In granting
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs who argued that Louisiana’s
constitutional ban on recognizing any marriage besides that of a single man to
a single woman violated equal protection, due process, and freedom of speech,
Feldman exposed the poverty of that argumentation. He also tackled a root
question prior to this, what kind of burden of proof states needed to regulate
in this area.
While plaintiffs argued that the
highest burden of proof was needed, thus reducing the ability of states to be
able constitutionally to regulate marriage, Feldman demonstrated in fact the
lowest was applicable, and in his opinion served notice that even if the highest
were used, the justifications as such – the state having a legitimate interest
in linking children with intact families formed by their biological parents and
by ensuring fundamental social change occurs by social consensus through
democratic processes – might well be just as compelling for that standard as
the lowest. (He didn’t address another justification, not mentioned by the
defense, facilely dealt with in Hebert
v. Kitchen, that the state has a compelling interest in promoting
procreation.)