At the state level, the limits in
question concern the three consecutive term limit for a legislator in the same
office. It is diluted, because it allows limited members in one chamber to try
to win election in the other, subverting to some degree the idea and allowing
politicians to continue serving in an office nearly identical in power and
scope. Because of this, interestingly the average length of continuous service in
the Legislature at the beginning of 2004 for the typical senator, the last term
before limits went into effect, was slightly shorter (just over 7 years) than
in 2008, the first term affected by limits (almost 7¼) because of all that
jumping.
(Keep in mind that now Pres. John Alario brought 36 years with him,
skewing the average up by almost a point. When all was said and done, the 13
successful jumpers averaged a shade over 12 years in House experience, while
the returning senators averaged just under 5 in their chamber. At the beginning
of 2012, with 10 more jumpers successful – totaling now after a couple of early
departures 21 of 39 – average years served by then nudged up almost a full year
to over 8.)
But while the Senate crept up in
terms of average consecutive tenure, the House’s indisputably fell as only one
senator jumped back successfully. Yet at the same time, it’s never going to be
that short, for assuming that no senators do try to jump back and only a few representatives
quadrennially leave early one way or the other, the House average at a term
beginning should be somewhere between 3-4 years given the rounded up or down three
four-year term maximum.
Sure, by 2012 senators’ average
was twice House members’, but does it convey that much of an advantage in terms
of something oft quoted as a presumed shortcoming to term limits, “institutional
knowledge?” Keep in mind that the most experienced House members, roughly a
third, will have spent the same amount of time in the House as the typical
senator, and will be chamber leaders for the most part. And, frankly, unless
you’re an idiot four years is more than enough time to learn about the byways
and folkways of the institution – it’s just not that complicated – so with the
majority of House members presumably up to speed, the notion that the
institution suffers from lack of “institutional knowledge” that requires
excessive deferral to non-legislators is specious.
By contrast, it’s entirely
advantageous that legislators be hampered from burrowing in one office. Even if
(as my own academic
research discovered) at the state legislative level in Louisiana term
limitation produced closer alignment of district preferences and legislative voting
behavior in only a narrow range of cases, in this political culture that
historically placed so much emphasis on candidate image and so little on
policy, anything that dampens the impact of personalism in politics – where politics
become invested in individuals and the power they can wield to distribute resources
to groups rather than in personality-neutral policy that determines
distribution – only can be positive. Terms limits does precisely that, and
perhaps it’s no accident therefore that the Legislature, led by the House, has
assumed a mindset more amenable to change and reform in the past few years,
demonstrated in areas such as elementary
and secondary education, budgeting,
health
care, and higher
education.
1 comment:
The primary effect of legislative term limits has been to increase the power of the governor by destroying the institutional memory of the legislature. If you're a fan of legislators who are completely unfamiliar with both public policy issues and the way state government works, then legislative term limits are a wonderful thing.
The best, most effective term limits are enforced at the ballot box.
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