Jeffrey D. Sadow is an associate professor of political science at Louisiana State University Shreveport. If you're an elected official, political operative or anyone else upset at his views, don't go bothering LSUS or LSU System officials about that because these are his own views solely. This publishes five days weekly with the exception of 7 holidays. Also check out his Louisiana Legislature Log especially during legislative sessions (in "Louisiana Politics Blog Roll" below).
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23.3.17
Expanded parole for cost sake endangers lives
In the rush to make Louisiana’s correctional policy
more efficient, policy-makers cannot forget the larger goal of preventing
crime. How the state’s
latest reform recommendations address parole of those with lengthy prison
sentences illustrates the tension between these two desires.
The Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task Force’s conclusions,
formulated after over a year of study, largely have met with stakeholder
approval. The only real controversy has come over a set of recommendations that
would make lifers eligible for parole after serving 30 years in prison and
reaching age 50, unless they were convicted of first-degree murder, and also recommending
those serving long but less-than-life sentences gain parole eligibility after
20 years in prison and reaching age 45.
Proponents of these changes – Louisiana joins
Mississippi as the only states denying such eligibility to those convicted of
second-degree murder – argue that older prisoners exhibit far lower recidivism
rates than the younger prison population. They also note that eligibility does
not automatically means release; in fact, only a small portion of inmates
granted parole come through the discretionary process where the subject must
demonstrate contrition, good character, and ability to live outside the walls
that may include having a support system in place.
Additionally, another set of prisoners (which
often overlaps with those that fall under this “geriatric parole” category) with
physical ailments the group also advocated for early release, called “medical
parole.” In this case, proponents assert that these individuals, for obvious
reasons, pose even less threat to society and perhaps could receive better
care, or at the very least suffer less when among family and friends, if let
out. Again, officials would vet individuals to ensure they would have better
situations if freed than continuing to live behind bars.
Of course, cost considerations also play a role
for both groups. Releasing geriatrics from supervision saves a bundle, and for
prisoners with disabilities or long-illness the state could pass along much of the
cost of care to the federal government, as they almost certainly would qualify immediately
for Medicaid.
But to give cost anything close to the same status
as imprisonment as a crime reducer subverts the whole mission of discouraging
criminal behavior. Prison not only serves as a means to keep criminals off the
street but also as a deterrent to criminal behavior. The latter works only by
keeping convicts in prison to serve their full sentences.
Deterrence works only when credible in the minds
of individuals tempted to go outside the system. Much more than the typical person,
or even policy-maker, understands, those from environments more accepting of
criminal behavior often operate with much first-hand knowledge of the criminal
justice system, including imprisonment. In neighborhoods with higher crime
rates, many families know of relatives or neighbors currently doing time, and
they become aware of what that means and entails.
Granted, in the commission of serious crimes that
especially includes those without premeditation, most criminals don’t
consciously weigh the benefits with the cost of potential long imprisonment.
For example, if somebody ends up convicted of murder-two because a petty
argument escalated into deadly violence, in the course of becoming enraged the
guy wasn’t stopping to think that he could get 30 years for that kind of crime if
he didn’t get ahold of himself. However, in the back of his mind from his
interactions with others, he may have a subconscious awareness that people with
long sentences in Louisiana never get out and that if he lets things escalate
that might become his fate.
And almost certainly a consideration like this
someone consciously would entertain if thinking about something like armed
robbery that went bad. In either case, the deterrent exists only because of the
threat of being locked up and the key thrown away for the entire sentence’s
duration. And if analysts have learned anything about the sitzkrieg against capital punishment
that has slowed it to a crawl, if any executions happen at all in some states,
a punishment loses its beneficial deterrent effects when belief sprouts that
you can beat the sentence.
That makes geriatric parole a risky proposition,
made even more so in that “geriatric” in the world of criminology means someone
older than 45. It makes a world of difference in the mind of a young punk contemplating
a serious crime if he thinks the worst that can happen to him is to be out at
45 as opposed to 55 or even never seeing freedom again.
Medical parole also carries risk, but different
deterrence effects operate here. The only thing worse than staying in prison a
long time is staying in prison a long time sick or disabled. No one thinks he’ll
get sick or disabled, so that future consequences simply do not enter into
calculations of present behavior.
Thus, medical parole does not alter crime
prevention, meaning it may happen without adverse consequences to public
safety. Yet if it must occur, it must happen in a cost-effective fashion with
no chance of recidivism. Simple cost-shifting from state to federal governments
does nothing to save the taxpayer money, who must pay for it regardless, and
cannot justify applying the concept. Rather, only in instances where an inmate with
a long-term, debilitating ailment would receive care less expensively regardless
of which public institution pays should the state permit medical parole.
Therefore, policy-makers should dismiss geriatric
parole entirely as a policy option for offenders with long sentences, and
employ medical parole sparingly according to the above standard. Saving money
does not provide sufficient rationale for the former compared to the its
increased potential for lives permanently made more adverse or lost, and for
the latter saving the state money as a justification doesn’t cut it when ultimately
taxpayers get hit. As policy-makers consider such options, they cannot let
dollar signs take precedence over innocent lives.
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