At issue is the court’s ruling in case
#2013-C-2879, which orders a Catholic priest to answer questions potentially
about the content of information he heard from a then-minor female five years ago.
The girl allegedly was abused sexually, told the priest in confession, who then
it is argued did not follow the law. This is relevant to a suit filed by the
girl’s family against the family and business of the reputed abuser and, later
added as plaintiffs, the Diocese of Baton Rouge and the priest; the alleged
abuser died not long after the reputed confessional sessions took place.
Louisiana law generally grants an
exception to its mandatory reporting law to clergy when the communication of
possible abuse of a minor or other crime comes as part of confidential communication
relevant to the performance of a professional duty; in this instance, the
sacrament of confession. However, the law (Code of
Evidence) also states that the receiver of the communication “shall encourage
that person to report the allegations to the appropriate authorities.” Also (Children's Code) stated is that "Notwithstanding any claim of privileged communication, any mandatory reporter who has cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare is endangered" by alleged conduct has a duty to report.
The suit seeks to discover whether that advice was given and if the priest thought there was endangerment, being that this at best is a judgment call and it's entirely possible the way it was communicated he did not think so. The Court says these may be discovered because it interprets the law to put the locus on what is treated as such communication in the hands of the sender of that communication, and the girl has made public what she said was communicated by both parties in a series of confessional sessions.
The suit seeks to discover whether that advice was given and if the priest thought there was endangerment, being that this at best is a judgment call and it's entirely possible the way it was communicated he did not think so. The Court says these may be discovered because it interprets the law to put the locus on what is treated as such communication in the hands of the sender of that communication, and the girl has made public what she said was communicated by both parties in a series of confessional sessions.
Contrary to what some states do,
Louisiana law does not unambiguously envelop both the sender’s and receiver’s
intent as to when a communication falls under this kind of confidentiality (saying only that a receiver may speak on behalf of the sender). In
other words, with privilege assumed only to be that of the sender as the Court
ruled, the sender may invalidate that confidential nature of the communication
without agreement or consent by the receiver of it, thereby in the eyes of the
law forcing the receiver to give information about it.
Unfortunately, that runs directly
afoul of Church canon law. Canon 983.1 of the
Code of Canon Law states, "... [i]t is a crime for a confessor in any way
to betray a penitent by word or in any other manner or for any reason” – not even
to save a life including his own or others’. So perhaps while the Church would
hope that secular law reflects canon law, in Louisiana on this matter it does
not because that secular law does not explicitly note that even if the sender
of the communication reveals his version of that, the receiver of it cannot be
compelled legally to reveal his version.
Louisiana’s Preservation
of Religious Freedom Act does not seem to apply here, as it is based upon
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the federal level version
of the law does not apply to state laws. But that this exemption regardless of
the sender’s action exists is implicit
within the Establishment Clause does seem very plausible; to disallow the
ability of a long-standing religion in America to protect an integral part of
the practice of its faith, applying the sacramental seal to every instance of
confession, restrains insufficiently government power that can control the
practice of that religion to make it act as an appendage of government (in this
instance, collecting evidence relevant to its arbitration of civil relations,
where that evidence may never have existed unless the sacramental seal of
penance was in effect).
In an unusual
public response to the matter, the Diocese asserts that it will pursue
legal action that would have to demonstrate that the Louisiana Supreme Court,
even if following state law, violated the U.S. Constitution with that ruling
because of its interpretation of the law that does not clearly extend privilege
to both parties. As well it should, for such a ruling clearly erodes religious
liberty in the U.S. If that happens, then the U.S. Supreme Court can use this
case to affirm that such privilege exists in both parties as a result of the
Establishment Clause, clarifying a matter of law and entering the case into the
jurisprudential history books.
While a legislative solution to clarify is desirable and should be pursued, that cannot and does not help now and would apply only to Louisiana. To help protect religious freedom both in state and across the country, the Diocese should proceed with its legal challenge forthwith.
While a legislative solution to clarify is desirable and should be pursued, that cannot and does not help now and would apply only to Louisiana. To help protect religious freedom both in state and across the country, the Diocese should proceed with its legal challenge forthwith.
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