It resembles his HB
387 from last year, which went nowhere, with two extensions. The bill would
protect any “public employee” who provides information to a legislator or
committee from “discipline, reprisal, or threats of discipline or reprisal by
the public employer for providing such information,” creates an enforcement
mechanism, and provides for penalties. It differs in that it acknowledges Department
of State Civil Service authority and defines what a “request” for information
means.
By its introduction and in its
wording, it carries a disingenuous air, implying that this practice already in
the main is not outlawed. But, in fact, the majority of Louisiana state
employees, those who are in the classified service, already have these
protections; they cannot be disciplined or fired without evidence of unsatisfactory
performance and they also have explicit protections (as the DSCS separately
conveyed in conjunction with the filing of the bill) when engaging in issue
advocacy, as testifying in front of a legislative committee would exemplify.
And even most in the unclassified
service – those positions of which hiring, personnel actions, and discharges
are governed under agencies other than the DSCS – enjoy the same protections. For
example, the single largest group of these kinds of state employees are in my
profession, university professor, and have merit qualifications attached to hiring,
promotion, pay, and firing (although I know of at least one elected official
who hinted to one or more of my superiors that my opinions expressed in this
and other spaces warranted some kind of corrective personnel action). Thus, the
vast majority of state employees already enjoy the protections that this bill,
in their cases, would impose superfluously.
However, the intent of Schroder
is to create these for the only state employees that currently do not have
them, appointees of elected officials, most of whom are hired and fired at will
by the governor. Supposedly, such a law would facilitate highly-placed
executive branch officials in testifying openly about their superiors’
policies, without fear that an adverse review might get them fired.
Yet even here, this kind of solution
ends up essentially duplicative, because the Legislature already has the powers
to prevent this. For one, Art. III Sec. 7(B)
of the Constitution gives them subpoena power to compel truthful testimony
under oath, so even if an official feared what candor could do they still will
deliver their opinions on these matters. And to prevent retaliation, the
Legislative wields impeachment power under Art. X Sec. 24 that
it can deploy to discourage instances that majorities of its member perceive as
unwarranted personnel actions involving at-will employees.
But it’s not the existence of procedures
already in place that make this bill’s content odious; instead, it’s the
violation it does to the concept of separated powers and democratic government.
Any executive needs the ability to have staff committed to the policies of that
executive, especially as these reflect the will of the people through the
electoral process (and a consent that may be withdrawn by them at the next election,
or sooner through the recall process if citizens have a disagreement with that
agenda), in order to be able to execute the powers of his office as defined
both constitutionally and statutorily.
In turn, those appointed into
these positions are obligated to know that if they disagree with these policies
to the point they cannot promulgate them faithfully they must resign or accept termination
if it becomes clear they fail to carry out their superiors wishes – one way in
which this may happen being as a result of supplying the competitor plenary
organ of government with information that increases its power at the executive’s
expense. And if such a person is discovered not compatible with the executive
by information provided, as a corrective action the discharge of that appointee
must be an option available to the executive.
Because to allow subordinates
deliberately to subvert their superior’s policies violates the principle that
elected executives be able to carry out their mandates; after all, it was the
superior, not subordinate, who won the people’s approval. By creating some kind
of protective shield around them as this law does exempting them from fidelity
to the agendas of their bosses, this means the executive lacks appropriate
control over being able to translate a popular mandate into policy. The ability
to pursue that agenda is the exact purpose of an executive branch, and in
retarding its power to do so inappropriately shifts too much power into the
hands of the Legislature, which already has impeachment power to check an
executive. Aggrandizing too much power into the Legislature and beyond the
intent of the Constitution, as this bill does, does violence to our basic
notions of separate powers and checks and balances.
At the federal level, giving the
president sufficient authority in this area was one of the first things decided
by Congress, and the reason remains as compelling today as it did then. And
possession of its extant powers means there’s no information the Legislature
already cannot get. There’s no good reason for the Louisiana Legislature to
injure stalwart principles that have made representative democracy work in
order to unwisely magnify its powers beyond the necessary and sufficient ones
it has already in this matter.
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