This audit
probed the implementation of the program that allows families whose children
are in underperforming public schools to receive state money to attend a
participating, either public or nonpublic, qualifying school of their choice.
It made several recommendations for programmatic changes, either by law or by
Department of Education regulation, that addressed implementation issues
including that DOE oversee more closely that participant schools keep better
financial and client records, that DOE provide better metrics to match school
resources to capacity in serving voucher students, and that DOE institute
specific criteria for determining whether schools should continue
participation, for consistency sake and accountability purposes.
In this case, the LLA produced a “performance
audit,” wherein the agency not only renders an accounting of how well the law
was followed, but also may insert recommendations for program operation, either
directly to the agency running the program or (in a “matter for legislative
consideration”) as a legal change to be wrought by its boss, the Legislature.
And it’s here where problems may creep in, for in recommending these things the
LLA is tempted to substitute its own policy-making judgment for that of the implementers
or creators of the program.
For example, DOE disagreed with
the assessment of specific criteria needed for continued program eligibility,
pointing out it had applied an internal standard that any two-year participant
school with at least 10 tested students that had on those tests an average
proficiency score of less than 25 percent that would end up restricting seven
schools as a result. The LLA in response averred these criteria did not address
complete ejection from program participation.
But in fact Bulletin
133, which summarizes regulations promulgated by DOE and authorized by the
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education concerning this program, in its
Chapter 9 is specified eight different criteria with which a provider must
comply to continue in the program. It does not contain performance data as one
of these, although it does allow for DOE to enforce “criteria for participation”
(for example, allowing DOE to limit the number of slots based upon performance).
Accordingly, because statute punts the question to BESE and BESE issued these
regulations, this is not a question of DOE not wanting to do or not clarifying,
it’s an issue of BESE nor the Legislature from wishing to establish numerical
targets.
Now, the LLA could have phrased
this as a “matter for legislative consideration,” as in “The legislature may
wish to consider establishing quantifiable performance criteria based upon the
scholarship cohort’s proficiency scores for program continuation” or something
along those lines. And, that may not be a bad idea although structural
aspects of the program may make computing usable aggregate scores for each and
every provider impossible, hence the discretion given DOE. But the approach of
the LLA in the audit was to opine that, since public schools both traditional and
charter faced sanctions as a result of poor performance based upon a
quantifiable scoring method, a similar kind of method should be used in this
circumstance for nonpublic schools as well.
Unfortunately, that statement
reflects more of a policy preference of the LLA – you have to compute some quantitative
performance-based standards and decide whether to kick schools out on that
basis – than presentation of a policy option. If BESE has decided to eschew use
of specific performance-based criteria for whatever reason or even not to address
whether a participant can be removed, that’s its call and is subject to
political debate over whether that is the optimal policy. But the LLA is not to
take sides in this debate.
Yet even the “matter for legislative
recommendation” route contains some potential pitfalls along these lines. In
the report, the LLA also makes one of these, after a brief review of
eligibility for provider participation. It notes that for public school
participants they have to meet a certain academic grade that defines “acceptability,”
but no such standard exists in law or regulation for nonpublic providers in
this program. Statute
only reads that a participating school meet non-public school approval (including
a curriculum at least equal to that in rigor for public schools) by BESE, comply
with nondiscrimination standards, and adhere to a 20 percent enrollment cap
of slots requested if having been in the program fewer than two years.
Again, this puts the LLA
perilously close to substituting policy content for evaluation. It could be
that policy-makers already have decided that the concept of “acceptability” does
not translate exactly or well here, that, as families will have a choice, the
market will reward schools that do a good job with more students and those that
do not will get fewer or zero, with “acceptability” measured by criteria
families think important (which likely will have a lot to do with their students’
or families’ children’s test scores). It’s another policy debate worth having (and one which was briefly broached in the legislative review of the report last week),
but the point is the LLA should not insert itself into that by, with such a
ruling and its phrasing, conveying a kind of imprimatur to one side of the
argument.
Whether unrealized lapses or
otherwise, the LLA needs to take great care in not exceeding its statutory mandate to
examine the “financial accountability, legal compliance and evaluations of the
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the auditee’s programs or any
combination of the foregoing.” This particular report gives an example of where
in this regard it could have exercised more caution.
1 comment:
Absolute nit-picking, at its worst!!
The voucher program is, obviously, in chaos, but none would ever expect you, or Bobby, to admit it.
Just change the subject and criticize someone else.
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