Since 2008, the federal government-run program established four decades
prior has operated by a series of short-term authorizations under existing
rules that continue to drain federal taxpayers to subsidize those wishing to
own property in riskier areas. Its rates set below real levels needed to offset
actual risk have meant in few years have premiums at least matched losses paid,
building up a steady deficit that has caused it soon to hit its $20.8 billion
borrowing limit, and with no real pressures to conform to market rates having driven
all private insurers of flood risk out early in the program’s history.
Actually, not a lot of the present borrowing authority had been used
until 2005, when Louisiana broke the bank and then-limit of $1.5 billion with
its hurricane disasters. Although one of the highest users of the program,
ranking third in
absolute numbers behind only the much larger in area and population Florida and
Texas in policies written, the value of them, and their premiums paid amount, historically
the state has sucked out resources from the program far out of proportion to
its population. With about 1.5 percent of the nation’s people, since its
inception the state has been the source of over a fifth of all losses historically and a
staggering two-fifths of all claims monies paid out – enough of the latter to account
for almost all of the money borrowed in the program’s history to date.
The House passed legislation in 2011 that the Senate has done nothing but
did come up with a similar version
it has tried to deal with this year. Both try to institute reforms that would allow the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to increase premiums, by a maximum 15 percent a year
in the Senate version, up from 10 percent; phase out subsidies for high-risk
properties; and require that new policies are based on actuarially sound rates.
The Senate’s version also could incorporate the latest continuing resolution’s
change of stripping the insurance’s use on vacation and second homes.
Yet even if passed before the
Jul. 31 expiration date of the latest extension, the anticipated rise in premium
rates would contribute only $4.6 billion more over the next decade, not nearly
enough to pay down debt, which may have to go even higher than its current
limit. While the bill does make the right choice in introducing more market
reforms, its ultimate
intention must be to get government entirely out of the business. That will
be hampered with the debt overhang.
Louisiana has a related situation
with its state-run, troubled
Citizens Property Insurance Company, where it insures homes, including for wind
and hail protection but not flood, at the highest of market rates in some
parishes and at least 10 percent higher in others. It dealt with the 2005 hurricane
disasters’ claims by the same borrowing strategy, but hitting up all state
policy-holders to pay down the debt.
The NFIP should adopt something
similar to cover its debt, except limit the extra assessment to that one
percent of properties nationwide required to have flood insurance. Naturally,
this will hit some Louisiana homeowners hard, but it’s the least they can do for
living off the subsidies of others for their choices in housing. The extra
assessment can be discontinued when premium rates have come up to actuarially
realistic rates.
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