While
the state requires diversion programs – which allow a defendant to skip
judicial proceedings and accept some kind of punishment for an alleged crime – in
a couple of instances, except for prohibiting some serious matters it leaves
whether to have such a program and its scope in then hands of the individual
authorities, essentially district attorneys or city prosecutors. Within these parameters,
authorities basically do what they want, subject to a 1993 state
attorney general’s opinion that declares these activities can’t enrich
offices beyond the costs to run them.
This
has allowed, particularly in the last few years, many judicial
districts to begin authorizing diversion for a host of crimes, often
dealing with traffic. This proves easy for DAs, as they exist as a separate government
entity as opposed to municipalities’ legal departments that enforce ordinances.
For a fee paid directly to the DA, those who draw citations have the DA drop
the charges.
That
usually turns out to be a good deal even for the innocent. Even if the fee turns
out pricey – this can run into the hundreds of dollars – these levies still
cost less than if convicted in court with higher insurance costs to follow or defense
expenses.
These
also turn out to be a good deal for DAs. While their record-keeping
leaves something to be desired, altogether they rake in tens of millions of
dollars annually – money that in part otherwise would have gone to other parts
of the criminal justice system – through diversion. It also skews law
enforcement priorities, when DAs go out and take these gains to pay for
increased patrolling that generates more diversion business.
Which
has caught the eye of critics, causing a complaint
filed last week by the Southern Poverty Law Center asserting that some
activities fall outside the permissible scope, as defined by the opinion. It
accuses some DAs of enriching their offices and/or distributing proceeds to
other agencies in contravention of that opinion.
But
that’s all the special interest group can do, file an ethics complaint. No other
legal avenue exists since the law itself doesn’t address the matter, with only
the Code of Criminal
Procedure defining prosecutorial discretion and no specific criminal behavior,
outside of the instances of impaired driving and sex crimes, defined by the
state.
As
such, the Legislature should step in and bring clarity to the issue. It should
take a very comprehensive approach, first by defining crimes allegedly committed
eligible for intervention programs. Not all infractions currently part of
programs may best increase public safety through the tactic. Also, new standards
must remove DA
discretion in determining who may participate, to prevent favoritism.
Also,
lawmakers should create or delegate authority to create regulations about the content
required in diversion programs, to ensure a genuine effort goes forth to educate
away from committing the crime again. As part of this, they must define clearly
what costs can tie to program revenues, with an eye on the process to reeducate,
and prohibit revenue-sharing with other agencies.
Finally,
these policy-makers have to spell out reporting requirements. This increases
accountability as well as gives an idea about whether elements of or the entire
program works cost-effectively.
The
current open-ended nature of these programs presents too much latitude that
lets DAs stray from what should be their sole purpose – reducing the crime rate
through wise use of citizens’ resources. Only state government action seems
likely to guarantee this.
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