep out of her in opposition. In 1997, she stayed silent as controversy raged about the impending transfer of operation of the Panama Canal to a Chinese holding company with close ties to its communist government. A year later, again she did not voice any opposition to a proposed lease of Long Beach, CA port facilities to a company owned by the Chinese military.
21.2.06
Right kind of conflict desirable in Legislature
Appropriate to yesterday’s posting comes some musing about the “divisiveness” in the recent Louisiana legislative special session. Many members seem to perceive an increase in it so that argues for a valid increase in it. The larger questions are, what does it portend and whether it is bad.
Initially, we must understand that “divisiveness” is in the eye of the beholder, if not actually created by the beholder who then accuses others of fomenting it. When the House voted down a key component of the Legislative Black Caucus agenda, satellite voting centers, first representatives of the Caucus accused opponents of bad faith, and then members of it walked out of that day’s session. The divisiveness was not there as a result of a policy disagreement, it was induced as a result of the boycott.
Which illustrates another aspect of “divisiveness” in the Legislature: it becomes undesirable only when it threatens comity and courtesy among members. Policy disagreement can cause the most possible friction but this does not create a problem unless that conflict spills over into personal attacks and lack of decorum. To use it again as an example, the Caucus began to get into trouble on this account when its leaders asserted that opposition to their agenda amounted to racism.
From my own observations (hundreds of hours of watching committee and floor action during a regular session, and dozens more during special sessions which interested parties can view summaries of at the Louisiana Legislature Log), there didn’t seem to be that much testiness concerning courtesy. (Also consider that when Caucus Chairman Rep. Cedric Richmond claims it’s the most “divided” Legislature that he’s seen, he’s only been in it a couple of years.) Perhaps, however, there was more policy conflict.
And that’s not a bad thing. Through much of its history, certainly recently, Louisiana has had a “get-along-go-along” legislature where a combination of strong gubernatorial leadership plus legislative politics that were built more upon personality and parochialism rather than engaging a contest of ideas has tended to produce fewer choices and more echoes in policy that came out of state government. If there were considerable good feelings, it’s because too often most everybody was on the same page: bring home goodies for your district or for the groups you felt you represented, and the rest of the time do what the governor wanted.
So if there’s more conflict as a result of an escalating battle of ideas, because more and more members are providing choices rather than echoes, that’s a good thing. And if existing legislators find that environment undesirable, then that’s a strong sign that voters need to make them go home, since the Framers of the Constitution were correct that debate should be as robust as possible because through it the observant can better separate the wheat from the chaff in public policy.
Initially, we must understand that “divisiveness” is in the eye of the beholder, if not actually created by the beholder who then accuses others of fomenting it. When the House voted down a key component of the Legislative Black Caucus agenda, satellite voting centers, first representatives of the Caucus accused opponents of bad faith, and then members of it walked out of that day’s session. The divisiveness was not there as a result of a policy disagreement, it was induced as a result of the boycott.
Which illustrates another aspect of “divisiveness” in the Legislature: it becomes undesirable only when it threatens comity and courtesy among members. Policy disagreement can cause the most possible friction but this does not create a problem unless that conflict spills over into personal attacks and lack of decorum. To use it again as an example, the Caucus began to get into trouble on this account when its leaders asserted that opposition to their agenda amounted to racism.
From my own observations (hundreds of hours of watching committee and floor action during a regular session, and dozens more during special sessions which interested parties can view summaries of at the Louisiana Legislature Log), there didn’t seem to be that much testiness concerning courtesy. (Also consider that when Caucus Chairman Rep. Cedric Richmond claims it’s the most “divided” Legislature that he’s seen, he’s only been in it a couple of years.) Perhaps, however, there was more policy conflict.
And that’s not a bad thing. Through much of its history, certainly recently, Louisiana has had a “get-along-go-along” legislature where a combination of strong gubernatorial leadership plus legislative politics that were built more upon personality and parochialism rather than engaging a contest of ideas has tended to produce fewer choices and more echoes in policy that came out of state government. If there were considerable good feelings, it’s because too often most everybody was on the same page: bring home goodies for your district or for the groups you felt you represented, and the rest of the time do what the governor wanted.
So if there’s more conflict as a result of an escalating battle of ideas, because more and more members are providing choices rather than echoes, that’s a good thing. And if existing legislators find that environment undesirable, then that’s a strong sign that voters need to make them go home, since the Framers of the Constitution were correct that debate should be as robust as possible because through it the observant can better separate the wheat from the chaff in public policy.
20.2.06
Parochial view puts Louisiana between rock, hard place
Sometimes, our elected officials speak unusually candidly. The state legislative delegation from around Opelousas for whatever reason did so at the conclusion of their latest special session, with one especially thought-provoking statement.
No, it wasn’t state Sen. Don Cravins’ remarkable admission that, assessing the session, “Some saw it an opportunity to push their own agenda and to get a mayor of their liking elected in New Orleans.” We already know that Cravins and his Democrat colleagues in the Legislature and in the executive branch weakened ballot security and needlessly committed state money to trying to get Democrats elected in Orleans Parish.
Rather, it was his son state Rep. Don Cravins’ observation that because the state is broke and Gov. Kathleen Blanco did not have cash to promise to legislators for pet projects, it made it hard for the governor to provide leadership. As if he were a zoologist commenting upon animals and their keeper, he noted, “There was nothing to calm them down, so nothing got done until the last few days, and then only some watered-down versions of what she wanted.”
No, it wasn’t state Sen. Don Cravins’ remarkable admission that, assessing the session, “Some saw it an opportunity to push their own agenda and to get a mayor of their liking elected in New Orleans.” We already know that Cravins and his Democrat colleagues in the Legislature and in the executive branch weakened ballot security and needlessly committed state money to trying to get Democrats elected in Orleans Parish.
Rather, it was his son state Rep. Don Cravins’ observation that because the state is broke and Gov. Kathleen Blanco did not have cash to promise to legislators for pet projects, it made it hard for the governor to provide leadership. As if he were a zoologist commenting upon animals and their keeper, he noted, “There was nothing to calm them down, so nothing got done until the last few days, and then only some watered-down versions of what she wanted.”
18.2.06
Democrats prefer preservation over responsibility in session
As if we needed any more proof of the inability of Louisiana’s current gubernatorial administration’s and its Legislature’s leadership to serve the people of the state, the recently-concluded special session delivered it in abundance.
The biggest priority, of course, was not even part of the special session call: trimming the low-value programs from state government and thoroughly reviewing personnel distribution to cut a bloated state bureaucracy (this had better be part of the regular session starting in five weeks). The next biggest priority was levee governance reform, followed by consolidation of Orleans government to save money and improve the city’s ability to bounce back from the recent hurricane disasters.
State Sen. Walter Boasso got the southeastern regional levee board consolidation and professionalization off to a good start at the session’s beginning, with a nice pep talk by Gov. Kathleen Blanco. However, Boasso then began to run into legislative critics who wanted to protect political fiefdoms that their local levee districts represented to them and/or who felt too much political pressure from local interests (backbones often being in short supply among Louisiana’s legislators) to stick with his plan. For awhile, any sort of reform looked as if it would founder.
Blanco seemed disinterested in salvaging the enterprise until the waning days of the session, with legislators saying she did not even bother to contact them until late. But what really seemed to turn the tide to produce any reform at all was federal relief coordinator Donald Powell lecturing the Legislature that reform had to come or the federal government would look much more dimly at providing any sort of relief. In the end, a watered-down bill that will improve somewhat the situation made it out.
The biggest priority, of course, was not even part of the special session call: trimming the low-value programs from state government and thoroughly reviewing personnel distribution to cut a bloated state bureaucracy (this had better be part of the regular session starting in five weeks). The next biggest priority was levee governance reform, followed by consolidation of Orleans government to save money and improve the city’s ability to bounce back from the recent hurricane disasters.
State Sen. Walter Boasso got the southeastern regional levee board consolidation and professionalization off to a good start at the session’s beginning, with a nice pep talk by Gov. Kathleen Blanco. However, Boasso then began to run into legislative critics who wanted to protect political fiefdoms that their local levee districts represented to them and/or who felt too much political pressure from local interests (backbones often being in short supply among Louisiana’s legislators) to stick with his plan. For awhile, any sort of reform looked as if it would founder.
Blanco seemed disinterested in salvaging the enterprise until the waning days of the session, with legislators saying she did not even bother to contact them until late. But what really seemed to turn the tide to produce any reform at all was federal relief coordinator Donald Powell lecturing the Legislature that reform had to come or the federal government would look much more dimly at providing any sort of relief. In the end, a watered-down bill that will improve somewhat the situation made it out.
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