SB
79 by state Sen. Robert Adley
would change the process by which the authorities, which possess wide-ranging
regulatory and spending power, have members nominated to them. Many of these
positions are designated for individuals with professional qualifications,
others for residents of the parishes involved, and still others have both
qualities, while a couple need none of these. Currently, a
nominating committee of representatives from public policy interest groups,
academicians, and professionals picked by organizations choose one or two
members for potential appointment by the governor, with Senate confirmation. If
they fail to do so by a certain time limit, the governor may select anyone who
meets the qualifications.
The bill would change this
procedure so that each position had to have three nominees from which the
governor selects or refuses. Refusal means more nominees would be put forward
by a certain time period until either the governor appoints one or the deadline
is missed and he may appoint any qualified person. The previous occupant
continues in office until a replacement surfaces, as is currently done.
Adley
brought the bill on behalf of Gov. Bobby
Jindal, whose desire to induce the change spurs from board members
launching a controversial, if not illegal, suit that ran counter to the state’s
plans in this area and also has drawn fire from most other agencies at the
state and local level. This alteration would give the governor more control
over the membership.
Which disturbs the BGR, it
declaring that “this would vastly increase the governor's control over the
composition of the flood protection boards and allow political considerations
to creep back into the selection process” – a reference to a decade ago when
the various scattered levee boards had most members nominated by legislators and
appointed by the governor without any professional qualifications needed for
any. It concludes that for SB 79, “By giving a governor too much control over the
composition of the boards, [the legislation] would weaken existing safeguards.
It should be rejected. We simply cannot afford to turn back the clock to a
failed, politics-based approach for selecting levee board members.”
Unfortunately, the myopia of this
assertion is exceeded only by the complete misunderstanding about the scope and
nature of politics and governance contained within it. It assumes that
governance can occur in a depoliticized fashion, that government can act in a
purely administrative mode, and that politics can be wrung completely out of the
policy-making process.
But a century’s worth of public
administration research and practice shows that such an assumption is, at best,
chock full of naïveté. Institutional policy-making
is nothing more than what government chooses to do or not to do, and human
beings making those decisions in those bodies with power bring with them value
judgments that color whatever professional norms they may possess – if they
possess or them in that decision-making. You simply cannot separate politics
from administration, even with matters considered nonpolitical.
Apparently fooling the BGR here
is belief that a nomination board comprised of supposedly nonpolitical agents
ineluctably forwards nonpolitical nominees who then automatically decide on
nonpolitical grounds, acting as a kind of insulation that equals
depoliticization. Yet the process is not like waving a magic wand and changing
human nature. Politics will get through, with Exhibit very capital A being the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection
Authority-East’s bringing the entirely
politicized suit lacking any pretense that it relies upon some kind of
professional standards despite the presumed depoliticized procedures in which
the BGR has faith even after real life has shown that trust to be misplaced.
Once properly understood that any
organization with formal, institutionalized political power will act
politically, the suit episode also shows the dangers of unaccountability. The
BGR, laboring under the fantasy that a sheltered nomination process can produce
depoliticized use of power, has become blind to the fact that instead of that
the insulation removes accountability – a flaw the bill attempts to reverse. By
shifting more appointive input to the governor’s preferences, at least the
people have an indirect means by which to rein in a rogue agency, through their
role in electing the appointer, instead of having an agency even more insulated
from them and thereby more capable and likely to act against the people’s will
and their good.
To add to its error, the BGR then
constructs a straw man argument in the contention that to reject the current
process constitutes a massive surrender to cronyism and hyper-politicization.
Nothing of the sort would be the case. The committee still would put forth
names that must meet the qualifications as set by law, so the governor could
not try to win a sitzkrieg by
rejecting name after name until he either got a crony delivered up or could put
one on by default, and the Senate will continue to have confirmation power. A majority
of members still will have expertise, but under the bill there will be this additional
checks to prevent excessive insularity from detaching them too thoroughly from
the public good and collectively heading off the rails.
Opponents of the bill will try to
posture themselves using the framework presented by the BGR to allege the
measure backwardly returns politics and tomfoolery to flood control matters. Supporters
need to emphasize the logical flaws and hollowness of this that serve to
sabotage the rectification of a process that increases the risk of democracy
flaunted and accountability thwarted.
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