Gov. Bobby Jindal and advocates of more efficient government in Louisiana can get two-for-one if the State Civil Service Commission follows through with revisions to its pay scales by the end of this year.
As the magnitude of Louisiana’s projected budget deficits for the next few years became clearer this past year, talk emerged about saving money through a more rational application of existing compensation rules. Presently, almost every classified employee receives a flat four percent raise annually if money is available because almost all are rated as satisfactory, while almost none are discharged to unsatisfactory performance. It has been recommended that pay increases be more closely correlated to gradations in performance and that evaluation be conducted utilizing more realistic standards.
This system of greater validity and flexibility might have avoided the need not to give any raises at all, as its current incarnation made it essentially an all-or-nothing proposition. Besides saving money, this debate also triggered reform proposals that would tie performance more closely to salary increases, the results of which were revealed by State Civil Service Director Sharon Templet.
Of the five, the best of them is the most complicated, where performance and market rates determine amounts. Unfortunately, its complexity likely will prove too confusing too employees and thereby reduce its motivational appeal for better output. Any of the other four plans, which would create at least three gradation and/or offer bonuses, would be an improvement over the current regime, as long as unsatisfactory performers get no raise, satisfactory-only-rated employees a very minimal one, and other gradations tied to higher evaluation levels are significantly different in their larger proportions given.
Happily, there may be another benefit to the implementation of one of these plans, which would go into effect next July 1. Frankly, a non-trivial portion of the roughly 62,000 classified employees in the state (about two-thirds of the total full-time equivalent state employees) know they will get little under the new system as for years, possibly their entire careers, they have eked out as little effort as possible to barely maintain adequacy while being assured of a fat four percent jump every year. Now that their raises, if any, would more faithfully reflect the amount of effort they are willing, or perhaps even only able, to put out, those who are advanced in their careers will not stick around – especially since they will be able to retire at nearly their entire current pay level, as potential state pensions for them are determined largely by their current salary level which wouldn’t go up much.
In short, this will encourage early retirements of the least capable employees and assist with another cost-savings idea, broached by Treasurer John Kennedy, of using attrition to cut as a goal of 5,000 jobs each over the next three years. Implement this new performance plan, and there will be no problem in meeting this aspiration. This is because the large majority of employees are in a retirement system that pays on the three consecutive designated by an employee as their base for calculation of their pension – usually their last three years prior to retirement because their pay is the almost always highest in this period. Bring on a new system, and a wave of retirements will hit the state bureaucracy cresting in June, 2011. All 15,000 would suggest a savings of around $600 million a year from then on (although it would aggravate the unfunded accrued liability situation of the pension fund.)
In the end, more rational use of fewer funds with better service will result from implementation of a new plan along the suggested lines. The Commission needs to act affirmatively on this and Jindal to approve it as soon as possible.
2.9.09
Glover's see no evil approach merits his job termination
Take Mayor Cedric Glover, subtract a hundred pounds or so, change the hair color and style, take off the glasses, and whitewash him, as because they already share the same attitude that allows corruption into Shreveport’s Department of Community Development, you wouldn’t be able to tell that former mayor Keith Hightower isn’t still in office.
Glover’s administration was stung by arrests of city employees made this week – so much so he has gone into seclusion from the media – who are accused of turning a blind eye that allowed contractors to be paid taxpayer money fraudulently, perhaps as much as $1.5 million and maybe much more. A grant program designed to pay contractors to improve residences of those on public assistance was abused by four contractors with the assistance of three city inspectors, with funds going to the four for substandard work and simply for no work performed, it is alleged.
Naturally, Glover said he hadn’t known about any of this, nor did the director of the department Bonnie Moore, until brought to their attention by investigators – despite the fact that some of the people supposed to be helped by the program realized what was going on and eventually that alerted Caddo Sheriff Steve Prator who opened the investigation. Even then, Prator described the city’s cooperation into the matter as lacking.
Regardless, this is no excuse for Glover. This department has been a chronic trouble spot, both in the area of paying out funds and inspections of property. In 2005, under Hightower and Moore, it was discovered that some associates of Hightower’s were getting what appeared to be favorable treatment on loans administered by the department. Instead of an investigation, Hightower and Moore stopped the program. Meanwhile, sloppy record keeping (also blamed for the lending controversy) in code enforcement essentially had ground that activity to a halt, costing the city millions of dollars in uncollected fines and in payment of maintenance of adjudicated property.
Glover ignored that history, retained Moore when he took over City Hall, and at least tried to beef up code enforcement and adjudication. Turns out he’s back to square zero on that, because with the arrest of the city inspectors for now there are no city employees to do any inspecting. If guilty as they are charged, one must wonder just how many other corrupt activities in this area have gone unnoticed, and for how many years.
Now there’s this. As an evidence of how badly managed the department is, some of the arrested contractors are that only in name – they have no license, which can be determined in a matter of seconds here. (Another name a couple of them have is “ex-con,” another red flag gone unnoticed.) Only the most inattentive and/or reckless management would fail to check that the contracts they are letting actually go to operators with state licenses.
If all of this happened in a place that values competence, Moore would have the sense to resign or Glover would have the gumption to fire her and either way make massive changes to the agency. Instead, among the last words he has spoken to the media he defended her. Which leads to the inevitable conclusion that, if Glover is not going to take seriously this matter, the person that’s going to get fired is him in 2010.
Glover’s administration was stung by arrests of city employees made this week – so much so he has gone into seclusion from the media – who are accused of turning a blind eye that allowed contractors to be paid taxpayer money fraudulently, perhaps as much as $1.5 million and maybe much more. A grant program designed to pay contractors to improve residences of those on public assistance was abused by four contractors with the assistance of three city inspectors, with funds going to the four for substandard work and simply for no work performed, it is alleged.
Naturally, Glover said he hadn’t known about any of this, nor did the director of the department Bonnie Moore, until brought to their attention by investigators – despite the fact that some of the people supposed to be helped by the program realized what was going on and eventually that alerted Caddo Sheriff Steve Prator who opened the investigation. Even then, Prator described the city’s cooperation into the matter as lacking.
Regardless, this is no excuse for Glover. This department has been a chronic trouble spot, both in the area of paying out funds and inspections of property. In 2005, under Hightower and Moore, it was discovered that some associates of Hightower’s were getting what appeared to be favorable treatment on loans administered by the department. Instead of an investigation, Hightower and Moore stopped the program. Meanwhile, sloppy record keeping (also blamed for the lending controversy) in code enforcement essentially had ground that activity to a halt, costing the city millions of dollars in uncollected fines and in payment of maintenance of adjudicated property.
Glover ignored that history, retained Moore when he took over City Hall, and at least tried to beef up code enforcement and adjudication. Turns out he’s back to square zero on that, because with the arrest of the city inspectors for now there are no city employees to do any inspecting. If guilty as they are charged, one must wonder just how many other corrupt activities in this area have gone unnoticed, and for how many years.
Now there’s this. As an evidence of how badly managed the department is, some of the arrested contractors are that only in name – they have no license, which can be determined in a matter of seconds here. (Another name a couple of them have is “ex-con,” another red flag gone unnoticed.) Only the most inattentive and/or reckless management would fail to check that the contracts they are letting actually go to operators with state licenses.
If all of this happened in a place that values competence, Moore would have the sense to resign or Glover would have the gumption to fire her and either way make massive changes to the agency. Instead, among the last words he has spoken to the media he defended her. Which leads to the inevitable conclusion that, if Glover is not going to take seriously this matter, the person that’s going to get fired is him in 2010.
1.9.09
Union decries innovation, supports continued mediocrity
You can make all of the procedural and administrative changes you like to how is delivered elementary and secondary education in Louisiana, but until reform comes to personnel and local administration only incremental improvement at best can be expected, as recent comments by a union representative claiming to represent teachers demonstrate.
Louisiana appears strongly to be in the running for funding from a federal government program, one of perhaps a dozen states that will split among them $4.4 billion that go to states that adopt standards and assessments that prepare students for success in college and the workplace, turn around low-performing schools, build data systems that measure student success, and recruit and reward effective teachers and principals. State Superintendant Paul Pastorek has said as many as 500 schools could benefit from the estimated $200 million the state could receive.
Some notes of caution were expressed by a spokesman for state school boards, who wondered whether this could mean institution of programs initially paid for by the state but then costs shifted onto districts. Pastorek insisted that any planning in this regard would look at this question. While it would be unfair to give districts with schools needing help a complete pass on the extra costs of improvement – after all, in the final analysis they are problems of their own makings – the state should provide a mechanism by which to heavily subsidize whatever efforts get established past the start-up phase.
But the reaction by the Louisiana Association of Educators to the possible windfall was puerile, if not infantile. ““When you really get down to it, it is the privatization of public schools using public dollars,” said Tom Tate, a lobbyist for the union. “We are just opposed to that.”
So what? Of course, it’s not even really clear what this objection is all about. Spoken in the context of state takeovers of schools, it appears this refers to the frequent practice of the state taking possession of failing local schools and converting them into charter schools. But this is not privatization; the schools still remain public, except they are contracted to non-government entities to run.
And what does that matter anyway? If this method provides a better education to students (as it appears to do), what in the world is wrong with it? That a union brays against supporting initiatives to improve education yet again speaks volumes about the central truth concerning these collectivities: they care nothing about children’s education, only about transferring as much of taxpayers’ dollars as possible to presumed teacher clients encouraged to put forth the least amount of effort in doing their jobs, aiming everything towards the lowest common denominator. They fear charter schools because of these institutions’ increased accountability mechanisms that demand more from teachers, pay more according to ability than longevity, and provide less cover for lazy and incompetent teachers.
It’s this bad attitude that is allowed to fester among the aggregate of state public school teachers (even as many individually recognize it and object to it while maintaining their own pursuits of excellence) and is most responsible for the substandard education being delivered in Louisiana. Only by instituting programs such as rigorous and frequent testing of teachers for subject area competence can accountability be established to squash this thinking. In the meantime, Pastorek and the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education need to ignore these defenders of privilege and mediocrity, by pressing on to procure this federal assistance, and to employ it in whatever way necessary to achieve the opposite of their opponents’ loathsome agenda.
Louisiana appears strongly to be in the running for funding from a federal government program, one of perhaps a dozen states that will split among them $4.4 billion that go to states that adopt standards and assessments that prepare students for success in college and the workplace, turn around low-performing schools, build data systems that measure student success, and recruit and reward effective teachers and principals. State Superintendant Paul Pastorek has said as many as 500 schools could benefit from the estimated $200 million the state could receive.
Some notes of caution were expressed by a spokesman for state school boards, who wondered whether this could mean institution of programs initially paid for by the state but then costs shifted onto districts. Pastorek insisted that any planning in this regard would look at this question. While it would be unfair to give districts with schools needing help a complete pass on the extra costs of improvement – after all, in the final analysis they are problems of their own makings – the state should provide a mechanism by which to heavily subsidize whatever efforts get established past the start-up phase.
But the reaction by the Louisiana Association of Educators to the possible windfall was puerile, if not infantile. ““When you really get down to it, it is the privatization of public schools using public dollars,” said Tom Tate, a lobbyist for the union. “We are just opposed to that.”
So what? Of course, it’s not even really clear what this objection is all about. Spoken in the context of state takeovers of schools, it appears this refers to the frequent practice of the state taking possession of failing local schools and converting them into charter schools. But this is not privatization; the schools still remain public, except they are contracted to non-government entities to run.
And what does that matter anyway? If this method provides a better education to students (as it appears to do), what in the world is wrong with it? That a union brays against supporting initiatives to improve education yet again speaks volumes about the central truth concerning these collectivities: they care nothing about children’s education, only about transferring as much of taxpayers’ dollars as possible to presumed teacher clients encouraged to put forth the least amount of effort in doing their jobs, aiming everything towards the lowest common denominator. They fear charter schools because of these institutions’ increased accountability mechanisms that demand more from teachers, pay more according to ability than longevity, and provide less cover for lazy and incompetent teachers.
It’s this bad attitude that is allowed to fester among the aggregate of state public school teachers (even as many individually recognize it and object to it while maintaining their own pursuits of excellence) and is most responsible for the substandard education being delivered in Louisiana. Only by instituting programs such as rigorous and frequent testing of teachers for subject area competence can accountability be established to squash this thinking. In the meantime, Pastorek and the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education need to ignore these defenders of privilege and mediocrity, by pressing on to procure this federal assistance, and to employ it in whatever way necessary to achieve the opposite of their opponents’ loathsome agenda.
31.8.09
Special election outcome warns of danger to Democrats
As usual, lessons present themselves after the results of a special election in a competitive Louisiana legislative district, this time from the Senate District 20 contest necessitated by the early departure of Reggie Dupre. The district, held by Democrats since the elimination of opposition to them after the Civil War by 1900, was won by about 10 percent by Democrat Norby Chabert over Republican Brent Callais.
First, more proof came from this that Republican Gov. Bobby Jindal doesn’t have much in the way of coattails in these kinds of elections. Jindal endorsed Callais, a former Lafourche Parish councilman, but it wasn’t enough. This followed another failed candidacy of a Jindal endorsee earlier this year. Jindal is popular in the state and thereby an endorsement can’t hurt, but so far they don’t seem to help, either. This points to a difficulty in translating a statewide consensus about a politician onto a local contest.
Second, while (in percentage terms) Callais produced the second-best showing ever by a Republican in the district, at only 20 percent GOP registration, even with white Democrats an even-money bet to defect in elections, it’s a lot to overcome as a Republican. The quick-and-dirty rule of thumb that argues half of white Democrats vote for Republicans and all Republicans do would give a GOP candidate about 42 percent in that district under typical circumstances, and Callais actually beat that by a bit. That in the primary Democrat candidates got over two-thirds of the district’s vote underscores the task for a Republican.
However, it is a competitive district and one that the GOP could pick off. In my research on voting behavior in Louisiana legislative elections, I have discovered the “8:3 rule” which states that if the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in a district exceeds this ratio, a Democrat wins most of the time, but if it does not, a Republican does. The numbers put this district right at that ratio, so why did it tip the way of Democrats this time?
Well, third, while Callais tried to link Chabert to national political forces, most principally pointing to Chabert’s past support of Pres. Barack Obama, as another challenger there wasn’t much that could be used against Chabert other than this. Had he been elected to office before, other pieces of evidence demonstrating Chabert’s support of unpopular policies or people might have been available – something which may be present for a potential rematch in 2011.
Fourth, personalistic factors loom large in Louisiana local politics and perhaps nowhere more than in the bayou country. The Chabert name still carries a lot of cachet around the district, with one of them serving in the Senate from 1980-96. That Norby Chabert could ace out sitting state Rep. Damon Baldone for the Democrat vote in the primary speaks to that, as well as that Baldone may have been seen as tied more closely to national Democrats because of votes he had taken in the House.
Fifth, this being a special election may have played to the Chabert name and difficulty in connecting Chabert to national Democrats. In these less-stimulating kinds of contests, voters that show up typically are more interested and informed about politics, as well as there being fewer cues present on which to base voting behavior. Thus, more voters more likely would have recognized some distance between the rookie candidate Chabert and national Democrats, blunting the effectiveness of that strategy of Callais’, and the Chabert name would be an extra and exaggerated relevant cue received favorably by many.
In short, while national political forces favored Callais, demographics, timing, and name recognition favored Chabert. But take away the timing and name, and maybe even just the latter, and Callais may well have won. Knowledge of this gives clues to future performances and electoral tactics.
All in all, if Democrats nationally continue to self-destruct, if Louisiana Republicans can campaign starkly on their policy differences, even if Louisiana legislative Democrats intentionally cast some high-profile conservative votes in the next two years, it may not be enough to stave off the public’s recognition that if you lie down with dogs, you get fleas. State-level Democrat candidates, especially incumbents, may be such fleabags by then that enough of the public will ignore whatever attempts to present themselves as conservatives.
If so, they will lose in districts like this one. Thus, the proper way to interpret this result is that unless the policy outcomes for Democrats change in the next couple of years and Republican candidates hold them accountable for their actions and associations, contests in Louisiana that shouldn’t be close for Democrats will be, and the majority of them that typically are close are not going to go their way.
First, more proof came from this that Republican Gov. Bobby Jindal doesn’t have much in the way of coattails in these kinds of elections. Jindal endorsed Callais, a former Lafourche Parish councilman, but it wasn’t enough. This followed another failed candidacy of a Jindal endorsee earlier this year. Jindal is popular in the state and thereby an endorsement can’t hurt, but so far they don’t seem to help, either. This points to a difficulty in translating a statewide consensus about a politician onto a local contest.
Second, while (in percentage terms) Callais produced the second-best showing ever by a Republican in the district, at only 20 percent GOP registration, even with white Democrats an even-money bet to defect in elections, it’s a lot to overcome as a Republican. The quick-and-dirty rule of thumb that argues half of white Democrats vote for Republicans and all Republicans do would give a GOP candidate about 42 percent in that district under typical circumstances, and Callais actually beat that by a bit. That in the primary Democrat candidates got over two-thirds of the district’s vote underscores the task for a Republican.
However, it is a competitive district and one that the GOP could pick off. In my research on voting behavior in Louisiana legislative elections, I have discovered the “8:3 rule” which states that if the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in a district exceeds this ratio, a Democrat wins most of the time, but if it does not, a Republican does. The numbers put this district right at that ratio, so why did it tip the way of Democrats this time?
Well, third, while Callais tried to link Chabert to national political forces, most principally pointing to Chabert’s past support of Pres. Barack Obama, as another challenger there wasn’t much that could be used against Chabert other than this. Had he been elected to office before, other pieces of evidence demonstrating Chabert’s support of unpopular policies or people might have been available – something which may be present for a potential rematch in 2011.
Fourth, personalistic factors loom large in Louisiana local politics and perhaps nowhere more than in the bayou country. The Chabert name still carries a lot of cachet around the district, with one of them serving in the Senate from 1980-96. That Norby Chabert could ace out sitting state Rep. Damon Baldone for the Democrat vote in the primary speaks to that, as well as that Baldone may have been seen as tied more closely to national Democrats because of votes he had taken in the House.
Fifth, this being a special election may have played to the Chabert name and difficulty in connecting Chabert to national Democrats. In these less-stimulating kinds of contests, voters that show up typically are more interested and informed about politics, as well as there being fewer cues present on which to base voting behavior. Thus, more voters more likely would have recognized some distance between the rookie candidate Chabert and national Democrats, blunting the effectiveness of that strategy of Callais’, and the Chabert name would be an extra and exaggerated relevant cue received favorably by many.
In short, while national political forces favored Callais, demographics, timing, and name recognition favored Chabert. But take away the timing and name, and maybe even just the latter, and Callais may well have won. Knowledge of this gives clues to future performances and electoral tactics.
All in all, if Democrats nationally continue to self-destruct, if Louisiana Republicans can campaign starkly on their policy differences, even if Louisiana legislative Democrats intentionally cast some high-profile conservative votes in the next two years, it may not be enough to stave off the public’s recognition that if you lie down with dogs, you get fleas. State-level Democrat candidates, especially incumbents, may be such fleabags by then that enough of the public will ignore whatever attempts to present themselves as conservatives.
If so, they will lose in districts like this one. Thus, the proper way to interpret this result is that unless the policy outcomes for Democrats change in the next couple of years and Republican candidates hold them accountable for their actions and associations, contests in Louisiana that shouldn’t be close for Democrats will be, and the majority of them that typically are close are not going to go their way.
28.8.09
With Vitter's race to lose, Melancon needs luck again
In the end, Democrat Rep. Charlie Melancon asked himself two questions, his answers to which would make him choose to exit his House spot and would propel him into a long-shot contest for Republican Sen. David Vitter’s seat.
The first dealt with whether he would have the money to compete. At this time, he has only about a third of the $3.2 million that Vitter has on hand. However, with the GOP having to defend more seats than Democrats in 2010, he probably got a commitment from the national party to help as its resources won’t be spread as thinly as they could be, which could keep him competitive with Vitter.
But therein lies the problem. It is highly unlikely, given Vitter’s past demonstrated abilities in fundraising and his present pace concerning it, that Melancon will be able to stay with Vitter, much less pass him on the money front. History is very unkind to Senate challengers against incumbents by whom they get outspent, as they rarely win – and some of those few wins are because the victorious candidate poured in large sums of his own wealth.
The reason why is that fundraising ability serves as a proxy of candidate strength, since the majority of donors to campaigns are economically rational. Like investors, they don’t want to throw away their money on causes that don’t have a reasonable chance of success. If Vitter were more than marginally vulnerable courtesy of alleged martial infidelities almost a decade ago, he would not have raised and would be unable to raise the sums of money he has and looks likely to receive. Therefore, Melancon chose to enter this contest as a decided underdog, not only from the historical perspective of resources and their use as an indicator of the relative security of Vitter’s position, but also with polls showing Vitter maintaining a healthy lead on him.
Then why do it, especially when he had the alternative of running for reelection to the House? The second question’s answer operated here. Melancon’s position since the beginning of the year politically in his district has deteriorated badly. With the coming of the Democrat Pres. Barack Obama administration, his strategy of acting left but sounding right has become impossible to pursue as increasingly constituents views all his actions from a prism of Obama and the president’s decidedly unpopular liberalism there, which demand just too many visible positions that Melancon cannot duck in their taking. It also hasn’t helped that other blunders, such as revelation of his expensive southern hemisphere tour, have manifested.
Had he sought reelection, he would not have been considered the man to beat by challengers, he may not even have been favored among all candidates. Plus, because of looming constitutionally-mandate redistricting, of the various scenarios the most likely outcome would eliminate his current district by 2012 with no office that year to which to try to parachute. And so the question became very simple: do you run for reelection that is chancy in a district that might soon disappear that gave only about 35 percent of its vote to Obama, or do you run as a challenger in a (statewide) permanent district with dicey prospects where Obama got around 40 percent of the vote? Given the reasonable expectation of enough money to be competitive existed, the latter became obvious.
This analysis underscores the key dynamic of the race as it has unfolded: as pointed out before, Melancon made the move out of weakness, not from strength. If he wanted a continued congressional career, this was the least unlikely alternative for him to maintain it. More to the point, he has entered a contest that he cannot win by his own campaign efforts. Given the already low Democrat tide in the state, Vitter’s slightly reduced but formidable strength, and an evolving political landscape that chances are will not only get worse for Democrats nationally, but significantly worse over the next 14 months, if only facing Melancon, this is Vitter’s contest to lose. There is nothing Melancon can do to win this race, except …
… get lucky one more time? Good fortune has marked Melancon’s national electoral career. He was able to take the open seat in 2004 only because of infighting among Republicans left a defeated GOP candidate attacking Melancon’s opponent. In 2006, that attacking defeated candidate emerged as Melancon’s primary challenger but his previous tactics discredited him among enough of the electorate, and in experiencing a good year for Democrats nationally were keys in allowing Melancon to manage reelection. Really bad tides for the GOP in 2008 permitted him to run unopposed. It could happen again in some unforeseen way … or maybe he’s more than used up his quota of good fortune.
Depending on luck as your main asset in a campaign doesn’t make you more than hoping you can beat the odds. But for now, it’s the best that can be said about Melancon’s Senate chances as his best hope to stay in national office past 2010 and his party’s to get the seat at all.
The first dealt with whether he would have the money to compete. At this time, he has only about a third of the $3.2 million that Vitter has on hand. However, with the GOP having to defend more seats than Democrats in 2010, he probably got a commitment from the national party to help as its resources won’t be spread as thinly as they could be, which could keep him competitive with Vitter.
But therein lies the problem. It is highly unlikely, given Vitter’s past demonstrated abilities in fundraising and his present pace concerning it, that Melancon will be able to stay with Vitter, much less pass him on the money front. History is very unkind to Senate challengers against incumbents by whom they get outspent, as they rarely win – and some of those few wins are because the victorious candidate poured in large sums of his own wealth.
The reason why is that fundraising ability serves as a proxy of candidate strength, since the majority of donors to campaigns are economically rational. Like investors, they don’t want to throw away their money on causes that don’t have a reasonable chance of success. If Vitter were more than marginally vulnerable courtesy of alleged martial infidelities almost a decade ago, he would not have raised and would be unable to raise the sums of money he has and looks likely to receive. Therefore, Melancon chose to enter this contest as a decided underdog, not only from the historical perspective of resources and their use as an indicator of the relative security of Vitter’s position, but also with polls showing Vitter maintaining a healthy lead on him.
Then why do it, especially when he had the alternative of running for reelection to the House? The second question’s answer operated here. Melancon’s position since the beginning of the year politically in his district has deteriorated badly. With the coming of the Democrat Pres. Barack Obama administration, his strategy of acting left but sounding right has become impossible to pursue as increasingly constituents views all his actions from a prism of Obama and the president’s decidedly unpopular liberalism there, which demand just too many visible positions that Melancon cannot duck in their taking. It also hasn’t helped that other blunders, such as revelation of his expensive southern hemisphere tour, have manifested.
Had he sought reelection, he would not have been considered the man to beat by challengers, he may not even have been favored among all candidates. Plus, because of looming constitutionally-mandate redistricting, of the various scenarios the most likely outcome would eliminate his current district by 2012 with no office that year to which to try to parachute. And so the question became very simple: do you run for reelection that is chancy in a district that might soon disappear that gave only about 35 percent of its vote to Obama, or do you run as a challenger in a (statewide) permanent district with dicey prospects where Obama got around 40 percent of the vote? Given the reasonable expectation of enough money to be competitive existed, the latter became obvious.
This analysis underscores the key dynamic of the race as it has unfolded: as pointed out before, Melancon made the move out of weakness, not from strength. If he wanted a continued congressional career, this was the least unlikely alternative for him to maintain it. More to the point, he has entered a contest that he cannot win by his own campaign efforts. Given the already low Democrat tide in the state, Vitter’s slightly reduced but formidable strength, and an evolving political landscape that chances are will not only get worse for Democrats nationally, but significantly worse over the next 14 months, if only facing Melancon, this is Vitter’s contest to lose. There is nothing Melancon can do to win this race, except …
… get lucky one more time? Good fortune has marked Melancon’s national electoral career. He was able to take the open seat in 2004 only because of infighting among Republicans left a defeated GOP candidate attacking Melancon’s opponent. In 2006, that attacking defeated candidate emerged as Melancon’s primary challenger but his previous tactics discredited him among enough of the electorate, and in experiencing a good year for Democrats nationally were keys in allowing Melancon to manage reelection. Really bad tides for the GOP in 2008 permitted him to run unopposed. It could happen again in some unforeseen way … or maybe he’s more than used up his quota of good fortune.
Depending on luck as your main asset in a campaign doesn’t make you more than hoping you can beat the odds. But for now, it’s the best that can be said about Melancon’s Senate chances as his best hope to stay in national office past 2010 and his party’s to get the seat at all.
27.8.09
Roads ideas divorced from new Jindal budget direction
Bad ideas disproportionately remain in currency, and thus it seems the idea of raising gasoline taxes and others of extracting additional revenues from the public do not go away when it comes to considering funding for roads construction in Louisiana, both for the existing but especially contemplated ones.
Frustrated this past session when he could not get his idea to index the cost of living to gasoline taxes enacted into law, state Rep. Hollis Downs got the Legislature to pass a resolution to study the issue. Naturally, at the top of his list was this idea, accompanied by establishment of toll roads and, the only suggestion which may not cost taxpayers more, public/private partnerships in operation.
But conspicuously absent from the roll was the idea on which existing legislation already is based, designed to bring hundreds of million of extra dollars annually for road building. Currently, funds collected from taxes and fees directly related to transportation such as 80 percent of the state’s 20 cent per gallon retail gasoline tax are supposed to go only to the actual building of transportation projects. Until that became law last year, those hundreds of millions could be used for any purpose and they were outside of these kinds of projects. These proceeds would amply eat into the estimated $12.6 billion backlog of roads projects.
Frustrated this past session when he could not get his idea to index the cost of living to gasoline taxes enacted into law, state Rep. Hollis Downs got the Legislature to pass a resolution to study the issue. Naturally, at the top of his list was this idea, accompanied by establishment of toll roads and, the only suggestion which may not cost taxpayers more, public/private partnerships in operation.
But conspicuously absent from the roll was the idea on which existing legislation already is based, designed to bring hundreds of million of extra dollars annually for road building. Currently, funds collected from taxes and fees directly related to transportation such as 80 percent of the state’s 20 cent per gallon retail gasoline tax are supposed to go only to the actual building of transportation projects. Until that became law last year, those hundreds of millions could be used for any purpose and they were outside of these kinds of projects. These proceeds would amply eat into the estimated $12.6 billion backlog of roads projects.
26.8.09
Shreveport correct not to socialize gas leasing risk
While much attention has deservedly gone to Pres. Barack Obama’s various attempts to socialize risk at the federal level, that issue has broken out at the local level in Shreveport as well.
At this time last year, the frenzy that accompanied mineral rights leasing reached its apogee as natural gas prices hovered at their highest levels ever, dramatically higher than two years previous. Northwest Louisiana got caught in the perfect good storm because just months earlier came confirmation of a huge gas discovery known as the Haynesville Shale. Residents, businesses, nonprofits, and governments suddenly discovered they had a marketable commodity, potentially a lot of it, in the middle of the greatest boom for it ever.
Some were agile and took immediate advantage. On the government side, DeSoto Parish was the nimblest, deciding quickly to use the traditional route of going through the state’s Mineral Board and cashed in near the peak that by doing so will provide benefits for its citizenry (if with wise governance) for years to come. Others, like Bossier Parish, hemmed and hawed and/or tried to do it themselves and eventually were unable to do anything but wait on forced unitization directed by the state. Shreveport moved cumbersomely, in part hampered by already-leased land at next-to-nothing at the instigation of former Mayor Keith Hightower, and hadn’t reaped anything but searched to do so
Individuals apparently fared the same. While some just dove in and got deals of varying worth, a few hired expertise to help them. Others took to the Internet, neighborhood fora (sometimes convened by the leasing companies themselves), and other inexpensive resources to educate themselves on what made for a reasonable lease and negotiated. Some informally banded together or talked among themselves to determine a good set of conditions. These strategies paid off for many such as in south Bossier, where a number of landowners individually negotiated and signed with one of the two big forces in the scramble, Petrohawk, in the $20-25,000 range per acre with a quarter royalty, by the end of summer.
But others gambled with time and organization, principally those with already-existing neighborhood associations. In Shreveport, many eventually coalesced into one group and the associations began to solicit their residents to sign letters of intent to allow the specific association, or in Shreveport’s case the group of them known as the ShreveCenter Coalition, to negotiate on their behalf. The thinking was akin to that used by labor unions in negotiations with managements: the larger the pool of the represented, the more coercive power they had that theoretically would make for a better deal.
The only problem was, the gamble failed. The record prices did not sustain and leasing activity – and return for rights holders – plummeted. So by the time these organizations got it together enough to be in a position to bargain from what they thought was strength, likely those individuals involved had forgone better opportunities if undertaken separately in the past than what they could get now and in the future collectively, in many cases substantially so.
The other major force in local leasing, Twin Cities, which works on behalf of Chesapeake Energy, now dealing with a buyer’s rather than seller’s market decided to forgo negotiating with the associations. That is their right, but it was not taken kindly by the associations which began to implore Mayor Cedric Glover to withhold approving leasing of Shreveport public lands desired by Chesapeake until they would work through the associations. Glover appeared to agree when he made critical remarks about the City Council’s unanimous vote to lease 740 city acres to Twin Cities, and threatened a veto.
For whatever reason, Glover let it go. Politically, a veto would have been disastrous. There are three kinds of potential voters out there, those agitating for him to have the city assist their efforts, those who have leased or who are negotiating that didn’t or wouldn’t get any help from that strategy, and those who have nothing to lease. The latter two groups are larger than the first and they would question why the city is depriving itself of money to support a special interest.
In the final analysis, tying leasing of city properties to negotiating with some collectives is nothing more than a socialization of risk to compensate for bad decisions made by a select few on behalf of less-involved others. Why should the entirety of Shreveport suffer with the loss of potential revenues just to shore up opportunity costs to what appears to be a tactic that went sour – and not even a guaranteed benefit to them because there’s no guarantee associations could bring in a better deal even if they are dealt with in the process. Plenty of other citizens on their own got what they considered good terms, so why should the Shreveporters in these neighborhoods be any exception?
At this time last year, the frenzy that accompanied mineral rights leasing reached its apogee as natural gas prices hovered at their highest levels ever, dramatically higher than two years previous. Northwest Louisiana got caught in the perfect good storm because just months earlier came confirmation of a huge gas discovery known as the Haynesville Shale. Residents, businesses, nonprofits, and governments suddenly discovered they had a marketable commodity, potentially a lot of it, in the middle of the greatest boom for it ever.
Some were agile and took immediate advantage. On the government side, DeSoto Parish was the nimblest, deciding quickly to use the traditional route of going through the state’s Mineral Board and cashed in near the peak that by doing so will provide benefits for its citizenry (if with wise governance) for years to come. Others, like Bossier Parish, hemmed and hawed and/or tried to do it themselves and eventually were unable to do anything but wait on forced unitization directed by the state. Shreveport moved cumbersomely, in part hampered by already-leased land at next-to-nothing at the instigation of former Mayor Keith Hightower, and hadn’t reaped anything but searched to do so
Individuals apparently fared the same. While some just dove in and got deals of varying worth, a few hired expertise to help them. Others took to the Internet, neighborhood fora (sometimes convened by the leasing companies themselves), and other inexpensive resources to educate themselves on what made for a reasonable lease and negotiated. Some informally banded together or talked among themselves to determine a good set of conditions. These strategies paid off for many such as in south Bossier, where a number of landowners individually negotiated and signed with one of the two big forces in the scramble, Petrohawk, in the $20-25,000 range per acre with a quarter royalty, by the end of summer.
But others gambled with time and organization, principally those with already-existing neighborhood associations. In Shreveport, many eventually coalesced into one group and the associations began to solicit their residents to sign letters of intent to allow the specific association, or in Shreveport’s case the group of them known as the ShreveCenter Coalition, to negotiate on their behalf. The thinking was akin to that used by labor unions in negotiations with managements: the larger the pool of the represented, the more coercive power they had that theoretically would make for a better deal.
The only problem was, the gamble failed. The record prices did not sustain and leasing activity – and return for rights holders – plummeted. So by the time these organizations got it together enough to be in a position to bargain from what they thought was strength, likely those individuals involved had forgone better opportunities if undertaken separately in the past than what they could get now and in the future collectively, in many cases substantially so.
The other major force in local leasing, Twin Cities, which works on behalf of Chesapeake Energy, now dealing with a buyer’s rather than seller’s market decided to forgo negotiating with the associations. That is their right, but it was not taken kindly by the associations which began to implore Mayor Cedric Glover to withhold approving leasing of Shreveport public lands desired by Chesapeake until they would work through the associations. Glover appeared to agree when he made critical remarks about the City Council’s unanimous vote to lease 740 city acres to Twin Cities, and threatened a veto.
For whatever reason, Glover let it go. Politically, a veto would have been disastrous. There are three kinds of potential voters out there, those agitating for him to have the city assist their efforts, those who have leased or who are negotiating that didn’t or wouldn’t get any help from that strategy, and those who have nothing to lease. The latter two groups are larger than the first and they would question why the city is depriving itself of money to support a special interest.
In the final analysis, tying leasing of city properties to negotiating with some collectives is nothing more than a socialization of risk to compensate for bad decisions made by a select few on behalf of less-involved others. Why should the entirety of Shreveport suffer with the loss of potential revenues just to shore up opportunity costs to what appears to be a tactic that went sour – and not even a guaranteed benefit to them because there’s no guarantee associations could bring in a better deal even if they are dealt with in the process. Plenty of other citizens on their own got what they considered good terms, so why should the Shreveporters in these neighborhoods be any exception?
25.8.09
Budgeting reform needs eyes on implementation to work
It’s a great time to be student of public administration in Louisiana as every politician, appointee, and former official who left their offices both voluntarily and otherwise spout one or the other of every trendy budgeting reform of the past three decades, in order to address large projected state deficits in the near future. But what we don’t hear any specifics about is how it’s going to be done.
We heard a current treasurer advocate a hiring a freeze, a former governor (somewhat contrary to what he actually did in office) stump for zero-based budgeting, a former legislative staffer suggest the derivative of assessing need and then construct revenue packages to match, and the current commissioner of administration expand upon (and thereby connect to its recent outcome-based budgeting initiative) the current (presumed) performance-based budgeting regime. All told, together they covered almost all of the reform ideas that emanated from the academy in the 1960 and 1970s.
But only Commissioner Angéle Davis seemed to grasp the essential truth of the situation when she lamented how the current performance-based system (tying appropriations to performance measured by ability to achieve assessed priorities) was not working well because of a disconnection between actual appropriations and achievement. Instead, the old incrementalist approach – take last year’s budget as a baseline, and then try to increase it from there except in tough times when tactics try to avoid as much decrease as possible – holds sway throughout state government, she asserted.
We heard a current treasurer advocate a hiring a freeze, a former governor (somewhat contrary to what he actually did in office) stump for zero-based budgeting, a former legislative staffer suggest the derivative of assessing need and then construct revenue packages to match, and the current commissioner of administration expand upon (and thereby connect to its recent outcome-based budgeting initiative) the current (presumed) performance-based budgeting regime. All told, together they covered almost all of the reform ideas that emanated from the academy in the 1960 and 1970s.
But only Commissioner Angéle Davis seemed to grasp the essential truth of the situation when she lamented how the current performance-based system (tying appropriations to performance measured by ability to achieve assessed priorities) was not working well because of a disconnection between actual appropriations and achievement. Instead, the old incrementalist approach – take last year’s budget as a baseline, and then try to increase it from there except in tough times when tactics try to avoid as much decrease as possible – holds sway throughout state government, she asserted.
24.8.09
Landrieu playing well her hand on health care debate
In contrast to the grave difficulties that Democrat Rep. Charlie Melancon is having in trying to pull off the balancing act of supporting liberalism in the face of a conservative constituency, his co-partisan Sen. Mary Landrieu has weathered the buffeting of the radical attempted overhaul of U.S. health care policy politically much better.
Landrieu solidly has provided support for liberal initiatives in her dozen years in office, yet has been able to spread the perception that she is moderate enough for conservative Louisiana. Melancon has tried to do the same thing but has gotten caught out because he has not been as politically astute as Landrieu (who does have the advantage of being a senator and whose greater seniority amidst these fewer competitors allows her to carve out attention) in finding a presumed moderate approach on a signature issue.
She struck gold with her stumping for the Wyden-Bennett “Healthy Americans” version of health policy reform. While still very liberal in that it would reduce competition through forced standardization and increase government oversight of health insurance that it makes it worse than the present regime, it is the least radical of all the Democrat plans being floated about. She has gotten great traction out of this since she signed on to it prior to Pres. Barack Obama’s taking office and subsequent Democrat attempts to stuff more radical plans down the American peoples’ throats.
If when all the dust settles the plan now supported by Landrieu is close to what gets enacted into law, if anything does, she’ll get that electoral gold mine. No matter what liberal votes she casts over the next six years, she will be able to claim she stopped radical health care reform and did something about the issue at the same time. Even though her preferred solution is on the liberal side, it is the contrast with what might have been that will benefit her, and it is something that will stick in people’s minds and override within most voters’ cognitions any number of liberal votes she makes.
Even if liberals blame her for scuttling truly radical changes, they will be placated by her other liberal votes. And, where else can they turn? She’ll get their support because the nature of liberalism first and foremost emphasizes the acquisition and use of power, and they’ll therefore always place politics over principle.
Of course, if somehow radical Democrats in the White House and Congress get a more radical plan to a vote, then it will be tougher on her. But she’ll probably think six years will be enough time to try to make people forget about her vote for that and she’ll take that route. All in all, she has positioned herself well politically on this issue.
This is why Landrieu is willing to brave genuine public appearances while Melancon will not, and why now Melancon’s political career is becoming jeopardized while hers seems untroubled.
Landrieu solidly has provided support for liberal initiatives in her dozen years in office, yet has been able to spread the perception that she is moderate enough for conservative Louisiana. Melancon has tried to do the same thing but has gotten caught out because he has not been as politically astute as Landrieu (who does have the advantage of being a senator and whose greater seniority amidst these fewer competitors allows her to carve out attention) in finding a presumed moderate approach on a signature issue.
She struck gold with her stumping for the Wyden-Bennett “Healthy Americans” version of health policy reform. While still very liberal in that it would reduce competition through forced standardization and increase government oversight of health insurance that it makes it worse than the present regime, it is the least radical of all the Democrat plans being floated about. She has gotten great traction out of this since she signed on to it prior to Pres. Barack Obama’s taking office and subsequent Democrat attempts to stuff more radical plans down the American peoples’ throats.
If when all the dust settles the plan now supported by Landrieu is close to what gets enacted into law, if anything does, she’ll get that electoral gold mine. No matter what liberal votes she casts over the next six years, she will be able to claim she stopped radical health care reform and did something about the issue at the same time. Even though her preferred solution is on the liberal side, it is the contrast with what might have been that will benefit her, and it is something that will stick in people’s minds and override within most voters’ cognitions any number of liberal votes she makes.
Even if liberals blame her for scuttling truly radical changes, they will be placated by her other liberal votes. And, where else can they turn? She’ll get their support because the nature of liberalism first and foremost emphasizes the acquisition and use of power, and they’ll therefore always place politics over principle.
Of course, if somehow radical Democrats in the White House and Congress get a more radical plan to a vote, then it will be tougher on her. But she’ll probably think six years will be enough time to try to make people forget about her vote for that and she’ll take that route. All in all, she has positioned herself well politically on this issue.
This is why Landrieu is willing to brave genuine public appearances while Melancon will not, and why now Melancon’s political career is becoming jeopardized while hers seems untroubled.
23.8.09
Too busy spending, traveling, Melancon dodges citizens
As he inches closer to a desperate U.S. Senate run, the belief that persists with Rep. Charlie Melancon that he can sidestep and fool the Louisiana electorate will not serve him well in that or any future contest.
The latest confirmation of this worldview of his comes from his comments on why he is refusing to meet with large groups of constituents whose presence and statements he can’t control. He claims it is because of a few isolated incidences at these occasions where liberal Democrats have been excoriated by plainspoken yet knowledgeable people motivated only by their genuine concerns about, in the main, a stealth federal government takeover and rationing of the sixth of the U.S. economy that comprises health care. Rather than listen to them, he asserts these actions don’t represent “honest questions.”
Instead, he says he will learn more by listening to presumed constituents handpicked by his organization who will tell him what he wants to hear. This is his version of the schoolyard tactic of shutting his eyes, covering his ears, and, to ensure he can’t hear anything that he doesn’t want to, by shouting loudly and repeatedly, “I don’t see you, I can’t hear you, you’re not here, go away!”
Particularly ironic about his lame rejoinder is that, by his own statements, he should have nothing to worry about since he voted against in committee a version of the Democrats’ health care plans which has the objectionable elements feared by a majority of the public. However, that’s because he fears they will ask him why he voted for a procedural move that allowed an amendment to the bill for taxpayer money potentially to fund elective abortions, in order to set things up so that later enough Democrats would be available to pass the whole thing despite his vote against.
And any meeting could allow the opportunity for questioners to publicize others of his brazen acts of misdirection as well. He foams at the mouth trying to get people to believe he is a rabid “Blue Dog,” i.e. Democrat who believes in fiscal constraint. Instead, he votes for the biggest increase in the federal budget deficit in history and then uses historical ignorance to try to defend himself. Also, he sticks taxpayers with hundreds of thousands of dollars in travelling expenses ostensibly to study “global warming” when he could have learned as much or more without gallivanting around and thereby not contributed to the production of greenhouse gases caused by his jet-setting.
This current excuse only represents yet another episode where Melancon says one thing that tries to distract the public from what he means which is another thing entirely, joining other recent demonstration of his constituents’ inability to trust him. Con Man Melancon doesn’t want to hear from you but he wants you to only hear what he’s trying to peddle – and it’s not the truth. Melancon doesn’t care about what you want, only what he wants, and that’s to get elected to some federal office somewhere so he can keep careening around the world on useless junkets and to lick lovingly the faces of liberal Democrats like the lap dog that he is. You’re just a thing to be used in this cosmology of his. As such, the silence he tries to impose surrounding the performance of his job in reality speaks volumes about his con game he employs in carrying it out.
The latest confirmation of this worldview of his comes from his comments on why he is refusing to meet with large groups of constituents whose presence and statements he can’t control. He claims it is because of a few isolated incidences at these occasions where liberal Democrats have been excoriated by plainspoken yet knowledgeable people motivated only by their genuine concerns about, in the main, a stealth federal government takeover and rationing of the sixth of the U.S. economy that comprises health care. Rather than listen to them, he asserts these actions don’t represent “honest questions.”
Instead, he says he will learn more by listening to presumed constituents handpicked by his organization who will tell him what he wants to hear. This is his version of the schoolyard tactic of shutting his eyes, covering his ears, and, to ensure he can’t hear anything that he doesn’t want to, by shouting loudly and repeatedly, “I don’t see you, I can’t hear you, you’re not here, go away!”
Particularly ironic about his lame rejoinder is that, by his own statements, he should have nothing to worry about since he voted against in committee a version of the Democrats’ health care plans which has the objectionable elements feared by a majority of the public. However, that’s because he fears they will ask him why he voted for a procedural move that allowed an amendment to the bill for taxpayer money potentially to fund elective abortions, in order to set things up so that later enough Democrats would be available to pass the whole thing despite his vote against.
And any meeting could allow the opportunity for questioners to publicize others of his brazen acts of misdirection as well. He foams at the mouth trying to get people to believe he is a rabid “Blue Dog,” i.e. Democrat who believes in fiscal constraint. Instead, he votes for the biggest increase in the federal budget deficit in history and then uses historical ignorance to try to defend himself. Also, he sticks taxpayers with hundreds of thousands of dollars in travelling expenses ostensibly to study “global warming” when he could have learned as much or more without gallivanting around and thereby not contributed to the production of greenhouse gases caused by his jet-setting.
This current excuse only represents yet another episode where Melancon says one thing that tries to distract the public from what he means which is another thing entirely, joining other recent demonstration of his constituents’ inability to trust him. Con Man Melancon doesn’t want to hear from you but he wants you to only hear what he’s trying to peddle – and it’s not the truth. Melancon doesn’t care about what you want, only what he wants, and that’s to get elected to some federal office somewhere so he can keep careening around the world on useless junkets and to lick lovingly the faces of liberal Democrats like the lap dog that he is. You’re just a thing to be used in this cosmology of his. As such, the silence he tries to impose surrounding the performance of his job in reality speaks volumes about his con game he employs in carrying it out.
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