With the next mayor’s race just a
year away, long-rumored candidate state Rep. Patrick Williams
recently put on a fundraiser. What raised eyebrows among observers was the
number of elected Republicans who had signed on to play a supporting role in
this endeavor for the Democrat – and this effort didn’t include only moderates
like Caddo Parish Commissioner John
Escude’, but also conservative stalwarts like state Sen. Barrow Peacock.
That most of the local GOP legislative
delegation signaled support for a black Democrat shows that they have written
off the chance for their party to capture the spot their party held for most of
the 1990s. As a candidate, Williams makes some sense from a conservative
perspective – if you believe the only kind of candidate who can win is a black
Democrat. On the Louisiana Legislature Log
voting index over his six years in office, Williams’ average score is almost
46, where a score of 100 means voting a perfect conservative/reform record, and
a 0 means voting a perfect liberal/populist record.
In fact, in two of those six
years, he was the highest scoring black Democrat in the House. But the picture is
far from perfect for, or even perhaps acceptable to, some conservatives. In the
second year of his first term, he (with another nine Democrats) scored a 0, and
this past year (second year of his second term) he scored only a 20. Still,
with a couple of scores of 60 and an overall average that exceeds the House
Democrats’ over that time period, that’s about as good as a conservative could
expect to find in a black Democrat.
Thus the thinking goes that it’s
better to get as moderate a liberal as possible in there instead of holding out
for a much more conservative candidate who has no chance of winning. That’s
based upon the changing demographic portrait of Shreveport voters.
In 2006 after the mayoral general
election, white former city attorney Jerry Jones seemed poised to get a
Republican back in office, when he faced former state Rep. Cedric Glover, a
black Democrat, in the general election runoff. Had the turnout model of the first
election held, Jones would have won 51-49. Instead, black turnout increased a
quarter more than white turnout, and while white crossover remained at about
the norm, black crossover voting for Jones almost disappeared, handing Glover an
eight-point win that he later parlayed into a nearly two-to-one triumph over
another Republican in 2010.
The demographics perhaps tell
this story. In 2006
at election time, whites comprised 48.7 of the registered total, a percent
higher than blacks. In terms of party registration, Republicans made up 24.7
percent, while 37.5 percent of the electorate was black Democrats. By 2010,
whites at 45.8 percent then trailed black registration by 4.2 percent and while
the proportion of registered Republicans remained the same, that of black
Democrats had increased 3.9 percent. As of Nov.
2013, blacks had increased their slim absolute majority of three years ago
to 52.2 percent, now 8.6 percentage points higher than whites, and GOP
adherents edged down to 24.3 percent while black Democrats represented 41.6
percent of the electorate.
In other words, the numbers are
much less favorable than in the reasonably close 2006 election for a Republican
candidate, and have deteriorated somewhat from the blowout loss in 2010. It’s
little wonder party elites seem to be headed into a mode of accommodation rather
than conflict.
And it’s a strategy that could
produce a more favorable outcome. By backing a conservative Republican, this
would erode votes from a more moderate Democrat of any color, allowing more
liberal Democrats to get into the runoff to win. By having conservatives eschew
that kind of candidate, the more moderate Democrat could gain enough to make
the runoff to win.
However, that strategy carries
some risk. This could entice even more liberal kinds of candidates into the contest,
thinking they needed to differentiate themselves even more decisively from any
candidate trying to present himself as a moderate, and it is unlikely that all
conservatives in the electorate simply would lay down and not have at least one
conservative Republican run. This could squeeze that less liberal Democrat out
for the runoff. Or, conservatives might be so discouraged without a true
conservative in the runoff contest that they sit it out, declining to support a
more moderate Democrat to allow a very liberal Democrat to win.
Reducing the chance of these
scenarios is that, among black Democrats in Shreveport, there has developed a
minor schism among those in power and those out of it. Thus, there will be
enough division in the initial general election portion to allow Republicans to
act as a decisive swing vote. In 2010, an incumbent Glover had the resources to
fend off the “outs” within the coalition of black Democrats that got him to the
runoff. In 2014, Williams stands a great chance of becoming the standard bearer
of the “outs” from 2010, sluicing away support from the “ins” of 2010 without
incumbency resources to keep them on that side to ensure his not getting aced
out of a runoff even with a conservative candidate running.
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