Over
a period of months these media collected publicly-available campaign finance
data from 2009-12, essentially duplicating what the state presents already, but
added some value in trying to discover among donors common employers and creating
an index that can sorted by candidate and geographical area. It then produced
several stories highlighting various aspects of the system, hinting that this
is in pursuit of some kind of agenda, reform or otherwise.
But
while there are no factual errors in the series, the information often is
presented in a way that would leave the reader not properly informed about the
issue, or with the wrong idea about it. A perfect illustration of this misleading
comes from the very title of the series; “Louisiana Purchased.”
No
doubt this catchy appellation can draw in the eyeballs, but it is based upon
the myth that large campaign donations buy elections and influence. The
political science literature is very clear on this: election victories at the
federal level have no relationship to money spent, and voting behavior of
members on Congress on the floor seldom is apparently influenced by donations
(it would seem only when neither a member’s constituents nor his own ideology gives
him guidance on an issue then it seems there is association between voting
behavior on an issue and money donated by interests allied with that issue).
The literature is less voluminous and certain the farther down one goes, but
from what we can tell it seems state level elections fairly well follow the
dynamics at the federal level and only at the local level does money begin to
take on any significance at all and only in some circumstances, because of the
scalar differences.
If
one understands the dynamics of elections and campaigns, this makes eminent
sense. Donors are like investors who want to put money down only on somebody
they reasonably think can win; otherwise, you waste resources. Emotion can get
the best of you and you’ll plunk it down on someone whose ideology is great but
has no chance given other dynamics, or maybe you’ll do it as a favor to an old
pal who also hasn’t a prayer of winning, but the vast majority of donations go
out of a belief not just in the candidate, but that he can win. And you don’t
even have to like the guy’s issue preferences; some give to such candidates as
a defensive reaction because they hope they can have access to try to influence
him later down the road. They give because they see him as the likely winner,
not to make him into a winner.
In
other words, money does not create quality in a candidate, but instead quality
attracts money. Simply, you can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear no
matter how much money you throw at someone. Regrettably, this is not the
impression the series leaves, with its base assumption that donors are trying
to find ways to give so much because they are going to influence outcomes.
Or,
that they can influence policy once somebody is elected, which is why they may
give so much and to all sides. Again, it’s not hard to understand why money
seldom buys influence: most donations come because of a community of interest
between donor and politician, and, as for the remainder, because of the
defensive strategy described above many receive money from all sides of an
issue. This makes them a free agent in how they vote; since they must disappoint
somebody on an issue regardless of how they vote, they can choose that on the
basis of what their constituents, colleagues, or conscience tells them without
regard to donors. And they are encouraged to do so because many of the same
donors throw them cash time and again.
In
fact, there is really only one thing the typical donor can get out of his gift,
potential access to the policy-maker. It means the recipient (or his staff) will
listen, but it guarantees nothing. Still, being listened to gives one a chance
to influence, while not having that opportunity pretty much precludes any
opportunity. That’s why they give; to think anything else will come out of it
is wishful thinking, and to think that factor alone has any significant or
consistent influence over electoral outcomes and policy at the state level is
misguided.
However,
giving also may serve a couple of other purposes, which the articles do
explore. One, mainly seen at the local level, is in no-bid contracting, where a
donation can be seen as announcement that the donor’s concern would like to get
in on the action. If in these circumstances policy-makers basically “sell” a
contract to the highest “bidder” among donors that can create problems.
But
this should not be overstated, which the authors find tempting to do. Only
small contract amounts are permitted to bypass the bidding process except in
emergency situations. Further, they do have to do the job for the money allotted
or be subject to public oversight, so those that could get selected for
politics ahead of competence would get caught out, to the embarrassment of the
policy-makers who authorized their participation. And, any contracts whose
values are above a minimal level must go through the public bid process that pretty
much removes politics from it all – something the series’ authors do not
acknowledge.
The
other is in that donations could lead to appointment to state boards. Many of
these, of whom many of their members never give a cent to the appointing
official(s), have extremely limited power and also impose requirements or
vetting processes that deemphasize political considerations. But politics
cannot be removed from boards’ operations (as a recent
example demonstrates) and thus politics always will be a consideration in
appointments, where one of those factors can be donations.
State law prohibits
appointments on the basis on pecuniary considerations, although that doesn’t
mean that donors won’t think that they should give money in order to be on the
radar screen for appointment along with others also ponying up. Problematically,
however, the articles overplay this, implying that there’s something wrong
about it all. But what is it?
Is
it that these appointees who “buy” their way on then do whatever they want? No,
as usually there is very high congruence in policy orientations between
appointer and appointee, which is the prerequisite far and beyond money in the
mind of an appointer regarding any significant policy-making position. Thus,
the appointee serves as an extension of the appointer who was put there by the
mass public voting. Is it that they’re unaccountable? No, because the
appointers are on the hook for their actions of the appointees, which can be
exploited at the ballot box in future electoral attempts. Is it that this is a
way to generate campaign cash? No, not only because of the risk of being caught
illegally making such a trade, but also because of the dynamic noted above that
donations arrive proportionally to the quality of the candidate; in other words,
if the donor did not think they guy could win, there’s no point in giving to
gain consideration for an appointment.
So
the authors cannot really tell readers what is wrong about this, only that it
looks bad in some sense. Which fits along the lines of a general theme
encapsulated in permutations of a phrase that appears repeatedly throughout the
stories, that this perfectly legal campaign finance regime permits activities
that “to evade the spirit, if not the letter” of the law. This declaration is
false, at least its “spirit” portion.
It’s
false because the authors are silent on the most crucial aspect of campaign
finance, failing to illuminate it to provide the proper context. The system is
this way, where despite limits of personal giving individuals can bundle money
from others or can give to political action committees and political parties in
unlimited fashion, because it is their
constitutional First Amendment right to do so. The authors, clearly
unversed in this aspect of the issue, claim that allowing political speech
through donations through various channels that goes above the individual limits
violates what they perceive to be the “spirit” of the concept of limiting
donations, showing they are entirely ignorant that to do so would violate the
spirit of the Constitution itself, as affirmed
lucidly and powerfully in recent years by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Their
blindness to this is explained by a persistent theme running through the
articles, as voiced in an accompanying
editorial, that this campaign finance regime permits a situation where “If
a small number of powerful people or groups hold sway over political candidates
and public policy debates, the people's interests will be secondary.” That
there are big donors out there, that some get appointed to boards, that some
win big contracts through a competitive bidding process and some small no-bid
ones, and that some candidates they support win elections are all held out as
evidence that the condition exists.
Except
that the T-P cannot prove that this
is the case in a widespread and consistent manner because it cannot provide
proof of the causal mechanism. It does not prove in any way that “powerful
people” can “hold sway” that supplants “the people’s interests” – if even the
two are not the same thing on any issue. Association is not correlation; indeed,
as noted above, the presumed causal mechanisms this kind of argument could rely
upon often are disproven by empirical research. This kind of attitude reveals
both ignorance of this information and a lack of critical thinking about it.
Now,
this doesn’t mean that occasional abuses of the system will not occur, as
they do, and that improvements at the margin cannot make it work a little
better. Donations reasonably suspect as being illegal could be required to be
returned by candidates, more information such as employers of immediate family
members could be asked for in disclosure of donations, and more resources could
be allocated for enforcement activities. But by no means is this system itself
insufficient much less a form of systemic and legalized empowerment of
particular interests over others, as the editorial implies, simply because it
allows for the exercise of constitutional rights.
Perhaps
the inability to recognize this comes from the system’s convoluted nature,
which points to the optimal
reform for it all that goes well beyond the margins: get rid of any limits
on individuals and associations, period, while maintaining full and even
greater disclosure. This would actually reduce the money spent in politics, by
putting a lot of PACs and political operatives out of business, while making it
much easier and extremely simple to trace donors to candidates while adhering
to the Constitution.
One
suspects, given the tenor and tone of these articles, that the T-P won’t head in this direction for a
policy recommendation on this issue, instead preferring limiting free
expression of political views as much as possible without running afoul of the
Constitution. Which presents the ultimate irony of the whole series: an entity
which makes its living because of free speech would want to limit individuals’
ability to engage in that, unless …
1 comment:
You lecture of "...the obvious reform that would cure the system's real ills as well as those imagined by the authors."
Query: Why, after almost six years, as our strong, reforming Governor, has Mr. jindal not addressed or instituted this "... obvious reform ..."?
Query: Is it because it has not been so "... obvious ..." to him?
Query: Or, is it because it has been so "... obvious ..." to him but he just has not yet got around to instituting it yet (just too busy)?
Query: Or, is it because he is politically (and hypocritically) using and the beneficiary of the "... system's real ills ..." and wants no "... obvious reform ..."?
The answer is "... obvious ..." to us.
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