Only two authoritative,
publicly-released studies have occurred on this policy, both by the Department
of Health and Hospitals prior to Edwards’ inauguration, and only the first,
released in 2013, went into a year-by-year, component-by-component study of the
issue. It presented four scenarios that depended upon the rates of enrollment
of the uninsured population specifically newly eligible because of expansion, of
increased enrollment in other Medicaid programs because of the publicity
surrounding expansion, and of enrollment of the insured population from the
private sector switching now eligible to switch to Medicaid. A second
report a year later confirmed, utilizing data gathered from other states’
experiences, that the most costly scenario most closely fit reality. The
extremely detailed report predicted for the last half of 2016, when Edwards
wants to start the increased coverage, this would cost the state $38 million; by
2023, the state would pay an additional $373 million that year.
The public could access both
reports – until shortly after Edwards took office. Echoing the communist world when
a new regime would wipe away evidence from the previous, the reports
mysteriously disappeared from the DHH website, and now locatable online only through
other unrelated archiving sites. Two
months later came Edwards’ pronouncement that alleges a positive $142 million
dollar swing in the forecast impact from the first for the last half of this
year.
But the Edwards Administration at
this writing has not made this report available to the public. It appears that
only information to the media has gone out, in a very rough outline that
presents no data analysis or detail. While this does not automatically invalidate
any reputed conclusions from it, unlike with the previous two that have sourced
data and lay out all assumptions, independent analysis cannot assess the
quality of the work.
However, the extraordinarily
sketchy information made available through the media provides at least a
limited review of it – an exercise that immediately raises questions about the quality
of its conclusions. Keep in mind as well that the figures are according to fiscal
year, not calendar years, which can confuse as the escalating state shares
occur on a calendar year basis.
From what can be derived from it,
it says the extra state contribution – none in 2016, then 5 percent in 2017, 6
percent in 2018, 7 percent in 2019, and 10 percent from there on out – from sources
not spelled out would be $51 million for FY 2017, presumably incorporating 2.5
percent of the total cost. It also alleges that moving current Medicaid
recipients into expansion (meaning lowering reimbursements from roughly 32
percent) would save (that is, the federal government paying more, even as the
overall taxpayer burden nationally increases) $24.8 million, that uncompensated
care costs (for the same reason) would decline $37.7 million, that extra state
compensation for charity hospitals would decline (for the same reason) that
saves $89.3 million, and that prisoner hospitalization (for the same reason) balances
would benefit with a $3.5 million reduction, for a total of $155.3 million. The
net result comes close to $100 million, at $104.3 million.
With few details given of the
Edwards Administration assertions this makes comparisons difficult, but one
possible concerns uncompensated care. The 2013 report predicted these costs
avoided, represented by dollars spent in the disproportionate share hospital
program, would be $35 million – essentially the same figure. With less
certainty, that report also estimated administrative costs of the program at
about $20 million annually, while the Edwards Administration insists
the hiring of nearly 250 staff would cost only about 15 percent of that.
The 2013 report seems more credible
on that account. The recent figures allocate only a bit more than $11,000 per
new person hired, when the salaries plus benefits easily could exceed four
times that. Again, with the lack of details released by DHH, it’s unknown what
figure was used in its computations, although it claims providers themselves would
foot the rather low startup costs figure (who then presumably would pass these
along to the public).
But the savings figure most in
dispute would be that shifting of the state subsidy to pull up safety net
hospitals, because that does not depend upon Medicaid expansion. That would be
a byproduct of it, but the state could realize savings simply by declaring
itself out of the charity business and not paying that extra to treat the 138
to 200 percent federal poverty limit segment, making those individuals buy their
own insurance.
So, when adjusting down or out these
figures, it’s entirely debatable that expansion in and of itself “saves”
Louisiana any money at all this next fiscal year. Leaving these objections
aside, however, even accepting the assumptions of the Edwards Administrations’
numbers, indisputably after next fiscal year expansion will cost the state more
than by refusing it.
If we assume the $51 million figure
represents the state portion of expansion, next fiscal year it goes from 2.5
percent to 5.5 percent, or an extra $61.5 million, while the alleged savings remain
roughly the same. By the time the proportion has risen to 10 percent, the state
will pay more than any asserted savings, even using what appears to be the
optimistic Edwards Administration assumptions.
Again, without any detailed
information from Edwards’ DHH it’s impossible to make meaningful comparisons,
but the broad assertions made certainly appear based upon much more optimistic cost
assumptions than the previous detailed studies. And that would run against the
field of play regarding Medicaid expansion, which has shown for most states costs well exceeded initial
expectations.
Policy-makers should show wariness
over accepting the Edwards Administration numbers that appear unsourced and
unexplained, contradict more detailed if dated analyses, and, even so, show
that expansion will end up a money-loser over time (and this does not even
consider expansion will not provide better care, if not produce worse outcomes,
than presently available to the uninsured). Any debate on this issue should
revolve around data and analysis made publicly available, not by asking to take
broad, essentially unverifiable assertions at face value.
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