A constant refrain we hear from many Louisiana public officials, liberals and Democrats, and their media accomplices (sometimes all three together) is the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans was made worse, both before and after, by Pres. George W. Bush and his administration’s reactions. Obviously, these people either don’t know or ignore the relevant facts showing that on both accounts the real causes hit a lot closer to home.
Before the storm struck, Bush and the federal government gets blamed for not spending enough money, indeed for suggesting cuts, in requests to improve the levees around the city, perhaps as a consequence to fund the war in Iraq, or by tax cuts. But in fact, not only could any amount of money spent during Bush’s term not have improved the situation, enough money to have significantly strengthened the levees was given to local authorities who then chose to spend it on other priorities.
With advancements in technology, only in the past decade or so has there been a realization that the existing levees would come up short relative to a huge hurricane and that it would take decades to fully complete an adequate levee system – one which in fact, given the vagaries of Mother Nature, might never be good enough. However, horribly, it seems that the money and the time once had been available – except that the governing authorities involved, the Orleans Parish Levee District and the state, diverted the funds to other priorities.
8.9.05
7.9.05
Katrina may convert New Orleans into Mexico
One unpredictable impact of Hurricane Katrina will be how the demographic changes it brings, centered in New Orleans, will affect Louisiana’s economy.
For over a century, the city has been in decline. It incompletely made the transition from a commercial capital in an agricultural-driven economy to the same status in an industrial-driven economy, and would have failed to do so without the oil and shipping industries. But when much of the oil industry fled starting 20 years ago, reducing the need for shipping as a consequence, and the city failed to make the transition into the information-driven economy, the steady ride downwards took on more the characteristics of falling off a cliff.
The main source of this decline came from a creeping political liberalism and populism which, ironically, penetrated the city later than the rest of the state but which today retards it more than anywhere else in the state. The New Orleans Ring political machine resisted the socialism of Gov. Huey Long past any other area of the state because it was the power he supplanted.
It then became exasperated by a series of mayors more interested in wealth redistribution, to both the “disadvantaged” and their own cronies, beginning with probably the worst, Bob Maestri, but fortunately followed by two relative reformists, deLesseps “Chep” Morrison and Vic Schiro. However, starting with Maurice “Moon” Landrieu, whose grandest economic idea was to build a storm shelter for uncivilized behavior, things began sliding backwards progressively with Ernest “Dutch” Morial and his son Marc Morial sandwiching the reign on the benign but un-visionary Sidney Barthelemy. (Many had high hopes for current mayor C. Ray Nagin, but his performance relative to the disaster ought to snuff those out pretty quickly. Also worth noting – all were Democrats and, beginning with Dutch Morial in 1978, all were black)
So, for the better part of 35 years, New Orleans has had political leadership that, if not outright corrupt, has been particularly ill-suited to bring development to New Orleans in the modern economy. This has created a city whose population continues to decline dramatically and which disproportionately leaves poorer and higher proportions of blacks in it.
In one respect, Katrina may cause New Orleans to become akin to Mexico, exporting poor people away from an environment that does not hold out much promise for economic development. Those who got out showed a determination not unlike that of illegal aliens (and, in fact, probably faced more hurdles than the typical border-crosser given our lax efforts to protect our southern border).
But while one might be tempted to regard this as a refreshing thing (getting the disproportionate number of the poor out who heavily use government services as a result of their poverty), in fact it probably acts as a curse. It was the mainly the most infirm, most unskilled, and most criminal element that did not leave, who are the greatest burden on government and taxpayers. Worse, joining the more-motivated poor who now reside in places where they can do better, a number of more productive citizens who stayed because of certain attachments, with those attachments now gone, also will never return.
(As a case in point, a friend of mine with an Ivy League degree and an advanced degree had just moved to the city to work in order that he and his wife be closer to her family. Her family lost most everything. Now, he reports they are unlikely to return and will head back east.)
These factors complicate the affirmative answering of the question whether New Orleans can even come close to its pre-Katrina semi-glory, much less reverse its decline. With now even the tourism prop somewhat knocked out from under it, a population disproportionately depleted of its more-capable citizens, and a city and state whose political leadership has had a hard time of mastering concepts which have led to growth elsewhere, New Orleans may continue not just to export it citizens as if it was Mexico, but soon also to look more than just politically like Mexico than the U.S.
For over a century, the city has been in decline. It incompletely made the transition from a commercial capital in an agricultural-driven economy to the same status in an industrial-driven economy, and would have failed to do so without the oil and shipping industries. But when much of the oil industry fled starting 20 years ago, reducing the need for shipping as a consequence, and the city failed to make the transition into the information-driven economy, the steady ride downwards took on more the characteristics of falling off a cliff.
The main source of this decline came from a creeping political liberalism and populism which, ironically, penetrated the city later than the rest of the state but which today retards it more than anywhere else in the state. The New Orleans Ring political machine resisted the socialism of Gov. Huey Long past any other area of the state because it was the power he supplanted.
It then became exasperated by a series of mayors more interested in wealth redistribution, to both the “disadvantaged” and their own cronies, beginning with probably the worst, Bob Maestri, but fortunately followed by two relative reformists, deLesseps “Chep” Morrison and Vic Schiro. However, starting with Maurice “Moon” Landrieu, whose grandest economic idea was to build a storm shelter for uncivilized behavior, things began sliding backwards progressively with Ernest “Dutch” Morial and his son Marc Morial sandwiching the reign on the benign but un-visionary Sidney Barthelemy. (Many had high hopes for current mayor C. Ray Nagin, but his performance relative to the disaster ought to snuff those out pretty quickly. Also worth noting – all were Democrats and, beginning with Dutch Morial in 1978, all were black)
So, for the better part of 35 years, New Orleans has had political leadership that, if not outright corrupt, has been particularly ill-suited to bring development to New Orleans in the modern economy. This has created a city whose population continues to decline dramatically and which disproportionately leaves poorer and higher proportions of blacks in it.
In one respect, Katrina may cause New Orleans to become akin to Mexico, exporting poor people away from an environment that does not hold out much promise for economic development. Those who got out showed a determination not unlike that of illegal aliens (and, in fact, probably faced more hurdles than the typical border-crosser given our lax efforts to protect our southern border).
But while one might be tempted to regard this as a refreshing thing (getting the disproportionate number of the poor out who heavily use government services as a result of their poverty), in fact it probably acts as a curse. It was the mainly the most infirm, most unskilled, and most criminal element that did not leave, who are the greatest burden on government and taxpayers. Worse, joining the more-motivated poor who now reside in places where they can do better, a number of more productive citizens who stayed because of certain attachments, with those attachments now gone, also will never return.
(As a case in point, a friend of mine with an Ivy League degree and an advanced degree had just moved to the city to work in order that he and his wife be closer to her family. Her family lost most everything. Now, he reports they are unlikely to return and will head back east.)
These factors complicate the affirmative answering of the question whether New Orleans can even come close to its pre-Katrina semi-glory, much less reverse its decline. With now even the tourism prop somewhat knocked out from under it, a population disproportionately depleted of its more-capable citizens, and a city and state whose political leadership has had a hard time of mastering concepts which have led to growth elsewhere, New Orleans may continue not just to export it citizens as if it was Mexico, but soon also to look more than just politically like Mexico than the U.S.
6.9.05
Landrieu rhetoric hides her inability to deliver for Louisiana
Sen. Mary Landrieu’s credibility took another hit when, after first criticizing the presidential administration of George W. Bush, she then threatened him, and people in general who criticized New Orleans police or sheriffs, with physical violence.
Granted, no level of government has distinguished itself in response to the crisis (in part man-made by state and local government) provoked by Hurricane Katrina, but that’s the nature of government. It’s inefficient, the nonprofit sector does better and, because it is driven by political rather than market forces, it will let you down a lot. But to blame Pres. Bush yet ignore her own actions simply is dishonest.
We know where the real blame is to be laid if you’re going to assign, and primarily it doesn’t rest with the federal government. But if you are going to blame the federal government, it is disingenuous to declare one official as culpable when your own actions leave you open to the same charge.
Yes, the federal government, under both Republican Bush and Democrat Bill Clinton should have made a greater commitment to flood protection because the Democrat state and local governments were abdicating their responsibility. Yes, the federal response could have been quicker, and may well would have been had Gov. Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin been more competent and less partisan.
But where was Landrieu in all of this? If both the Clinton and Bush Administrations were assigning upgrading of levees a low priority, why didn’t she raise their consciousnesses, having 9 years in office to do so? If she were a really effective senator for Louisiana, she would have succeeded in this task and in the last week she would have provided leadership to have cajoled the obstinate Blanco into accepting federal assistance earlier.
I’ve criticized some state officials here. It’s not the New Orleans Police (whose leaders failed them and drove some to desperate measures) or any sheriffs, but, Sen. Landrieu, go ahead if you like, punch me. Punch me like you’ve used the state and citizens of Louisiana as a punching bag for the past 9 years as our senator. Just in the past couple of years, you’ve voted to support abortion, to increase government spending, against tax cuts, to use taxpayer dollars to support abortion, to rescind tax cuts, to discontinue welfare reform, and against a qualified black nominee to the federal courts. And what have you done exactly to help this state, besides make partisan attacks to hide the fact you’d rather follow an ideological agenda (and try to make excuses for your brother Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu’s tepid response to the crisis and your father Moon Landrieu’s reign as New Orleans mayor which began to city’s slide into ungovernability) than do what’s good for the state?
So, take a swing at me. You can’t hurt me worse than what you’ve already done to this state, and the dishonor you bring it with your outrageous remarks.
Granted, no level of government has distinguished itself in response to the crisis (in part man-made by state and local government) provoked by Hurricane Katrina, but that’s the nature of government. It’s inefficient, the nonprofit sector does better and, because it is driven by political rather than market forces, it will let you down a lot. But to blame Pres. Bush yet ignore her own actions simply is dishonest.
We know where the real blame is to be laid if you’re going to assign, and primarily it doesn’t rest with the federal government. But if you are going to blame the federal government, it is disingenuous to declare one official as culpable when your own actions leave you open to the same charge.
Yes, the federal government, under both Republican Bush and Democrat Bill Clinton should have made a greater commitment to flood protection because the Democrat state and local governments were abdicating their responsibility. Yes, the federal response could have been quicker, and may well would have been had Gov. Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin been more competent and less partisan.
But where was Landrieu in all of this? If both the Clinton and Bush Administrations were assigning upgrading of levees a low priority, why didn’t she raise their consciousnesses, having 9 years in office to do so? If she were a really effective senator for Louisiana, she would have succeeded in this task and in the last week she would have provided leadership to have cajoled the obstinate Blanco into accepting federal assistance earlier.
I’ve criticized some state officials here. It’s not the New Orleans Police (whose leaders failed them and drove some to desperate measures) or any sheriffs, but, Sen. Landrieu, go ahead if you like, punch me. Punch me like you’ve used the state and citizens of Louisiana as a punching bag for the past 9 years as our senator. Just in the past couple of years, you’ve voted to support abortion, to increase government spending, against tax cuts, to use taxpayer dollars to support abortion, to rescind tax cuts, to discontinue welfare reform, and against a qualified black nominee to the federal courts. And what have you done exactly to help this state, besides make partisan attacks to hide the fact you’d rather follow an ideological agenda (and try to make excuses for your brother Lt. Gov. Mitch Landrieu’s tepid response to the crisis and your father Moon Landrieu’s reign as New Orleans mayor which began to city’s slide into ungovernability) than do what’s good for the state?
So, take a swing at me. You can’t hurt me worse than what you’ve already done to this state, and the dishonor you bring it with your outrageous remarks.
5.9.05
Lots of fiscal pain ahead for Louisiana in Katrina's wake
Around a good part of Louisiana, a week ago one could never have known that Hurricane Katrina and its aftereffects dealt a massive blow to the state, as the sun shone and in many parts about life seemed fairly normal. Just how badly will become reflected in state finances for fiscal year 2005-06, and that impact will be felt far and wide, and probably into succeeding years.
The grim fact is the greater New Orleans area has roughly one-third the state’s population and perhaps an even greater share of total state economic activity. This is because the area is home to two high-volume, high-dollar activities disproportionate to the rest of the state, oil and tourism.
There will be some displacement, of course. Some economic activity will flow to other Louisiana cities, Baton Rouge in particular. Higher gas prices will boost severance tax collections a little (even as the reduced volume does the opposite). And with the federal government pledging already $10.5 billion for rebuilding, that (maybe half; we do have to share with Mississippi) is money entering the economy which likely never would have come this way (as are insurance payoff dollars, estimated in the area of $26 billion of which almost 80 percent should come to Louisiana). But the negatives are going to outweigh the positives by far.
We can estimate that 40 percent of sales taxes, severance taxes, alcohol and beer taxes, auto rental taxes, and individual and corporate income get generated through the area. One-third of all of the remaining kinds of taxes and other forms of revenue tied to economic activity we can estimate come from the area as well. And, of course, it generates 100 percent of the land-based casino receipts
Now (and this is being optimistic; for example, do we really think the land-based casino can earn half of what it was projected to?) let’s cut these totals in half for the 2005-06 cycle. Thus, the state may expect only 80 percent of its anticipated revenues in the areas of sales taxes, alcohol and beer taxes, auto rental taxes, and individual and corporate income (let’s move severance taxes to the other category, given higher prices), and only 83 1/3 percent of anticipated revenues from other sources. (A few small revenue sources should not be affected by the disaster, such as interest earnings.)
This leaves the state with a shocking $1.625 billion loss in anticipated revenues for the next year, almost 9 percent of projected revenues for a budget which we hear every year is short on “needs.” Of course, state expenditures will go down because it won’t be making ordinary expenditures particularly around New Orleans and which ones it will be making now will be subsidized by the federal government. Again, though, some of the expenditures (health care, welfare, etc.) will get displaced just as revenues did. And even new ones may get created.
One could argue the state could draw substantial tax revenues from the $25.5 billion or so federal and insurance money coming in. Assuming it all comes in over the next ten months and the state grabs 4 percent of it (sales tax rate on many items; again, this scenario is optimistic), it’s not far fetched to surmise that the fiscal year 2005-06 budget will end up half a billion dollars in the hole.
Your guess is as good as mine where that money will come from, but I can tell you there will be no educator pay raises, no new initiatives, nor even expansions in practically every state program. Indeed, we are likely to see cuts.
So let’s try looking on the bright side. Maybe this looming economic crisis, of a magnitude the state never before has realized, finally will spur long-needed reform efforts. Simple spending priority alterations such as in the way long-term health care is managed (transferring dollars from institutional to community-based care) and elimination of inefficient uses of state monies such as the notorious Urban and Rural (slush) Funds may come about. Hopefully, other efficiencies may be squeezed from a bloated government.
(Keep in mind that this is an optimistic scenario. Not only must reformers grapple with a political culture that thrives on handouts rather than responsibility, but a lot must go right in the rebuilding process. For example, basically there is now no highway approach from the east to New Orleans. Until this is fixed, economic activity will be severely affected.)
Still, these together would probably save only about $125 million a year. Even if in the short run much of the state will see an increase in economic activity, do not be fooled. The huge hole left in Louisiana’s economy will provide plenty of pain for all taxpayers and producers of wealth and, worst of all, a nontrivial portion of this population will choose to do what many other of their brethren have in recent years – leave the state, aggravating matters even more.
The grim fact is the greater New Orleans area has roughly one-third the state’s population and perhaps an even greater share of total state economic activity. This is because the area is home to two high-volume, high-dollar activities disproportionate to the rest of the state, oil and tourism.
There will be some displacement, of course. Some economic activity will flow to other Louisiana cities, Baton Rouge in particular. Higher gas prices will boost severance tax collections a little (even as the reduced volume does the opposite). And with the federal government pledging already $10.5 billion for rebuilding, that (maybe half; we do have to share with Mississippi) is money entering the economy which likely never would have come this way (as are insurance payoff dollars, estimated in the area of $26 billion of which almost 80 percent should come to Louisiana). But the negatives are going to outweigh the positives by far.
We can estimate that 40 percent of sales taxes, severance taxes, alcohol and beer taxes, auto rental taxes, and individual and corporate income get generated through the area. One-third of all of the remaining kinds of taxes and other forms of revenue tied to economic activity we can estimate come from the area as well. And, of course, it generates 100 percent of the land-based casino receipts
Now (and this is being optimistic; for example, do we really think the land-based casino can earn half of what it was projected to?) let’s cut these totals in half for the 2005-06 cycle. Thus, the state may expect only 80 percent of its anticipated revenues in the areas of sales taxes, alcohol and beer taxes, auto rental taxes, and individual and corporate income (let’s move severance taxes to the other category, given higher prices), and only 83 1/3 percent of anticipated revenues from other sources. (A few small revenue sources should not be affected by the disaster, such as interest earnings.)
This leaves the state with a shocking $1.625 billion loss in anticipated revenues for the next year, almost 9 percent of projected revenues for a budget which we hear every year is short on “needs.” Of course, state expenditures will go down because it won’t be making ordinary expenditures particularly around New Orleans and which ones it will be making now will be subsidized by the federal government. Again, though, some of the expenditures (health care, welfare, etc.) will get displaced just as revenues did. And even new ones may get created.
One could argue the state could draw substantial tax revenues from the $25.5 billion or so federal and insurance money coming in. Assuming it all comes in over the next ten months and the state grabs 4 percent of it (sales tax rate on many items; again, this scenario is optimistic), it’s not far fetched to surmise that the fiscal year 2005-06 budget will end up half a billion dollars in the hole.
Your guess is as good as mine where that money will come from, but I can tell you there will be no educator pay raises, no new initiatives, nor even expansions in practically every state program. Indeed, we are likely to see cuts.
So let’s try looking on the bright side. Maybe this looming economic crisis, of a magnitude the state never before has realized, finally will spur long-needed reform efforts. Simple spending priority alterations such as in the way long-term health care is managed (transferring dollars from institutional to community-based care) and elimination of inefficient uses of state monies such as the notorious Urban and Rural (slush) Funds may come about. Hopefully, other efficiencies may be squeezed from a bloated government.
(Keep in mind that this is an optimistic scenario. Not only must reformers grapple with a political culture that thrives on handouts rather than responsibility, but a lot must go right in the rebuilding process. For example, basically there is now no highway approach from the east to New Orleans. Until this is fixed, economic activity will be severely affected.)
Still, these together would probably save only about $125 million a year. Even if in the short run much of the state will see an increase in economic activity, do not be fooled. The huge hole left in Louisiana’s economy will provide plenty of pain for all taxpayers and producers of wealth and, worst of all, a nontrivial portion of this population will choose to do what many other of their brethren have in recent years – leave the state, aggravating matters even more.
4.9.05
Nagin's failure demands new leadership to rebuild New Orleans
It looks like New Orleans is getting back to some semblance of order after the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Good form asks that blame for the things that went wrong not be apportioned until the situation absolutely has stabilized, but good sense demands that, with so many lives and the economic health of the state on the line, that the roadblocks to success be removed.
In a previous post I mused that New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin politically may have gotten a break with his city falling into disaster, that he could evoke sympathy. That was before we knew how extensively Nagin had shirked his responsibility to the city and then tried to blame others for it.
Nagin’s failure to competently discharge his duty began long before the Katrina near-miss cracked levees in Orleans Parish. He appeared not to take seriously disaster preparation even though he has been in office over two years. In retrospect, his plan seemed to be this:
1. Tell everybody to evacuate
2. Whoever doesn’t, get city buses to pick them up and take them to shelters, the primary one being the Superdome
3. When it was over, rescue who needs to be rescued using all public safety forces while pleading for help
It was a plan horribly flawed from the start:
Why did Nagin give an evacuation order only hours before state police would go off the job and allow chaos that slowed the process, as well as not give other enough time or impetus to leave? Shouldn’t he have done so sooner, or at least coordinated efforts with the state police? Granted, people should take their own fates in their own hands, but surely Nagin knew even a brush by the storm would cause huge problems – after all, he was in planning sessions last year that emphasized this. It was obvious to the thousands already fleeing a day before his call at the very least a brush was coming. This late call also impeded buses being rounded up to take those remaining behind away and/or to shelters.
Why did Nagin not ensure that evacuation centers were prepared to handle such a crisis? Instead of pre-stocking them with ample emergency supplies, they had next to nothing. Their plan just seemed to be to stuff as many people as possible into the Superdome and other places with next to no resources and expect them to wait there days with nothing. As SMC’s regional manager, with responsibility for the Superdome, said, “We can make things very nice for 75,000 people for four hours. But we aren't set up to really accommodate 8,000 for four days.” (Then, of course, holes got made in the roof by the storm, which begins to suggest state culpability as well.)
Why did Nagin fail to create the conditions to allow for assistance to be rendered, for at least two days? He should have known, given the levels of crime and Carnival ethos in the city that the second police were told not to, in a word, police, that looting and violence would break out. Nagin’s excuse was the police were to be engaged in rescue operations and that he could understand if people wanted to take food, and seemed genuinely surprised other kinds of looting would take place. Meanwhile, the violence created impeded help from outside. (Of course, had Nagin ensured that the city had planned ahead, it would have had food in shelters, and firemen and medics could have pointed people to and assisted them in getting to these locations while police kept order.)
For three days, Nagin ran around like a chicken with its head cut off, watching his plan fail, until he decided to move on to his Plan B – blame everybody else, especially Pres. George W. Bush. Which perhaps makes us understand why his policies did so little to have the city prepared for the crisis and to cope with it afterward – as is typical with the liberalism/populism that infuses the political culture of this state, especially in New Orleans, he abdicated responsibility and stuck his hand out waiting for somebody else to take charge and give him something.
In a previous post I mused that New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin politically may have gotten a break with his city falling into disaster, that he could evoke sympathy. That was before we knew how extensively Nagin had shirked his responsibility to the city and then tried to blame others for it.
Nagin’s failure to competently discharge his duty began long before the Katrina near-miss cracked levees in Orleans Parish. He appeared not to take seriously disaster preparation even though he has been in office over two years. In retrospect, his plan seemed to be this:
1. Tell everybody to evacuate
2. Whoever doesn’t, get city buses to pick them up and take them to shelters, the primary one being the Superdome
3. When it was over, rescue who needs to be rescued using all public safety forces while pleading for help
It was a plan horribly flawed from the start:
For three days, Nagin ran around like a chicken with its head cut off, watching his plan fail, until he decided to move on to his Plan B – blame everybody else, especially Pres. George W. Bush. Which perhaps makes us understand why his policies did so little to have the city prepared for the crisis and to cope with it afterward – as is typical with the liberalism/populism that infuses the political culture of this state, especially in New Orleans, he abdicated responsibility and stuck his hand out waiting for somebody else to take charge and give him something.
The task of rebuilding New Orleans will be long and arduous, and the area and state cannot waste a moment in doing so. It requires wisdom and leadership that Nagin has shown us he does not possess. The grownups from the federal government seem to be in charge of the situation now, so if Nagin could mature for just one moment he can do what he must in order to maximize the city’s chances of recovery – resign as mayor.
31.8.05
Katrina exposes populism/liberalism's legacy: flooding and looting
Earlier this week, first when Hurricane Katrina damage looked tractable, then when it became anything but, I posted some questions about how, operationally, things were handled leading up to and after the event, with their long-term consequences. Now it’s time to come to grips with the political ideology that has aggravated this whole unfortunate situation.
In some ways, we have brought this on ourselves by permitting and tolerating a political culture that endorses the ideas that there are free lunches, that’s it’s easier to get power by being entertaining and taking care of your friends rather than by pursuing ethical, efficient policies, and that you always can blame your shortcomings on someone or something else (the “wealthy,” “big business,” insert your favorite racial/ethnic and/or religious slur here, etc.) rather than taking responsibility for your own affairs and failures.
While in a global sense we associate these attitudes with political liberalism, more specifically in Louisiana we see its variant populism. And where liberalism/populism deserves blame in all of this is in measures taken before this disaster that were supposed to mitigate it, and in the things that have happened since this horror.
We’ve known for decades that the lack of emphasis on efficiency and/or the outright corruption that so often afflicts public works projects in Louisiana may have contributed to road and bridge collapses, pump failures, and levee breaks that caused the vast majority of damage in the greater New Orleans area. We know that the state would rather spend funds on favored constituencies and slush funds than to use them more wisely, one aspect of which could have been better preparation for something like this. We know that aggressive state taxation and overburdening regulatory policy have been punitive towards exactly those whose energy and activities precisely could bring a change to these inferior sets of attitudes. We know that patronage and preferments run rampant in policy-making.
Nowhere have these attitudes flourished more than in New Orleans, leading to waste, inefficiency and corruption, most egregiously in its police forces. As a result, school achievement sank (when the public schools were not being abandoned), business fled followed by people, and the city began to take on a Third World aspect with burgeoning underemployment, an increasing number of squalid neighborhoods whose people lived in fear lacking confidence in the city and police, and whose industries congregated in the categories of industrial and entertainment and tourism – two of the lower growth, lower value sectors.
And at present the city gets to demonstrate these attitudes further with an unacceptably-large portion of its population now devoted to looting (which is itself another sign of their stupidity; everybody has to leave the city, you can’t take your stolen guns, appliances, cars, even apparel, with you, and they may well be ruined by the disaster’s aftermath or confiscated while you’re gone, so what’s the point?). These thugs have learned the lessons of liberalism all too well, its call for class warfare encouraging these people to think they are oppressed and thus deserve to help themselves to things that they have not earned because they have not contributed enough to society, and its preaching that moral precepts supported by religion be removed from the public square and thus prompt their elimination as a concern in our daily comportment.
Certainly no politician in Louisiana must have wished any of this on the affected area and people. But the fact is, the majority of our statewide officials and legislators, and particularly those in Orleans Parish, are political liberals who share the same basic attitude on this subject of wealth redistribution and religious belief’s relationship to government as do the looters. They must look at themselves in the mirror and come to grips with the fact that, while they prefer to use government to correct what they see as “unfairness,” that looters use direct means, with violence if necessary, to accomplish the same purpose. They need to understand this is how, in the real world, their core ideological beliefs translate into action and consequence.
That realization, along with the complex of liberal attitudes which encourage envy, selfishness, and meanness as part of public policy, should be sobering and encourage these officials to abandon these and instead to pursue policy that lets people keep what is theirs, that provides incentives for productivity, that allows people to live with minimal government interference, and that supports efforts to encourage moral behavior. Others both nationally and internationally don’t get it; let’s hope that our Louisiana politicians do.
In some ways, we have brought this on ourselves by permitting and tolerating a political culture that endorses the ideas that there are free lunches, that’s it’s easier to get power by being entertaining and taking care of your friends rather than by pursuing ethical, efficient policies, and that you always can blame your shortcomings on someone or something else (the “wealthy,” “big business,” insert your favorite racial/ethnic and/or religious slur here, etc.) rather than taking responsibility for your own affairs and failures.
While in a global sense we associate these attitudes with political liberalism, more specifically in Louisiana we see its variant populism. And where liberalism/populism deserves blame in all of this is in measures taken before this disaster that were supposed to mitigate it, and in the things that have happened since this horror.
We’ve known for decades that the lack of emphasis on efficiency and/or the outright corruption that so often afflicts public works projects in Louisiana may have contributed to road and bridge collapses, pump failures, and levee breaks that caused the vast majority of damage in the greater New Orleans area. We know that the state would rather spend funds on favored constituencies and slush funds than to use them more wisely, one aspect of which could have been better preparation for something like this. We know that aggressive state taxation and overburdening regulatory policy have been punitive towards exactly those whose energy and activities precisely could bring a change to these inferior sets of attitudes. We know that patronage and preferments run rampant in policy-making.
Nowhere have these attitudes flourished more than in New Orleans, leading to waste, inefficiency and corruption, most egregiously in its police forces. As a result, school achievement sank (when the public schools were not being abandoned), business fled followed by people, and the city began to take on a Third World aspect with burgeoning underemployment, an increasing number of squalid neighborhoods whose people lived in fear lacking confidence in the city and police, and whose industries congregated in the categories of industrial and entertainment and tourism – two of the lower growth, lower value sectors.
And at present the city gets to demonstrate these attitudes further with an unacceptably-large portion of its population now devoted to looting (which is itself another sign of their stupidity; everybody has to leave the city, you can’t take your stolen guns, appliances, cars, even apparel, with you, and they may well be ruined by the disaster’s aftermath or confiscated while you’re gone, so what’s the point?). These thugs have learned the lessons of liberalism all too well, its call for class warfare encouraging these people to think they are oppressed and thus deserve to help themselves to things that they have not earned because they have not contributed enough to society, and its preaching that moral precepts supported by religion be removed from the public square and thus prompt their elimination as a concern in our daily comportment.
Certainly no politician in Louisiana must have wished any of this on the affected area and people. But the fact is, the majority of our statewide officials and legislators, and particularly those in Orleans Parish, are political liberals who share the same basic attitude on this subject of wealth redistribution and religious belief’s relationship to government as do the looters. They must look at themselves in the mirror and come to grips with the fact that, while they prefer to use government to correct what they see as “unfairness,” that looters use direct means, with violence if necessary, to accomplish the same purpose. They need to understand this is how, in the real world, their core ideological beliefs translate into action and consequence.
That realization, along with the complex of liberal attitudes which encourage envy, selfishness, and meanness as part of public policy, should be sobering and encourage these officials to abandon these and instead to pursue policy that lets people keep what is theirs, that provides incentives for productivity, that allows people to live with minimal government interference, and that supports efforts to encourage moral behavior. Others both nationally and internationally don’t get it; let’s hope that our Louisiana politicians do.
Previously reeling, Orleans schools troubled even worse after Katrina
Foreword: This was the posting I wrote Monday morning, when it was apparent Hurricane Katrina missed New Orleans and the direct damage from it seemed minimal, which I had intended to run later that day:
As if things couldn’t get any worse, the Orleans schools cleanup needs may be more extensive than those created by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
It’s not enough that 65 percent of the Orleans Parish School District’s schools failed state accountability standards, and that the budget is tens of millions of dollars on the negative side, and that the federal government is investigating the whereabouts of $70 million. Now we have confirmation of the system’s financial corruption that shows nobody who should know does know what is going on there – or perhaps that they even care.
The most incredulous aspect to all of this is that the practices of “gaming” the system where allowed to continue year after year. How unaware were the system’s top officials. Summing it all up was the remark made by Interim Superintendent Ora Watson: “I've never worked in a school district where stipends played that big a role in how people got paid. It seemed that it had become, in my opinion, something people began to consider a right.”
How long has Watson worked for this system (I don’t actually know; the district’s website has no biographical information on her)? At least the past couple of years as the deputy superintendent, and she never had an inkling of any of this? This is going to be a real problem if she’s got more of a clue than anybody else in the system that doesn’t even know how many employees it has.
But what should we expect from a school board who fired the previous superintendent who had least tried to make progress, who then assented to Watson in the interim position then nearly replaced her, who fought the appointment of fiscal turnaround experts by calling the enterprise “racist,” and whose president did everything he could to prevent bringing in the experts Alvarez and Marsal?
None of this should have been any surprise to anybody years ago. In 2003-04, Orleans, with 9.36 percent of the average daily membership in state public schools, spent 15.84 percent of the state’s education expenditures. In other words, while the other 67 districts spent $4,709 per student, Orleans averaged a whopping $8,583 per student, over 82 percent more, to deliver the state’s worst education, according to test scores.
Even people with education administration degrees should have figured out a problem existed in Orleans schools long ago and begun to work to correct it. Then again, they probably got favored in this top-heavy, wasteful system. Interestingly, of all education employees statewide, Orleans only had 8.68 percent, but of theirs, 3.47 percent were top administrators – an incredible 27.4 percent of all such positions statewide being in Orleans.
And now there’s the complication of the Katrina aftermath. No doubt millions of dollars will have to be spent on repair of school facilities, by a system whose resource burden already groans under its weight.
Even with the first round of layoffs will 500-700 more to go, somehow the two years Alvarez and Marsal have doesn’t look long enough to salvage this incredible mess. Even if the streets were clear of water and school buildings habitable.
Afterword: Obviously, this analysis has been superseded. Likely the whole fall semester has been wiped out; there is no school system in operation to reform now, and won’t be for weeks. Maybe there won’t be a budget deficit now without any expenses, but infrastructural needs now must be in the tens of millions of dollars. It’s unclear whether the state even has the power to step in and run an entire school district on the basis of this kind of emergency. The cynical could say maybe the dirty flood waters will wash the system’s problems clean away and everything can start anew. Somehow, I don’t think it’s going to be that simple or easy.
As if things couldn’t get any worse, the Orleans schools cleanup needs may be more extensive than those created by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
It’s not enough that 65 percent of the Orleans Parish School District’s schools failed state accountability standards, and that the budget is tens of millions of dollars on the negative side, and that the federal government is investigating the whereabouts of $70 million. Now we have confirmation of the system’s financial corruption that shows nobody who should know does know what is going on there – or perhaps that they even care.
The most incredulous aspect to all of this is that the practices of “gaming” the system where allowed to continue year after year. How unaware were the system’s top officials. Summing it all up was the remark made by Interim Superintendent Ora Watson: “I've never worked in a school district where stipends played that big a role in how people got paid. It seemed that it had become, in my opinion, something people began to consider a right.”
How long has Watson worked for this system (I don’t actually know; the district’s website has no biographical information on her)? At least the past couple of years as the deputy superintendent, and she never had an inkling of any of this? This is going to be a real problem if she’s got more of a clue than anybody else in the system that doesn’t even know how many employees it has.
But what should we expect from a school board who fired the previous superintendent who had least tried to make progress, who then assented to Watson in the interim position then nearly replaced her, who fought the appointment of fiscal turnaround experts by calling the enterprise “racist,” and whose president did everything he could to prevent bringing in the experts Alvarez and Marsal?
None of this should have been any surprise to anybody years ago. In 2003-04, Orleans, with 9.36 percent of the average daily membership in state public schools, spent 15.84 percent of the state’s education expenditures. In other words, while the other 67 districts spent $4,709 per student, Orleans averaged a whopping $8,583 per student, over 82 percent more, to deliver the state’s worst education, according to test scores.
Even people with education administration degrees should have figured out a problem existed in Orleans schools long ago and begun to work to correct it. Then again, they probably got favored in this top-heavy, wasteful system. Interestingly, of all education employees statewide, Orleans only had 8.68 percent, but of theirs, 3.47 percent were top administrators – an incredible 27.4 percent of all such positions statewide being in Orleans.
And now there’s the complication of the Katrina aftermath. No doubt millions of dollars will have to be spent on repair of school facilities, by a system whose resource burden already groans under its weight.
Even with the first round of layoffs will 500-700 more to go, somehow the two years Alvarez and Marsal have doesn’t look long enough to salvage this incredible mess. Even if the streets were clear of water and school buildings habitable.
Afterword: Obviously, this analysis has been superseded. Likely the whole fall semester has been wiped out; there is no school system in operation to reform now, and won’t be for weeks. Maybe there won’t be a budget deficit now without any expenses, but infrastructural needs now must be in the tens of millions of dollars. It’s unclear whether the state even has the power to step in and run an entire school district on the basis of this kind of emergency. The cynical could say maybe the dirty flood waters will wash the system’s problems clean away and everything can start anew. Somehow, I don’t think it’s going to be that simple or easy.
30.8.05
Bad Katrina news gets worse for state
When I wrote yesterday’s posting, the worst it appeared the state would see was in the greater New Orleans area a lot of broken windows, a few flattened structures, and some flooding. It appeared the real destruction in the state would have occurred in the sparsely-populated area near the mouth of the Mississippi.
But that was before more levees broke in Orleans today, and now the place is filling up with water. Unfortunately, the city having been a crime haven, it has shown that again with noticeable looting. As I wrote of yesterday, there will be more political and policy consequences as a result of the further devastation.
At the local level, embattled politicos such as Mayor Ray Nagin and the Orleans Parish School Board will find a reprieve from their critics. Even U.S. Rep. Bill Jefferson may find the heat reduced in a federal investigation that seems to have targeted him.
However, the ripples will be felt all throughout the state. As mentioned in yesterday’s posting, the federal government does not pick up all disaster-related costs; states are expected to pay some. Given the magnitude of the impending disaster, they will not be inconsiderable.
Further, the big bonus the state’s treasury expected from oil now will be curtailed. Prices are up relatively slightly, but the falloff in production even if only for days could cost the state millions of dollars in severance taxes.
This hit to the state budget mostly will be born by current revenues. The state’s emergency spending mechanism would provide only a pittance up against damage of this magnitude. Or, to put it another way, if there’s any special session of the Legislature to be called, it will be to deal with this, not a teachers’ pay raise. That money probably is gone.
I pray for my friends and former colleagues in the New Orleans area, including avid reader of this blog C.B. Forgotston and New Orelans Bulletin blogger John Vinturella and his wife Dr. Susan Howell that the trials they face as a result of this be minimal.
But that was before more levees broke in Orleans today, and now the place is filling up with water. Unfortunately, the city having been a crime haven, it has shown that again with noticeable looting. As I wrote of yesterday, there will be more political and policy consequences as a result of the further devastation.
At the local level, embattled politicos such as Mayor Ray Nagin and the Orleans Parish School Board will find a reprieve from their critics. Even U.S. Rep. Bill Jefferson may find the heat reduced in a federal investigation that seems to have targeted him.
However, the ripples will be felt all throughout the state. As mentioned in yesterday’s posting, the federal government does not pick up all disaster-related costs; states are expected to pay some. Given the magnitude of the impending disaster, they will not be inconsiderable.
Further, the big bonus the state’s treasury expected from oil now will be curtailed. Prices are up relatively slightly, but the falloff in production even if only for days could cost the state millions of dollars in severance taxes.
This hit to the state budget mostly will be born by current revenues. The state’s emergency spending mechanism would provide only a pittance up against damage of this magnitude. Or, to put it another way, if there’s any special session of the Legislature to be called, it will be to deal with this, not a teachers’ pay raise. That money probably is gone.
I pray for my friends and former colleagues in the New Orleans area, including avid reader of this blog C.B. Forgotston and New Orelans Bulletin blogger John Vinturella and his wife Dr. Susan Howell that the trials they face as a result of this be minimal.
29.8.05
Katrina leaves policy, political questions in her wake
I hope and pray that all are safe and damage is minimal in the Mississippi River delta area of the state and offshore, as well as to another of my former areas of residence, southern Mississippi.
As New Orleans and the rest of the area wrings themselves out, there are some things to ponder:
The contraflow system seemed to work much better than last year. This turned highways into double-sized, unidirectional thoroughfares for evacuation purposes. Still, problems remained, specifically, citizen knowledge about the system (available at the State Police website), more efficient diversion of traffic (too many headed only west), and that going west the system stopped after the I-10/I-55 interchange at LaPlace while eastward traffic on I-10 still was embargoed (frustrating many and causing some reckless folks to treat eastbound lanes as westbound lanes)
The Superdome lost parts of its roof, and one must question whether the repairs to it a decade ago were adequate to withstand the winds of a Category 5 storm. When built 30 years ago, the whole structure was supposed to be able to. If not, then it’s a classic example of Louisiana state government, just like with our highways, being pennywise and dollar foolish.
And what of its use as an evacuation center? Emergency protocols should be such that it ought to be able to hold many tens of thousands for days – there’s not a larger or (supposedly) safer structure in the city for this purpose.
And what does this mean for the Saints? Will they have repairs done in time for their home opener 9/18? Even more intriguing, will this affect the negotiations between the team and the state to get out of the lucrative deal the Saints have with it?
Many have argued New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin waited too long to officially issue an evacuation order. Of course, sensible people don’t have to wait on an elected official to tell them what to do and it’s a tough judgment call, but the fact of the matter was the contraflow plan was terminated at 4 PM Sunday, only a few hours after the call went out, in order to protect and better deploy public safety personnel. While there’s no real right or wrong in this situation, political opponents of Nagin may use this against him in his presumed reelection bid next year.
With the breaking of at least three levees in the area, questions can be raised about the quality of them. One never can build a levee that will block all surges from all hurricanes, but were these built to specification, and were the specifications stringent enough?
How much will this disaster cost the state, as ever strapped for money? There will be disaster cleanup costs, of course, despite that the majority of money to accomplish will come from the federal government, some (as much as 25 percent of the total) will come from the state. Also, already an estimated 1 million barrels of oil a day for the short term will be reduced from the affected area and this could be more. This will delay, if not eliminate, this extraction which is taxed by the state the proceeds from which go into state coffers.
Finally, no doubt flood insurance rates will rise as a result – how will this play out in the Legislature, the Department of Insurance, with the federal flood insurance and mitigation programs, and even the costal restoration issue at the federal level?
Like it or not, the answers to or resolutions of these questions will have policy and political impacts in Louisiana.
As New Orleans and the rest of the area wrings themselves out, there are some things to ponder:
Like it or not, the answers to or resolutions of these questions will have policy and political impacts in Louisiana.
28.8.05
To the Caddo Sheriff and Commission: nice try, but try again
Appropriate to my plea that they get on with it, Caddo Sheriff Steve Prator has made an offer to the Caddo Parish Commission that everybody drop legal maneuverings concerning who pays what at the Caddo Correctional Center by ridding the controversy over its central arguing point – housing of one kind of non-parish prisoners.
Essentially, the parish had tried to make Prator pay for “fixed” expenses of the operation of the jail when the law said he only had to cover security operating expenses, minus extraordinary items such as medical care and transportation of prisoners and other potential expenses that can be averted by having labor performed by sentenced prisoners. The courts negated that tactic but said Prator could not bill the parish for other expenses which the parish argues he still does. Prator then informed the parish that he could bill them for some others items he claimed he did not bother to charge the parish. The punch line, of course, is that the ultimate payer in all of this is the same, the Caddo parish taxpayer, regardless of what entity actually sends out the bill and to whom.
Basically, what Prator has suggested is a kind of “nuclear option.” Since the haggling seems to come over the disposition of expenses related to non-parish prisoners, then Prator suggested simply that the CCC not accept any state prisoners. Of course, at an average of 240 such prisoners per 365 days a year at $22.39 reimbursement each by the state, Prator wants to turn down $1,961,364 a year in revenues (Prator estimates the revenue reduction to be $1.8 million annually although because of lag time it would be a year before this fully would be realized).
Essentially, the parish had tried to make Prator pay for “fixed” expenses of the operation of the jail when the law said he only had to cover security operating expenses, minus extraordinary items such as medical care and transportation of prisoners and other potential expenses that can be averted by having labor performed by sentenced prisoners. The courts negated that tactic but said Prator could not bill the parish for other expenses which the parish argues he still does. Prator then informed the parish that he could bill them for some others items he claimed he did not bother to charge the parish. The punch line, of course, is that the ultimate payer in all of this is the same, the Caddo parish taxpayer, regardless of what entity actually sends out the bill and to whom.
Basically, what Prator has suggested is a kind of “nuclear option.” Since the haggling seems to come over the disposition of expenses related to non-parish prisoners, then Prator suggested simply that the CCC not accept any state prisoners. Of course, at an average of 240 such prisoners per 365 days a year at $22.39 reimbursement each by the state, Prator wants to turn down $1,961,364 a year in revenues (Prator estimates the revenue reduction to be $1.8 million annually although because of lag time it would be a year before this fully would be realized).
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)