If his opponents want to oust Sen. David Vitter from office in 2010, they have found exactly the wrong way to do it. He now enjoys the happy coincidence of an issue where he can come out in favor of his conservative principles and ride public sentiment in his favor while making opponents look sanctimonious and simultaneously devalue the only real vulnerable issue concerning Vitter.
Until last year, Vitter was 99.44 percent assured of reelection, given his strong conservative voting record in a majority conservative state. Then he revealed commission of a “serious sin” in the past, likely the usage of a prostitution ring prior to election to federal office. Given his record on the issues, his apparent contrition, and that many voters will accept somebody who votes the right way as long he doesn’t abuse the powers of his office, his chances for reelection may have plunged to 90 percent.
But with the emergence the possibility of the federal government bailing out one or more failing domestic automakers, he may be on the way to that higher plateau of reelection possibility. This issue not only allows Vitter to remind Louisianans of his specific opposition to this, shared nationally, and general dislike of government intervention into the economy, but the way in which his opponents have attacked him about it makes him look even better while pushing away the “character” issue. Just one sample of the rhetoric from a union hack that plays into Vitter’s hands:
“I don't know what Sen. Vitter has against GM [which has a major facility in Shreveport] or the United Auto Workers or the entire domestic auto industry; whatever it is, whatever he thinks we've done, it's time for him to forgive us, just like Sen. Vitter has asked the citizens of Louisiana to forgive him,” said [Morgan] Johnson, president of [Shreveport] Local 2166. Otherwise, Johnson said of Vitter, it would appear, “He'd rather pay a prostitute than pay auto workers.”
Is it possible to critique Vitter in a less intelligent way than this? Here’s a guy defending an industry losing money hand over fist because of an inadequate business model that allows a $30 differential in labor costs to its rivals promoted by his very union which allow typical workers to make $55,000 a year (exclusive of benefits worth 150 percent more), which until recently paid people not to work up to two years, paid them more in early retirement than when they worked, and supplies health benefits that even members of Congress would envy. And has the audacity to ask taxpayers many of whom are poorer that these unionized workers to subsidize this? Especially when Vitter would have supported a bailout bill that moved up minor union concessions only two years?
(It’s not like the UAW has been a fan of Vitter’s. Over his career, on average he has supported the UAW in votes only 6 percent of the time. So what did they expect? And General Motors hasn’t exactly been generous to Vitter during his 9 years in office: for the first time, earlier this year it gave him a contribution, of $1,000. Contrast this with the $19,000 they have thrown at Republican Vitter’s Democrat colleague Sen. Mary Landrieu in her 12 years in office, who wanted the bailout to go through.)
All this rhetoric does is it makes Vitter look like a champion of taxpayers, the middle class, and even more courageous because he is going against a special interest in his own state. And to drag in the shot about “pay” not only looks stupid because it’s clear that Vitter, nor anybody else, is obligated to “pay” any workers, but by coming up with such a strained metaphor on the character issue reduces its effectiveness. That is, when people see such an attack and recognize it is so ludicrous, it desensitizes them to the issue forcibly tied to it.
It also helps Vitter that he has attackers from outside the state that also seem to be part of a greedy cabal asking for handout to save them from their own folly. Speaking of paying, Vitter could not have had the funds to fund all the favorable publicity he can derive from a column appearing in the Detroit Free Press which basically called Vitter and others ingrates from not supporting the handout when Detroit manufacturers had sent aid after the 2005 hurricane disasters – never mind the difference between a natural disaster and bringing your own problems onto yourself, and not having the wisdom to figure out that if you’re doing something wrong that put you in this situation you don’t ask for a handout and not make more than cosmetic changes. (Perhaps it’s no surprise that with such simplemindedness in its product this outlet is losing so much money it is eliminating home delivery every day of the week; maybe it should ask for a bailout, too.)
If Vitter keeps getting these political softballs to whack over the fence, nobody is going to remember he had a “transgression” at all. If his opponents allow Vitter to demonstrate conservative credentials favored by the state’s majority over and over again, they might as well save their resources and give up on defeating him now.
17.12.08
Looming deficits beg reevaluation of handling mechanisms
As Louisiana goes forward to contend with a budget deficit of $341 million this year (so far; there are two more regularly checkpoints at minimum on this figure before the end of the fiscal year) and a potential $2 billion deficit for fiscal year 2009-10, the question arises how the state’s fiscal mechanisms can deal with these deficit situations which cannot exist according to the state’s Constitution except for extreme circumstances. A review of these procedures is in order.
As of this year note that about 65 percent of the state operating expenditures can be financed currently through federal monies of some kind. Thus, the total being discussed here is about $14.5 billion. (Recognize this excludes any disaster recovery federal dollars.) Of that, a little over 63 percent is discretionary funds that have no strings attached to them in their expenditures, a little over 10 percent are non-discretionary in that they are fees or other self-generated revenues that go back into the programs from which they are generated, and the remainder is by law revenues dedicated to a certain purpose. (Technically, about three percent of the grand total really goes to capital outlay projects.) The “undedicated” monies go into the general fund, and the dedicated funds have each of 36 funds into which they go.
When there is a budget deficit in the current year reported in a fund, appropriations from the fund in question may be reduced. Typically, the only meaningful deficits that exist are in the general fund, and to take care of those typically appropriations must be reduced to the discretionary areas. In this instance, on Friday the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget is likely to certify the deficit numbers coming from the general fund with little or no deficits from the others.
As of this year note that about 65 percent of the state operating expenditures can be financed currently through federal monies of some kind. Thus, the total being discussed here is about $14.5 billion. (Recognize this excludes any disaster recovery federal dollars.) Of that, a little over 63 percent is discretionary funds that have no strings attached to them in their expenditures, a little over 10 percent are non-discretionary in that they are fees or other self-generated revenues that go back into the programs from which they are generated, and the remainder is by law revenues dedicated to a certain purpose. (Technically, about three percent of the grand total really goes to capital outlay projects.) The “undedicated” monies go into the general fund, and the dedicated funds have each of 36 funds into which they go.
When there is a budget deficit in the current year reported in a fund, appropriations from the fund in question may be reduced. Typically, the only meaningful deficits that exist are in the general fund, and to take care of those typically appropriations must be reduced to the discretionary areas. In this instance, on Friday the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget is likely to certify the deficit numbers coming from the general fund with little or no deficits from the others.
15.12.08
LA tightened belt 4 years ago; it can work again
The news about Louisiana’s looming budget deficit probably was beyond what elected officials wanted to hear – current year $341 million, and if spending stays at the current projection factoring in known increases without adding services, it will be a billion dollars more and $1.2 billion less in revenues to cover it.
Some things to note about the issue for this fiscal year:
For this year as a whole, this projects to about a 3.5 percent hit on the general fund minus dedicated funds which constitutionally means Gov. Bobby Jindal and the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget together can handle the cutting (although in reality, since half the year has gone by, it is a 7 percent real cut) by up to 5 percent in a fund
Over half of this, about $5 billion, for disbursement lies in statutory dedications many of which are stable but some potentially unpredictable in cost – for example, higher enrollments and tuitions at state universities through TOPS, those stemming from judicial proceedings, debt service increases, etc. – which must be paid without the budget going into deficit
The remainder is not statutorily dedicated and is considered totally discretionary in its treatment, of which almost 34 percent goes to higher education and 40 percent to health care – meaning that potentially if cuts are uniform across agencies at the 3.5 percent level, these two will absorb around $252 million in cuts, or a real reduction in their general fund allocations for the remainder of the fiscal year of 15.6 percent and to their overall budgets of 8 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively
About 29 percent, the largest portion, of the general fund goes to the Minimum Foundation Program, but that is the exception to the rule and can be cut at most only 1 percent, or around $27 million, providing less than 10 percent of the amount needed.
About $4.35 billion of statutory revenue dedications, as opposed to those of expenditures above, also come into the state’s coffers, but to redirect any of these immediately would require legislation from a special session, so the only savings here would be from operations such as those from executive orders recently issued by Jindal and then subsequent transfers of funds
Next year’s numbers truly are sobering (although not unreal such as those of 20 years ago were with a $1 billion deficit to a general fund that then was less than $4 billion in generated revenue), a drop of about 13 percent to around $8 billion in revenue for the general fund (note that as recently as May, the forecast for next fiscal year was essentially flat). Jindal wisely has promised not to use the Budget Stabilization Fund monies to tackle this year’s deficit because next year’s really will call for these funds. It also cries out for him to dump the maximum amount of funds from the declared fiscal year 2007-08 surplus into it to use next year.
This is serious. The head of my budget unit has called a faculty meeting tomorrow on 18 hours notice just to address this. It’s going to take quite a bit of skill to maneuver this just for this year’s alone so Jindal better be prepared to sacrifice his holidays (the budget must be brought in balance 30 days after a deficit projection or else a special session is triggered).
As for the future, as Jindal wisely has ruled out tax increases that might depress the economy even further, tinkering around the margins as Jindal can do for this fiscal year will be insufficient. Still, to put matters in perspective, the initial revenue forecast after the 2005 hurricane disasters pegged the general fund at $6.6 billion and $700 million worth of cuts made that turned out to be not needed to match realized revenues. If it could be done then, it can be done again.
Some things to note about the issue for this fiscal year:
Next year’s numbers truly are sobering (although not unreal such as those of 20 years ago were with a $1 billion deficit to a general fund that then was less than $4 billion in generated revenue), a drop of about 13 percent to around $8 billion in revenue for the general fund (note that as recently as May, the forecast for next fiscal year was essentially flat). Jindal wisely has promised not to use the Budget Stabilization Fund monies to tackle this year’s deficit because next year’s really will call for these funds. It also cries out for him to dump the maximum amount of funds from the declared fiscal year 2007-08 surplus into it to use next year.
This is serious. The head of my budget unit has called a faculty meeting tomorrow on 18 hours notice just to address this. It’s going to take quite a bit of skill to maneuver this just for this year’s alone so Jindal better be prepared to sacrifice his holidays (the budget must be brought in balance 30 days after a deficit projection or else a special session is triggered).
As for the future, as Jindal wisely has ruled out tax increases that might depress the economy even further, tinkering around the margins as Jindal can do for this fiscal year will be insufficient. Still, to put matters in perspective, the initial revenue forecast after the 2005 hurricane disasters pegged the general fund at $6.6 billion and $700 million worth of cuts made that turned out to be not needed to match realized revenues. If it could be done then, it can be done again.
Months later, wisdom of line item vetoes confirmed
Much wailing and gnashing of teeth occurred this summer when Gov. Bobby Jindal did what he said he would, cut down on state government money going to private interests. He employed his line item veto to excise around $16 million going to 258 nonprofit organizations, and some legislators who had one or more such entities in their districts made disapproving noises about how crippling the lack of funds would be for the organizations.
But Jindal and supporters of these moves pointed out that if these truly were desirable functions being performed, other sources of money would compensate for the loss of state funds, or the organizations would find more efficient ways of doing these things, or government formally would oversee the function. Almost six months later, this is exactly what has happened as opposed to the apocalyptic scenarios some legislators asserted would be the outcome.
Some organizations did find other philanthropic sources. Others relied more heavily on volunteers. Still others found ways to work more efficiently. Many had to cut back services to some degree, but that only demonstrates that perhaps they was an oversupply of that service to begin with or a more efficient way or alternative funding sources could not be found. In all, this demonstrates that government money was not being used as optimally as it should have been, as these other solutions and resolutions existed but had not been implemented precisely because of the free flow of money from government.
This disposition also points out why the system has existed so long, not because it is a good use of taxpayers’ monies, but because it suited the political needs of politicians. Legislators could promise money to these organizations, the members of which no doubt would work for that legislator’s reelection and sing that person’s praises. The governor could use line item veto threats of these kinds of projects to entice legislators to support his initiatives.
By taking the issue off the table, however, these political dynamics no longer apply. It was a bold move by Jindal, unilaterally surrendering this tool of power, but he did so and by his continuing to enforce this standard, the state will be better off.
But Jindal and supporters of these moves pointed out that if these truly were desirable functions being performed, other sources of money would compensate for the loss of state funds, or the organizations would find more efficient ways of doing these things, or government formally would oversee the function. Almost six months later, this is exactly what has happened as opposed to the apocalyptic scenarios some legislators asserted would be the outcome.
Some organizations did find other philanthropic sources. Others relied more heavily on volunteers. Still others found ways to work more efficiently. Many had to cut back services to some degree, but that only demonstrates that perhaps they was an oversupply of that service to begin with or a more efficient way or alternative funding sources could not be found. In all, this demonstrates that government money was not being used as optimally as it should have been, as these other solutions and resolutions existed but had not been implemented precisely because of the free flow of money from government.
This disposition also points out why the system has existed so long, not because it is a good use of taxpayers’ monies, but because it suited the political needs of politicians. Legislators could promise money to these organizations, the members of which no doubt would work for that legislator’s reelection and sing that person’s praises. The governor could use line item veto threats of these kinds of projects to entice legislators to support his initiatives.
By taking the issue off the table, however, these political dynamics no longer apply. It was a bold move by Jindal, unilaterally surrendering this tool of power, but he did so and by his continuing to enforce this standard, the state will be better off.
14.12.08
Fleming takes Democrats' best shot, likely to stay awhile
A year ago, when Rep. Jim McCrery semi-surprisingly announced his retirement, it would have been hard to believe that an obscure coroner from Webster Parish would succeed him. Lessons both locally and nationally may be learned from this.
Dr. John Fleming not only was not considered a contender at the time, he wasn’t even on the radar screen. But after a couple of big names passed as they liked their current situations, local Republicans were presented with a thin bench of elected officials to compete for this due to a mixture of age, inexperience, too much flirtation with the Democrats, or interest in keeping some semblance of a private life.
Still another factor loomed as well – 2008 was not shaping up to be a good GOP year on the national front. When around Baton Rouge a Democrat slid into that seat in a special election months later, that seemed to confirm the trend, and by then it was known a lackluster nominee would head the Republican ticket for the presidency.
This opened up the field for candidates willing to take risks and those who had little connection with government, given the anti-incumbent sentiment that more than anything else was hurting the GOP. Of the three Republicans who finally contested the nomination, only Fleming had any experience in elective office – serving as Webster Parish coroner from 1996-2000 by virtue of racking up about 7,000 votes, and then bowing out after a single term.
With no real record for any of these candidates to fall back on yet unabashedly conservative in their orientations, Fleming ultimately would come out on top because his personal story was the most compelling. Born of humble circumstances, by grit and wit he had persevered to become an extremely successful businessman – the antithesis to what many saw as the typical Washington politician. This was despite his being probably the most conservative candidate in the contest, articulating some issue preferences that on the surface can be easily caricatured negatively but in reality are nuanced, complex, and on the whole comprise very sound public policy.
Fleming then caught a couple of breaks with his Democrat opponent, retiring First District (Caddo Parish) Attorney Paul Carmouche. While Carmouche fit well the Democrat playbook for the South – be conservative on a few, mainly social, issues to mask a willingness to serve liberal interests in Washington – and had a much larger geographical base, the fact that he was a career politician who had not run a campaign in decades not only provided a lengthy record with sufficient negative fodder to publicize, but made it easy to have him appear as just another political insider.
However, as important was Mother Nature which sent Hurricane Gustav to cause postponement of state elections. Without this, the general election would have been held the same day as all national elections; instead, the runoff primaries for party nomination were pushed back to then. Carmouche would show his weakness as a competitor in two ways here: first, when he got forced into a runoff with a black retiree from the rural southern part of the district who spent a tenth of what Carmouche did, and that he, an old-time white politician preaching that he was conservative, depended so much on black voters for support. On Nov. 4, with Barack Obama on the top of the ticket, Carmouche got about 93,000 votes in wining the nomination.
But on Dec. 6, with no other contest on the ballot, in the general election that should have been on Nov. 4, not even 93,000 votes total were cast. Carmouche’s total was only about 47 percent of his runoff total, while Fleming exceeded his total from a month previous by 3 percent. In other words, a significant portion of Republicans who voted for Fleming’s runoff opponent showed up again and voted for Fleming, while many who had voted for Carmouche and his opponent, probably largely blacks, sat out the general election. Had an inspiring figure such as Obama topped the ticket as would have happened without the delay, Carmouche would have won.
Republicans have faced a lot of bad luck this election cycle, with the difference in the presidential election being an economic crisis triggered by Democrat over-regulation of the mortgage industry yet blame placed on Republicans. Yet the postponed election finally got something to break their way, at least in northwest Louisiana. And it’s a break Democrats will rue for years, because the Fourth District’s history is that once elected, a Member of Congress typically stays as long as he likes. Unless he makes some seriously questionable and/or liberal policy choices, Fleming can stay in this seat as long as he likes, thereby adding another chapter to his interesting life story.
Finally, when Republicans were down after Pres. Bill Clinton’s 1992 triumph, the first sign of a turnaround came when a Republican knocked off an incumbent Democrat senator a month later. Two years later, the GOP swept into power on Capitol Hill. Is the Fleming victory a sign that Republican fortunes are rebounding from their nadir?
Dr. John Fleming not only was not considered a contender at the time, he wasn’t even on the radar screen. But after a couple of big names passed as they liked their current situations, local Republicans were presented with a thin bench of elected officials to compete for this due to a mixture of age, inexperience, too much flirtation with the Democrats, or interest in keeping some semblance of a private life.
Still another factor loomed as well – 2008 was not shaping up to be a good GOP year on the national front. When around Baton Rouge a Democrat slid into that seat in a special election months later, that seemed to confirm the trend, and by then it was known a lackluster nominee would head the Republican ticket for the presidency.
This opened up the field for candidates willing to take risks and those who had little connection with government, given the anti-incumbent sentiment that more than anything else was hurting the GOP. Of the three Republicans who finally contested the nomination, only Fleming had any experience in elective office – serving as Webster Parish coroner from 1996-2000 by virtue of racking up about 7,000 votes, and then bowing out after a single term.
With no real record for any of these candidates to fall back on yet unabashedly conservative in their orientations, Fleming ultimately would come out on top because his personal story was the most compelling. Born of humble circumstances, by grit and wit he had persevered to become an extremely successful businessman – the antithesis to what many saw as the typical Washington politician. This was despite his being probably the most conservative candidate in the contest, articulating some issue preferences that on the surface can be easily caricatured negatively but in reality are nuanced, complex, and on the whole comprise very sound public policy.
Fleming then caught a couple of breaks with his Democrat opponent, retiring First District (Caddo Parish) Attorney Paul Carmouche. While Carmouche fit well the Democrat playbook for the South – be conservative on a few, mainly social, issues to mask a willingness to serve liberal interests in Washington – and had a much larger geographical base, the fact that he was a career politician who had not run a campaign in decades not only provided a lengthy record with sufficient negative fodder to publicize, but made it easy to have him appear as just another political insider.
However, as important was Mother Nature which sent Hurricane Gustav to cause postponement of state elections. Without this, the general election would have been held the same day as all national elections; instead, the runoff primaries for party nomination were pushed back to then. Carmouche would show his weakness as a competitor in two ways here: first, when he got forced into a runoff with a black retiree from the rural southern part of the district who spent a tenth of what Carmouche did, and that he, an old-time white politician preaching that he was conservative, depended so much on black voters for support. On Nov. 4, with Barack Obama on the top of the ticket, Carmouche got about 93,000 votes in wining the nomination.
But on Dec. 6, with no other contest on the ballot, in the general election that should have been on Nov. 4, not even 93,000 votes total were cast. Carmouche’s total was only about 47 percent of his runoff total, while Fleming exceeded his total from a month previous by 3 percent. In other words, a significant portion of Republicans who voted for Fleming’s runoff opponent showed up again and voted for Fleming, while many who had voted for Carmouche and his opponent, probably largely blacks, sat out the general election. Had an inspiring figure such as Obama topped the ticket as would have happened without the delay, Carmouche would have won.
Republicans have faced a lot of bad luck this election cycle, with the difference in the presidential election being an economic crisis triggered by Democrat over-regulation of the mortgage industry yet blame placed on Republicans. Yet the postponed election finally got something to break their way, at least in northwest Louisiana. And it’s a break Democrats will rue for years, because the Fourth District’s history is that once elected, a Member of Congress typically stays as long as he likes. Unless he makes some seriously questionable and/or liberal policy choices, Fleming can stay in this seat as long as he likes, thereby adding another chapter to his interesting life story.
Finally, when Republicans were down after Pres. Bill Clinton’s 1992 triumph, the first sign of a turnaround came when a Republican knocked off an incumbent Democrat senator a month later. Two years later, the GOP swept into power on Capitol Hill. Is the Fleming victory a sign that Republican fortunes are rebounding from their nadir?
11.12.08
Cao win puts another nail into Melancon's House coffin
Besides the obvious fact that the biggest loser of Anh “Joseph” Cao’s upset win over Rep. Bill Jefferson was the incumbent himself, next in line is the neighbor to the south, Rep. Charlie Melancon, and Louisiana Democrats as a whole.
A Democrat as is Jefferson, he is the most endangered species in the Louisiana House delegation since every single member other member now is a Republican. The giddy dreams some state party officials must have had now have turned nightmarish; the party had hoped to wiggle out of this election cycle with another Democrat to succeed Jefferson on the Second District, Paul Carmouche to pick up the open seat in the Fourth, and Rep. Don Cazayoux to retain the seat he has won by special election only months early, to give the delegation a majority in the state. Instead, despite all being at least even-money possibilities, all three wishes came up craps.
In the short run, the surviving Melancon (unopposed for reelection) really gains nothing more than he already had. Even had Jefferson won, the indictments hanging over his head would had rendered him largely ineffective as a powerbroker, so Melancon among the state’s House members, being of the same party as the current Congressional majority and incoming president (plus now among the most senior even just starting his third term), would still have been the most influential. But in the long run, the Cao upset along with these other GOP victories makes Melancon’s deteriorating position even worse.
With Louisiana very likely losing a House seat due to reapportionment in 2012, Melancon’s seat remains the most threatened. Three interests will jockey over this process, and two of them have a community of interest that will drive it. Republicans will want to create conditions that will ensure at least five of the six seats remain in their hands, while black Democrats will want a secure seat for themselves.
This cuts out white Democrats entirely, and the other two forces have the muscle to put this through the state legislature. Republicans already effectively control the House and while Democrats control the Senate, black legislators among them will defect on this issue. And of course Gov. Bobby Jindal whose approval is necessary on any plan and could only be bypassed with an impossible supermajority is a Republican.
The idea all along has been to carve up Melancon’s Third District and shifting other districts at the margins. This would allow the Second District to take in majority black areas of the Third and reach into the Sixth and First to do the same to reinforce its current black majority – necessary not only because of general population loss, but as a result of the hurricane disasters of 2005. These with the Seventh then can swallow up the Third.
Just in case black Democrats hesitate, Jindal and his allies can offer them a deal they can’t refuse. With depopulation costing New Orleans as many as five legislative seats, Republicans can offer to save most of these black legislators’ seats in exchange for dismantling the Third. Those affected incumbents will throw Melancon overboard faster than the Silver Zipper can charm a female ex-reporter.
But with the election of Cao, they may not need such inducements. The special circumstances of this contest are not likely to repeat, but they still demonstrate that the seat is not as safe as they might like for a black. Any thoughts they may have harbored about trying to eliminate a Republican seat against the odds to save Melancon’s surely are reduced now.
As 2010 approached, had a black Democrat been ensconced in the Second and Cazayoux or Carmouche or both in office, there would have been less concern about shoring up the majority black status of the Second and perhaps the Sixth or Fourth (likely the latter) would have been more vulnerable for elimination. But the 2008 cycle produced the worst possible outcome for Melancon, meaning this could be his last term. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, in 2010 he may take a chance opposing a slightly vulnerable Sen. David Vitter as the only opportunity to extend his political career past 2012.
A Democrat as is Jefferson, he is the most endangered species in the Louisiana House delegation since every single member other member now is a Republican. The giddy dreams some state party officials must have had now have turned nightmarish; the party had hoped to wiggle out of this election cycle with another Democrat to succeed Jefferson on the Second District, Paul Carmouche to pick up the open seat in the Fourth, and Rep. Don Cazayoux to retain the seat he has won by special election only months early, to give the delegation a majority in the state. Instead, despite all being at least even-money possibilities, all three wishes came up craps.
In the short run, the surviving Melancon (unopposed for reelection) really gains nothing more than he already had. Even had Jefferson won, the indictments hanging over his head would had rendered him largely ineffective as a powerbroker, so Melancon among the state’s House members, being of the same party as the current Congressional majority and incoming president (plus now among the most senior even just starting his third term), would still have been the most influential. But in the long run, the Cao upset along with these other GOP victories makes Melancon’s deteriorating position even worse.
With Louisiana very likely losing a House seat due to reapportionment in 2012, Melancon’s seat remains the most threatened. Three interests will jockey over this process, and two of them have a community of interest that will drive it. Republicans will want to create conditions that will ensure at least five of the six seats remain in their hands, while black Democrats will want a secure seat for themselves.
This cuts out white Democrats entirely, and the other two forces have the muscle to put this through the state legislature. Republicans already effectively control the House and while Democrats control the Senate, black legislators among them will defect on this issue. And of course Gov. Bobby Jindal whose approval is necessary on any plan and could only be bypassed with an impossible supermajority is a Republican.
The idea all along has been to carve up Melancon’s Third District and shifting other districts at the margins. This would allow the Second District to take in majority black areas of the Third and reach into the Sixth and First to do the same to reinforce its current black majority – necessary not only because of general population loss, but as a result of the hurricane disasters of 2005. These with the Seventh then can swallow up the Third.
Just in case black Democrats hesitate, Jindal and his allies can offer them a deal they can’t refuse. With depopulation costing New Orleans as many as five legislative seats, Republicans can offer to save most of these black legislators’ seats in exchange for dismantling the Third. Those affected incumbents will throw Melancon overboard faster than the Silver Zipper can charm a female ex-reporter.
But with the election of Cao, they may not need such inducements. The special circumstances of this contest are not likely to repeat, but they still demonstrate that the seat is not as safe as they might like for a black. Any thoughts they may have harbored about trying to eliminate a Republican seat against the odds to save Melancon’s surely are reduced now.
As 2010 approached, had a black Democrat been ensconced in the Second and Cazayoux or Carmouche or both in office, there would have been less concern about shoring up the majority black status of the Second and perhaps the Sixth or Fourth (likely the latter) would have been more vulnerable for elimination. But the 2008 cycle produced the worst possible outcome for Melancon, meaning this could be his last term. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, in 2010 he may take a chance opposing a slightly vulnerable Sen. David Vitter as the only opportunity to extend his political career past 2012.
10.12.08
Caddo failing schools plan itself not likely to succeed
Newcomer Caddo Parish School District Superintendent Gerald Dawkins has introduced a plan to deal with schools threatened by state takeover, which should receive an answer concering it from the state next week. As befitting a situation where dramatic results must be changed the plan is bold. Unfortunately, it addresses too few of the impediments that have created the underachieving problem in the first place.
To prompt better performance out of failing schools, first one must be clear about why the underperformance happens. No one cause, but several in part interrelated must be addressed before any substantial improvement can occur. They deal with the students’ backgrounds themselves, the competency of the teachers, and the administrative/political environment in which it all operates.
Dawkins’ plan faces long odds because it cannot adequately address all of these considerations. It seeks to create a theme at each subpar school (typically utilizing some already-developed education system), clear all present positions of their occupants and invite open hiring into them, and add instructional and development time among other things. The hope is to attract students from other attendance zones in the district interested in theme areas which (even if this goes unstated) can increase the school’s test scores, as well as to attract better teachers to get students to achieve more.
These outcomes may be realized, but given all of the other inertia they are unlikely to cause the big improvement necessary. The least controllable factor of school performance is the students themselves, more specifically the backgrounds and cultures from which they hail. Simply, in these schools, children disproportionately come from families that do not possess the attitudes and/or abilities to facilitate success in learning.
Regrettably, too many of these children have parents who do not value education and/or are unable to assist their kids in their schoolwork or in providing support that encourages students to stay in school and learn. (Not surprisingly, most of these parents were poor or indifferent students usually if now working in low-paying jobs that afford them little opportunity to give support, creating a cycle of low achievement.) Shamefully, until welfare reform in the past dozen years, these attitudes were encouraged (what was so important about doing well in school if the state would support you regardless?) and it will take a generation to undo the entitlement mentality present in the subculture of underachievement, something Dawkins’ plan can do nothing about.
Teacher competency in their subject knowledge base also contributes. In its initial certification guidelines (and note that schools are not forced to hire only teachers certified in the subject area they teach), Louisiana requires some undemanding demonstration of knowledge, but none to renew certificates. And a large number of teachers still operate under the old certification system where no demonstration of competency is required at any time. Louisiana as many states have done already needs to implement a periodic testing of subject area knowledge of all teachers to make sure only those who demonstrate proficient knowledge of the subject areas they teach be allowed to do so.
But this necessity is a pipe dream as long as current school governance remains unaltered and teachers’ unions given power to prevent the needed changes. Ideally, the best teachers, both in terms of subject competency and in pedagogical skill, would be placed in the worst schools. The central office could create a process offering substantially better pay for teaching in these schools, based upon these two merits demonstrated by some objective process, with it doing the hiring for these schools. That would be needed to get the better teachers in place.
However, this would invoke the wrath of the beneficiaries of the current process, where hiring is done in a decentralized process by principals primarily based upon seniority and who knows whom where the low-performing school are generally the last choice of teachers, and would be opposed bitterly by unions whose main goal is to transfer as much money as possible into the pockets of as many (unionized) teachers as they can and who have vehemently obstructed any efforts at kinds of merit pay or competency testing. Another potential improvement would be to introduce much sterner disciplinary measures for disruptive students, whose behavior disproportionately plagues these schools, but then different political and legal forces would fight these changes as well.
For a vexing problem it’s good to be a big thinker. But one also must understand the root causes of the disease, some of which are beyond schools’ control and others where fundamental political change must occur requiring courage seldom seen within the educational establishment. Dawkins’ plan addresses little of this, and such represents a reshuffling of chairs resting on the deck of a sinking ship.
To prompt better performance out of failing schools, first one must be clear about why the underperformance happens. No one cause, but several in part interrelated must be addressed before any substantial improvement can occur. They deal with the students’ backgrounds themselves, the competency of the teachers, and the administrative/political environment in which it all operates.
Dawkins’ plan faces long odds because it cannot adequately address all of these considerations. It seeks to create a theme at each subpar school (typically utilizing some already-developed education system), clear all present positions of their occupants and invite open hiring into them, and add instructional and development time among other things. The hope is to attract students from other attendance zones in the district interested in theme areas which (even if this goes unstated) can increase the school’s test scores, as well as to attract better teachers to get students to achieve more.
These outcomes may be realized, but given all of the other inertia they are unlikely to cause the big improvement necessary. The least controllable factor of school performance is the students themselves, more specifically the backgrounds and cultures from which they hail. Simply, in these schools, children disproportionately come from families that do not possess the attitudes and/or abilities to facilitate success in learning.
Regrettably, too many of these children have parents who do not value education and/or are unable to assist their kids in their schoolwork or in providing support that encourages students to stay in school and learn. (Not surprisingly, most of these parents were poor or indifferent students usually if now working in low-paying jobs that afford them little opportunity to give support, creating a cycle of low achievement.) Shamefully, until welfare reform in the past dozen years, these attitudes were encouraged (what was so important about doing well in school if the state would support you regardless?) and it will take a generation to undo the entitlement mentality present in the subculture of underachievement, something Dawkins’ plan can do nothing about.
Teacher competency in their subject knowledge base also contributes. In its initial certification guidelines (and note that schools are not forced to hire only teachers certified in the subject area they teach), Louisiana requires some undemanding demonstration of knowledge, but none to renew certificates. And a large number of teachers still operate under the old certification system where no demonstration of competency is required at any time. Louisiana as many states have done already needs to implement a periodic testing of subject area knowledge of all teachers to make sure only those who demonstrate proficient knowledge of the subject areas they teach be allowed to do so.
But this necessity is a pipe dream as long as current school governance remains unaltered and teachers’ unions given power to prevent the needed changes. Ideally, the best teachers, both in terms of subject competency and in pedagogical skill, would be placed in the worst schools. The central office could create a process offering substantially better pay for teaching in these schools, based upon these two merits demonstrated by some objective process, with it doing the hiring for these schools. That would be needed to get the better teachers in place.
However, this would invoke the wrath of the beneficiaries of the current process, where hiring is done in a decentralized process by principals primarily based upon seniority and who knows whom where the low-performing school are generally the last choice of teachers, and would be opposed bitterly by unions whose main goal is to transfer as much money as possible into the pockets of as many (unionized) teachers as they can and who have vehemently obstructed any efforts at kinds of merit pay or competency testing. Another potential improvement would be to introduce much sterner disciplinary measures for disruptive students, whose behavior disproportionately plagues these schools, but then different political and legal forces would fight these changes as well.
For a vexing problem it’s good to be a big thinker. But one also must understand the root causes of the disease, some of which are beyond schools’ control and others where fundamental political change must occur requiring courage seldom seen within the educational establishment. Dawkins’ plan addresses little of this, and such represents a reshuffling of chairs resting on the deck of a sinking ship.
8.12.08
Fat lady sings but Carmouche doesn't yet listen
Democrat candidate Paul Carmouche for Louisiana’s Fourth Congressional District is of a mind to ask for a recount of the results from last Saturday’s contest with Republican Dr. John Fleming, where Fleming came out 356 votes ahead. The way the numbers are, it is the equivalent of coming into the last hole of a golf tournament in second place trailing the clubhouse leader by four shots on a par 5 hole.
At least this is according to national Republican officials, who sent out information Monday about what a recount would entail. Important to note is that the only recounting done is for ballots not counted electronically. Excluded are paper ballots courtesy of early voting procedures by mail, which since they are counted by a scanner typically have a very low error rate. All other ballots are electronically cast and could be recounted only if there is some verified irregularity revealed when they are “opened” tomorrow. (See here for an excellent front-line explanation of what gets counted.)
Therefore, the only place where Carmouche could make up ground would be with provisional ballots – those cast because an election commissioner had reason to believe the voter was registered but for whatever reason was not recorded as being registered to that precinct – and any challengeable spoiled ballots. There are only 36 verified of the former and 171 of the latter (and perhaps an additional 10 potentially spoiled).
But there could be many more provisional ballots in each precinct box containing information from the voting machines. A general rule of thumb from national statistics is that one percent of the total cast end up as provisional, meaning 926 in this case (although Republican operatives estimate there may only be about 200). Further, other rules of thumb indicate that only half of provisional ballots are verified and half of spoiled ballots are reintroduced and declared valid.
If these numbers hold – 463 provisional and 181 spoiled – Carmouche would really have to pull a rabbit out of his hat to win with these. Even if he got 50 percent greater than Fleming on each set (such as a 75/25 split) that’s only 322 votes he makes up. He would have to capture close to 80 percent of the votes (assuming voting machine tallies check and no errors made in tallying already-processed paper ballots which all would have to be non-randomly in his favor) in order to pull ahead.
That seems very improbable given the closeness of the contest. Of course, a higher number of provisional ballots discovered would decrease the margin necessary to win, as would more of them and the spoiled ballots being validated, but these things also would entail a departure from statistical norms, and potentially dramatic ones for a difference to be made. After spending in the neighborhood of $1.5 million to try to take this office, Carmouche can’t be blamed for putting a little more down on a recount, but it looks like it will be just a little more good money after bad for him and an unnecessary taxing of registrar resources and the public’s patience for everybody else.
At least this is according to national Republican officials, who sent out information Monday about what a recount would entail. Important to note is that the only recounting done is for ballots not counted electronically. Excluded are paper ballots courtesy of early voting procedures by mail, which since they are counted by a scanner typically have a very low error rate. All other ballots are electronically cast and could be recounted only if there is some verified irregularity revealed when they are “opened” tomorrow. (See here for an excellent front-line explanation of what gets counted.)
Therefore, the only place where Carmouche could make up ground would be with provisional ballots – those cast because an election commissioner had reason to believe the voter was registered but for whatever reason was not recorded as being registered to that precinct – and any challengeable spoiled ballots. There are only 36 verified of the former and 171 of the latter (and perhaps an additional 10 potentially spoiled).
But there could be many more provisional ballots in each precinct box containing information from the voting machines. A general rule of thumb from national statistics is that one percent of the total cast end up as provisional, meaning 926 in this case (although Republican operatives estimate there may only be about 200). Further, other rules of thumb indicate that only half of provisional ballots are verified and half of spoiled ballots are reintroduced and declared valid.
If these numbers hold – 463 provisional and 181 spoiled – Carmouche would really have to pull a rabbit out of his hat to win with these. Even if he got 50 percent greater than Fleming on each set (such as a 75/25 split) that’s only 322 votes he makes up. He would have to capture close to 80 percent of the votes (assuming voting machine tallies check and no errors made in tallying already-processed paper ballots which all would have to be non-randomly in his favor) in order to pull ahead.
That seems very improbable given the closeness of the contest. Of course, a higher number of provisional ballots discovered would decrease the margin necessary to win, as would more of them and the spoiled ballots being validated, but these things also would entail a departure from statistical norms, and potentially dramatic ones for a difference to be made. After spending in the neighborhood of $1.5 million to try to take this office, Carmouche can’t be blamed for putting a little more down on a recount, but it looks like it will be just a little more good money after bad for him and an unnecessary taxing of registrar resources and the public’s patience for everybody else.
7.12.08
Numbers show disgust at Jefferson likely ousted him
Analysis shows the reason why Rep. Bill Jefferson lost a chance at a tenth term, even if it might have been attenuated, was his black voting base abandoned him at his time of need while disproportionately more non-black voters showed up to give Republican Anh “Joseph” Cao enough margin to knock Jefferson off.
It’s fascinating to review the 91 precincts in the Second Congressional District that have at least 95 percent black majorities with fewer than 2.5 percent whites in them over the Oct. 4 Democrat primary, the Nov. 4 nomination runoff, and the Dec. 6 general election. In this time period they averaged 61,477 registrants or about a sixth of the district’s voters, and it’s no surprise that almost all of them in all three contests returned 95 percent-plus majorities for black candidates (several in the first election, Jefferson in the remaining two). Indeed, in the general election Jefferson swept every vote in 10 of them, while Cao was shut out in another 7.
The problem for Jefferson was, too few of them voted in the general election compared to the others. Turnout in October was only a little under 17 percent in these districts, but swelled to over 37 percent in November. But in December, it plunged to just under 12 percent. In numerical terms, the drop from October to December was over 3,000. Considering that Jefferson would have gotten at least 95 percent of this vote and he lost by 1,826 votes, even a turnout level, all other things equal, matching October’s would have brought him the victory by about 1,000 votes.
Why did turnout fall so incredibly? One clue is to look at the October election’s other contests and compare it to other contests on the ballot. Comparing precincts, there wasn’t a whole lot of difference between the sum total of votes received in the Second District primary and those for other local contests. Important to remember is that Republicans could vote in these other local races, but they comprise only about 11 percent of the district’s total. In other words, in a contest where a range of choices besides Jefferson was available, turnout was roughly equivalent to other contests on the ballot, meaning few of those voting were there only to vote on local races and rolled off on the congressional contest.
Therefore, if all other things were equal, turnout should have been close in December to October levels in these precincts. Instead, it dropped five percent. This would appear to indicate that some who voted in October did not vote in December because their choice was either a damaged Democrat in Jefferson or non-Democrats. Rather than be forced to make such a choice, they stayed home.
This played into Cao’s favor given the dynamics with which he had to work. He saw a boost come from white and Vietnamese constituencies. In October, turnout in the 24 precincts (that comprise over 25,000 registrants) with at least 80 percent of registrants being white and fewer than 5 percent being black, adjusting for Republicans not being able to participate until December turnout was over 28 percent, zooming to about 52 percent in November, and then declining back to about 29 percent in December.
The differentials are striking, especially in December. Typically, black turnout will fall a few percentage points behind that of whites. But the gaps here are unusual, of 11, 15, and 17 percent. The last in particular was stunning and cannot be explained, as Jefferson seems to want to believe, that there was “confusion.” Whites turned out at almost exactly the same adjusted rate October to December, so is it being argued here that whites somehow were less confused? The only explanation that makes sense is that some black, mostly Democrats, in October found someone they could for in the Democrat primary, but in December they felt there was nobody on the ballot for which they could touch the screen, and therefore stayed home.
Even though whites comprise only 31 percent of the district while blacks have twice as high a proportion, white turnout apparently was over 2.5 times that of blacks (this was the scenario for a Cao victory previously outlined). The magnitude of the increased differential suggests that some whites and other race voters who had participated in the Democrat primary defected to Cao. So he not only benefitted from a depressed Jefferson base, but appeared to also differentially benefit from defections. There maybe have been “apathy” among blacks about this election, but let’s be clear about why – it was because of the Democrat nominee.
(Only four precincts have a large Vietnamese population. In the two where other races outnumbered blacks, turnout increased from October to November, and then stayed the same from November to December – likely a boost of about a hundred votes for Cao.)
In the end, Jefferson appeared to lose support in the general election well in excess of what normally would have been expected – likely because of the federal indictments hanging over him – while Cao’s base remained more present and firmer. It’s why this unprecedented situation has occurred where for the nest two years a non-black Republican will represent a district with over half of his registered constituents being black Democrats.
It’s fascinating to review the 91 precincts in the Second Congressional District that have at least 95 percent black majorities with fewer than 2.5 percent whites in them over the Oct. 4 Democrat primary, the Nov. 4 nomination runoff, and the Dec. 6 general election. In this time period they averaged 61,477 registrants or about a sixth of the district’s voters, and it’s no surprise that almost all of them in all three contests returned 95 percent-plus majorities for black candidates (several in the first election, Jefferson in the remaining two). Indeed, in the general election Jefferson swept every vote in 10 of them, while Cao was shut out in another 7.
The problem for Jefferson was, too few of them voted in the general election compared to the others. Turnout in October was only a little under 17 percent in these districts, but swelled to over 37 percent in November. But in December, it plunged to just under 12 percent. In numerical terms, the drop from October to December was over 3,000. Considering that Jefferson would have gotten at least 95 percent of this vote and he lost by 1,826 votes, even a turnout level, all other things equal, matching October’s would have brought him the victory by about 1,000 votes.
Why did turnout fall so incredibly? One clue is to look at the October election’s other contests and compare it to other contests on the ballot. Comparing precincts, there wasn’t a whole lot of difference between the sum total of votes received in the Second District primary and those for other local contests. Important to remember is that Republicans could vote in these other local races, but they comprise only about 11 percent of the district’s total. In other words, in a contest where a range of choices besides Jefferson was available, turnout was roughly equivalent to other contests on the ballot, meaning few of those voting were there only to vote on local races and rolled off on the congressional contest.
Therefore, if all other things were equal, turnout should have been close in December to October levels in these precincts. Instead, it dropped five percent. This would appear to indicate that some who voted in October did not vote in December because their choice was either a damaged Democrat in Jefferson or non-Democrats. Rather than be forced to make such a choice, they stayed home.
This played into Cao’s favor given the dynamics with which he had to work. He saw a boost come from white and Vietnamese constituencies. In October, turnout in the 24 precincts (that comprise over 25,000 registrants) with at least 80 percent of registrants being white and fewer than 5 percent being black, adjusting for Republicans not being able to participate until December turnout was over 28 percent, zooming to about 52 percent in November, and then declining back to about 29 percent in December.
The differentials are striking, especially in December. Typically, black turnout will fall a few percentage points behind that of whites. But the gaps here are unusual, of 11, 15, and 17 percent. The last in particular was stunning and cannot be explained, as Jefferson seems to want to believe, that there was “confusion.” Whites turned out at almost exactly the same adjusted rate October to December, so is it being argued here that whites somehow were less confused? The only explanation that makes sense is that some black, mostly Democrats, in October found someone they could for in the Democrat primary, but in December they felt there was nobody on the ballot for which they could touch the screen, and therefore stayed home.
Even though whites comprise only 31 percent of the district while blacks have twice as high a proportion, white turnout apparently was over 2.5 times that of blacks (this was the scenario for a Cao victory previously outlined). The magnitude of the increased differential suggests that some whites and other race voters who had participated in the Democrat primary defected to Cao. So he not only benefitted from a depressed Jefferson base, but appeared to also differentially benefit from defections. There maybe have been “apathy” among blacks about this election, but let’s be clear about why – it was because of the Democrat nominee.
(Only four precincts have a large Vietnamese population. In the two where other races outnumbered blacks, turnout increased from October to November, and then stayed the same from November to December – likely a boost of about a hundred votes for Cao.)
In the end, Jefferson appeared to lose support in the general election well in excess of what normally would have been expected – likely because of the federal indictments hanging over him – while Cao’s base remained more present and firmer. It’s why this unprecedented situation has occurred where for the nest two years a non-black Republican will represent a district with over half of his registered constituents being black Democrats.
6.12.08
Cao's stunning win shows maturity of Second District
One would have thought that Anh “Joseph” Cao had as good a chance as anyone to turn the majority-black Louisiana Second Congressional District into a Republican seat, at least for two years. He has a rag-to-riches background, faced an indicted incumbent the evidence concerning which was particularly toxic, and had the good fortune for the election to occur in the optimal electoral environment that would attract disproportionately his supporters compared to those of his opponent’s, Democrat incumbent Rep. Bill Jefferson.
But early voting totals seemed to dispel the notion of an upset, combined with the insistence by a large portion of the district’s black voters that comprise 62 percent of the total electorate that when it comes to voting, the absolute necessary condition for any candidate to be eligible to receive a vote is that he is black. For Cao to have any chance of winning, he had to draw disproportionately from Republicans, mainly whites. Early voting indicators showed that wasn’t going to happen. As these results tipped off an overall low turnout, this would have helped Cao only if whites had disproportionately shown up then (signaling the same was likely to occur on Saturday). Instead, the ratio of white-black-other-race turnout was pretty close to the district’s overall ratio.
And yet, Cao pulled off the biggest upset of the 2008 election campaign. I’ll need more time to scan the precincts to give a definitive answer, but two things seemed obvious. First, turnout for the election was just 70 percent of the Democrat/independent-only primary total on Nov. 4 – now about 50,000 Republicans would get a say and looked to ahev turned out disproportionately. Second, while some of the super-black-majority precincts in Orleans (95 percent-plus black registration) had decent turnouts of 20 percent, other turnouts were microscopic – heavily Jefferson, but less than 5 percent. Even a 10 percent turnout in these might have been enough to win Jefferson the election.
Just a couple of days ago, rhetoric such as this was emanating from Jefferson supporters:
“They're trying to disenfranchise us, trying to convince us that it's a wasted vote to go on Saturday and pull the lever for a man who we know is ours,” said the Rev. Samuel Butler, who organized the news conference [Thursday supporting Jefferson]. He didn't elaborate on how he believes Republicans are trying to accomplish [that].
“This district means a lot to us because it was really created ... for the blacks to have representation,” said the Rev. Zebedee Bridges, a longtime Jefferson ally. “I'm hoping that the people in that district don't sit down and let someone walk in and take our rights away from us. You really can't visualize how much this means to us. This is history.”
Such ignorance reflects poorly on the leadership, if any, that these ministers demonstrate. Butler needs to explain how the election of Cao would “disenfranchise” him, blacks, or anybody else. How would the election of Cao in any way show compromising of the right to vote? Bridges desperately needs a history lesson: the district was designed to have black interests represented, not blacks – demonstrated by the fact that the longest-serving holders of the district were husband-and-wife white politicians Hale and Lindy Boggs. And he needs to explain the obviously racist sentiment that somehow failure to elect a black to the office would “take our rights away from us.” Does he mean whites like the Boggs in office did that? Or in Tennessee, does he imply that white Democrat Rep. Steve Cohen discriminates against black constituents in his majority-black district?
One would have thought America was past this with the election of multi-racial president-elect Barack Obama. These people may not be, but the voters of the Second District showed they were.
But early voting totals seemed to dispel the notion of an upset, combined with the insistence by a large portion of the district’s black voters that comprise 62 percent of the total electorate that when it comes to voting, the absolute necessary condition for any candidate to be eligible to receive a vote is that he is black. For Cao to have any chance of winning, he had to draw disproportionately from Republicans, mainly whites. Early voting indicators showed that wasn’t going to happen. As these results tipped off an overall low turnout, this would have helped Cao only if whites had disproportionately shown up then (signaling the same was likely to occur on Saturday). Instead, the ratio of white-black-other-race turnout was pretty close to the district’s overall ratio.
And yet, Cao pulled off the biggest upset of the 2008 election campaign. I’ll need more time to scan the precincts to give a definitive answer, but two things seemed obvious. First, turnout for the election was just 70 percent of the Democrat/independent-only primary total on Nov. 4 – now about 50,000 Republicans would get a say and looked to ahev turned out disproportionately. Second, while some of the super-black-majority precincts in Orleans (95 percent-plus black registration) had decent turnouts of 20 percent, other turnouts were microscopic – heavily Jefferson, but less than 5 percent. Even a 10 percent turnout in these might have been enough to win Jefferson the election.
Just a couple of days ago, rhetoric such as this was emanating from Jefferson supporters:
“They're trying to disenfranchise us, trying to convince us that it's a wasted vote to go on Saturday and pull the lever for a man who we know is ours,” said the Rev. Samuel Butler, who organized the news conference [Thursday supporting Jefferson]. He didn't elaborate on how he believes Republicans are trying to accomplish [that].
“This district means a lot to us because it was really created ... for the blacks to have representation,” said the Rev. Zebedee Bridges, a longtime Jefferson ally. “I'm hoping that the people in that district don't sit down and let someone walk in and take our rights away from us. You really can't visualize how much this means to us. This is history.”
Such ignorance reflects poorly on the leadership, if any, that these ministers demonstrate. Butler needs to explain how the election of Cao would “disenfranchise” him, blacks, or anybody else. How would the election of Cao in any way show compromising of the right to vote? Bridges desperately needs a history lesson: the district was designed to have black interests represented, not blacks – demonstrated by the fact that the longest-serving holders of the district were husband-and-wife white politicians Hale and Lindy Boggs. And he needs to explain the obviously racist sentiment that somehow failure to elect a black to the office would “take our rights away from us.” Does he mean whites like the Boggs in office did that? Or in Tennessee, does he imply that white Democrat Rep. Steve Cohen discriminates against black constituents in his majority-black district?
One would have thought America was past this with the election of multi-racial president-elect Barack Obama. These people may not be, but the voters of the Second District showed they were.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)