From the beginning, organizers of
the effort to create the city of St. George, which would be comprised of
unincorporated land, have said this is a way to facilitate formation of a
district separate from the East Baton Rouge Parish School System. Within the
past couple of weeks, at a gathering of area leaders, a couple of them reiterated
that very point.
Historically,
the state never has had a school district that was not coterminous with the
boundaries of a parish or municipality, and the last one to come to life,
Central Community School System, did so only
after the separate city of Central was formed. In order to have a separate
district in education, the Legislature must enable it by statute, and the
Constitution must be amended to provide a funding mechanism. On its second try
earlier this year, the enabling legislation was passed, but it cannot operate
until funded.
Organizers have taken some opponents
at their word that if it takes a municipality to form district around (which would
have different boundaries than the one already in law), then that’s what they’ll
do. But now some
opponents either are backtracking on this impression (among the state legislators
of the bunch, many turning hypocrite after having voted for the district’s formation)
or revealing that they opposed the district idea all along, stating that city
creation will not influence their views on the school district. This includes
state legislators with votes here more crucial than ever given the two-thirds
requirement in the Legislature to put up an amendment; the last attempt fell 12
votes short of the supermajority requirement in the House of Representatives.
Yet in doing so, they follow and
old political maxim that political forces by their rhetoric and actions tell us
what they really fear: in this case, the incorporation more than the new
district in that they insist incorporation won’t get supporters closer to
having a district. If they did not fear the new city more than the new
district, there would be no reason for them to telegraph the way they would vote
on the district.
They react this way because
expanding the area of conflict threatens the power and privilege of more
political elites than just those on the EBRPSS and provides
an opportunity to set those groups against each other in terms forcing decisions
about cutting losses. By manufacturing a scenario for those elites not
connected to the EBRPSS where they can risk much more by continuing to fight
incorporation in order to stave off creation in losing both than by
capitulating on the creation question and saving territory, supporters can play
off this increased leverage to make more attainable their initial goal of
district operation.
As the organizers have posed
rhetorically, it is easier to get 20,000 signatures (a bit more than needed to
get an incorporation vote in the area) than 70 House votes. To the EBR elite,
this reality is the doomsday weapon that more of them than not, even if they do
not admit so publicly, think would trigger a successful plebiscite. And given
those odds, they would rather “sacrifice” the school district (which as presently
constituted is smaller in land area) than “lose” it all.
Organizers surely realize this,
and this points to the appropriate strategy. Before next year’s legislative session
begins they probably will hit the magic number of around 18,000 signatures to
call the election for St. George establishment. When they have that amount in
petitions in their hands, they should announce that and that they will continue
to gather more for good measure – but that if the Legislature acts to pass the
necessary amendment to put it up to a vote next fall this session, they will
halt efforts and not turn in the petitions. Further, knowing that some
signatories do see the city as the primary need, they can pledge to turn them
over eventually to any group that wishes to use them – but only after the
amendment has faced a vote (there is no time limit on the signature-gathering
process) and pledge to work against future incorporation vote that could come
from those petitions. But if the Legislature fails on amending, then they pull
the trigger and dump the petitions off at the Secretary of State’s office.
Such an offer probably is one
that can’t be refused. While school district elites get hung out to dry, others
risk nothing with acceptance. Organizers can facilitate this by reasserting
what they have wanted all along is a vote on the district and proving it by
promising they will try to help defeat any subsequent incorporation effort
regardless of amendment passage. This makes for the clincher that a deal of
this nature allows opponents the faint hope that they could have it all, on the
slim chance that statewide voters would turn down the constitutional change
(unlikely as these kinds of amendments typically elicit deferral from voters
outside the affected area, thinking that if a majority in the affected area
wants something, who are they to veto that).
Of course, not yet being at that
point organizers would not want to admit to this, because they’re still
building their doomsday device with the help of some who want it genuinely used
for its intended purpose. Yet once that is done, they can argue convincingly it
was better to go for the sure thing and achieving smaller goals, and also point
out incorporation movements still are free to form and try to go for the whole
hog, although without their help.
Just as one political maxim
interprets opponents’ behavior on this issue, another tells us about its
supporters: if political actors keep saying they want to do something, if the
opportunity arises they’re probably going to try to do it. In East Baton Rouge,
for those outside of the city disappointed
in the choices made by ruling political elites, it’s always been about the
quality of schools. If as part of the incorporation saga they can coax a deal for the chance to put education in their own hands in exchange for
jettisoning the rest, they’ll take it.
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