Ignore distorted criminal justice change claims

Don’t drink the Flavor Aid when it comes to criminal justice changes made in Louisiana five years ago, which when properly analyzed haven’t demonstrated significant savings or made Louisiana any safer, if not the reverse.

Back then, initial efforts commenced to decrease incarceration levels in the state by reducing punishments and not imprisoning more nonviolent offenders. Supposed savings in part would go to measures to reduce recidivism and assisting juvenile offender programs, and the main gatekeeper and partial beneficiary of the shift in dollars, the Department of Corrections, issued a report alleging over the span $152.6 million in savings attributed to the changes.

It concluded this from the declining number and length of incarcerations, with nonviolent criminals dropping by over half from 2016-21 although violent criminals' numbers ticked up by almost 10 percent, resulting in just over a 10 percent reduction in state prisoners and around 35 percent in local jails. Statutorily shorter sentences and increased use of probation decreased time spent imprisoned except for nonviolent sex offenders.

However, the report has noticeable flaws that erode its validity. First, it blindly assumes that changes in prison population occurred solely as a result of the changes, which missed two more consequential sources of criminal behavior and corrections. Since the dawn of data-driven approaches to crime, researchers have acknowledged the most important factor in explaining crime rates comes from the proportion of population comprised of younger males. As this changes, the crime rate strongly varies directly with it.

Reviewing the period, in Louisiana the proportion of its people aged 19-34 declined in 2016 from 21.9 to 20.6 percent, while in the country as a whole this went from 21.4 to 20.8. This would produce a significant fall in the pool of criminal behavior thus present fewer prisoners for incarceration independently of the policy decisions of 2017 and 2018.

It also should have reduced the crime rate. Instead, violent crime spiraled upwards, in Louisiana rising from 565 to 639.4 (through 2020) per 100,000. Nonviolent crimes, with the exception of motor vehicle theft, did decrease. That 2020 featured mainly commercial restrictions due to the Wuhan coronavirus pandemic that could influence crime rates may make conclusions drawn from this less reliable.

These trends point out the second difficulty in establishing whether the legal changes led to savings: an increased propensity for some prosecutors not to prosecute and judges to give lighter sentences. For example, with a change in district attorneys in Orleans parish in 2020, prosecutions became fewer and for reduced charges, while judges in the Monroe area in recent years have gone easier on convicts. These actions independent of what statute says will send fewer people to prison for less time served.

Finally, the report doesn’t mention that because of the dramatic fall in state prisoners going to local jails the Legislature raised the daily payments going to local law enforcement agencies, as their fixed expenses hardly declined with reduced caseloads, as a means of enticing continued local participation. This added tens of millions of dollars a year to costs not accounted for in the report.

In sum, the lower number of state prisoners the report claims came as a result of the changes was influenced by factors that had nothing to do with changes, such as demographics and differing attitudes by judges and prosecutors, so the “savings” are overstated. Further, that computation doesn’t acknowledge additional costs imposed by the changes. To determine the actual savings, if any, a much more sophisticated analysis including these other factors is needed.

Worst of all, it’s uncertain whether the changes made Louisianans any safer. Violent crime and motor vehicle thefts surged through most of the period presented, but from a chicken-and-egg perspective it’s more likely the decline in nonviolent crime overall came from factors exogenous from the changes, causing fall in such imprisonments, rather than less imprisonment (such as more use of probation, more services to reduce recidivism, etc.) reducing the commission of these crimes.

Claims in the report of vast savings from the changes are overbroad and not to be trusted. More importantly, other data cast doubt that the changes had a significant positive impact on level of criminal behavior, particularly of the violent kind. As such, policy-makers should minimize its conclusions when assessing the changes’ programmatic and societal impacts.