LA judicial selection method change desirable

From the inception of this blog, time after time after time after time it has implored the state to change its method of judicial selection. The case of Democrat 19^th Judicial Judge Eboni Johnson Rose invites a reminder of this.

Rose recently was suspended, with pay, entirely from the bench, which in Louisiana is done upon recommendation of a panel of judges, lawyers, and other citizens appointed by various levels of judges collectively called the Judiciary Commission and ratified by the Supreme Court. It’s the most serious sanction possible, keeping her off the bench even before the Commission completes an investigation. While those details are confidential for now, a series of questionable decisions in just her first three years in office apparently led to this punishment that assumes justice from her bench would be severely compromised were she allowed to continue presiding over cases.

Of course, the quality of her decision-making, if not competence, were unknowns when she secured her spot, through an election which in no way guarantees a quality judge will be selected, just one who can collect a majority of votes. Generally speaking, the Commission and Court are quite loath to intervene in these cases, as it involves for some Commission members and for the Court other judges supposedly there at the behest of the electorate.

These kinds of concerns largely could be ameliorated were partisan election and only partisan election weren’t the method of selection. Indeed, Louisiana’s is the most hyper-partisan-election of all, as the only state with partisan elections and defined judicial districts at the intermediate appellate and court-of-last-resort levels (as opposed to at-large elections).

A more reliable way to avoid clunkers would impose a kind of screening test used in over a dozen states, through a nomination commission. Basically, a panel whenever a vacancy is in the offing would nominate a slate of individuals (for a district from that district or at-large) that an appointer, a governor or legislature, would choose from to fill the spot.

To refine this more as well as leave some element of popular accountability, after at least two years (which could be closer to four years if a special election were needed by a vacancy prior to a term’s end – six years for district judges, ten for appellate and Supreme Court justices – as if fewer than two years would pass before an unexpired term ended, then appointment would occur again) an election could be held for retention only for that judge who may use a partisan label where a supermajority (60 percent is one commonly used in other states) allows filling out the rest of the term, but failure to achieve that restarts the process. Succeeding elections also are in this fashion, until the judge vacates the office or reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 prior to the start of the next potential term.

For Louisiana, perhaps there could be a nomination commission of three appointees by the governor and two each from the attorney general, House Speaker, and Senate President, serving concurrently with these elected officials., where one from each must be a member of the Louisiana bar. They could nominate three (a number commonly used in other states) individuals for each open position for potential gubernatorial appointment. An individual rejected in a retention election could not be renominated for at least two years.

Note that while the commission may be tilted heavily, if not entirely, towards one political party, minority party judges wouldn’t be shut out because of the retention elections. Unless an appointee fits the electoral proclivities of the district, he won’t gain the supermajority of the electorate required, which unless that it taken into consideration by nominators and the governor would lead to an endless cycle of retention elections and short-termers.

This system increases the chances of a quality appointee through the initial vetting instead of the crapshoot of an election, but also gives the public a chance to weigh in after a couple of years of data. Note that it won’t really attenuate present choices in practice, since under the current system few sitting judges even are challenged and almost none are defeated.

I can dream away of course, such as with a complete overhaul of the state’s organization that reduces the number of the state’s judges, so, as long as I am at it, maybe this, which also runs against the grain of progressive political ambition for lawyers, legislators, and judges, will come true as well.